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Editorial:

Environmental Histories of Mediterranean Fascisms

Guest Editors

Marco Armiero

Roberta Biasillo

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1 Fascism and nature in historiography

THIS special issue aims to explore the environmental dimension and engagement of Mediterranean fascist regimes inclusive of their colonial possessions. Methodologically, this has firstly implied to go beyond the narrow understanding of environmental history as a discipline putting at the centre of its analysis natural or ecological elements and, secondly, to bridge environmental history with political and social history, and other historical subfields. Among the many themes touched in this volume, we would like to stress three more significant and overarching issues: reclamation as a material and ideological regeneration of people and places; modernity as the ideology through which fascist regimes employed science and technology to create socio-ecologies at the service of their goals; and colonization (internal and external) as the concrete laboratory where reclamation and modernity were experimented as forms of control, regime-building, and oppression.

Blending fascist studies and environmental history sounds like an unconventional scholarly enterprise. Seemingly, this is because the former addresses complex and contradictory mixtures of traditionalism, racial and scientific positivism, anti-liberalism, corporatism, authoritarianism, but also modernist ideologies and innova-

tive forms of mass communication and mobilization. Whereas the latter is an academic discipline attentive to processes of natural depletion and conservation, and also considered quite progressive, we might argue. Even more than that, fascist studies and environmental history form an odd couple because the first line of enquiry is actually one of the most well-established areas of interest for historians of modern times, while the latter is often seen as a rather marginal or emerging field of studies, especially in the Mediterranean countries. Finally, fascist and environmental histories form an unusual combination because according to traditional sub-disciplinary boundaries, environmental historians should not be concerned about themes like fascism. Quite the opposite, they should dedicate themselves to the confined niche of "the environment" (Armiero 2016). In this sense, our special issue questions the narrow understanding of "the environment" and propose a vision of our discipline not in terms of themes but rather of perspectives.

The articles hosted in this special issue help clarify our vision. Not all of the authors would in fact define themselves environmental historians and, rather than checking disciplinary IDs at the borders of this special issue, we have opted for welcoming whoever was interested in looking at the fascist histories in their intertwining with nature and for learning from these mixed

gazes. For us the challenge has never been to speak within our networks yet we have tried to reach the broader history community. We aim at proving that environmental history is not about an obvious set of "natural" objects but it entails to consider the socio-ecological relationships embedded into the stories we tell about the past. Thereby, with this special issue we contribute to answer the fundamental question John McNeill has posed almost ten years ago:

Sometimes environmental history seems too tangential to the main concerns of other historians. What can it tell them about the big issues that have preoccupied historians for generations? What can it say about empire, war, revolution? What can it say about issues that have preoccupied the last generation, such as gender, identity, or slavery? (McNeill 2010, 357)

2 Beyond nation and politics: new approaches to the history of fascism

Fascist regimes have represented crucial themes for generations of historians of different backgrounds who have explored almost every aspect of those historical phenomena. A large portion of such research has been conducted on the national scale. Hundreds of publications have explored different aspects - from gender to corruption, from science to education - of Italian, Portuguese and Spanish fascisms, for instance. Domestic policies concerning social, demographic, economic and cultural realms reinforced the vision of fascism as a work-in-progress, often a contradictory political movement. Since the 1960s, fascism has also been addressed as a European phenomenon, *The European Right* to echo the title of the volume edited by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (1966). A comparative approach allowed historians to outline a single framework encompassing several national regimes. Along with numerous recent studies describing European fascism as an ongoing formation rather than a static object (Riley 2010; Lewis 2003), Robert Paxton proposed five stages characterizing the evolution of any fascist regime: the creation of the movements; their embedding in the political system; the seizure of

power; the exercise of power; and "finally, the long duration, during which the fascist regime chooses either radicalisation or entropy" (Paxton 2004, 32). Conversely, the value of comparative history has been undeniable in stressing national variables and divergences (Roberts 2002). In relation to Mussolini's regime, historian Emilio Gentile has defined fascism as an experiment in political domination (Gentile 2002). Undeniably, among national fascisms, the Italian dictatorship plays a key role in this historiographical realm (Bosworth 1998; Pollard 1998; Dahl 1999; De Grand 2000; Elazar 2001). Measuring how much a certain regime looked like the Italian one became the ultimate test to establish its level of fascistization.

Overcoming national boundaries and comparative approaches, recent research are looking at the international connections among diverse national experiences and the circulation of ideas, practices, and sets of knowledge. As explained by Ángel Alcalde,

After the transnational turn, historians instead see fascism as a single transnational and global phenomenon that violently expanded throughout Europe and beyond by processes of transfer, mutual inspiration, hybridisation, interaction, entanglement and cross-border exchange (Alcalde 2020, 243-44)

This transnational interpretation of fascism transcends the classic dichotomy between Italian fascism and German national-socialism and shows how internationalism coexisted with the fundamental ultra-nationalist character of the numerous fascist movements and regimes in interwar Europe (Bauerkämper and Rossoliski-Liebe 2017; Dagnino, Feldman, and Stocker 2019; Law 2019). From the United Kingdom to the Balkans and from the Iberian Peninsula to Ukraine, ultra-nationalists and conservatives primarily looked towards Rome and Berlin for ideological inspiration. Yet transfers did not come without alteration. In an essay published in 2017, Aristotle Kallis, who in the past theorised useful analytical concepts such as "fascistization" and "hybridization", proposed the notion of "recontextualization": a reframing of an object or idea into a new context through active adaptation, filtering,

selection and addition (Kallis 2017, 51).

The extent to which fascist ideologies and movements reached out beyond Europe to become global phenomena is generating an extensive debate (Jacoby 2016). Power politics, world order and territorial expansion added the category of expansionism to the generic attributes of fascist ideology and practices (Hofmann and Hedlinger 2017). As the articles in this special issue will show, the long-held assumption that fascism was essentially a European phenomenon would no longer resist critical scrutiny and the inclusion of colonies in historical reconstructions of fascisms is unsettling Eurocentrism and decentring their geographies.

Together with the emerging interest in transnational and global entanglements of fascism, over the last decade, historians started to explore fascism through the entry point of the environment (Staudenmaier 2004, Armiero 2014). Since the 1980s Anna Bramwell's controversial thesis about an alleged green wing of the Nazi party (Bramwell 1985), there has been a growing interest on the topic, generally quite critical of Bramwell's argument. While most of the scholarship has focused on the German case (Brügge-meier, Cioc, and Zeller 2005; Blackbourn 2006; Uekoetter 2006) - and the same Bramwell was sceptical of the green attitude of other radical right regimes - , new research on other fascist regimes started to emerge (Swyngedouw 2015; Saraiva 2017; Gorostiza 2017; Valencia-García 2019; Hardenberg 2021; Armiero, Biasillo, and Hardenberg Forthcoming). Those studies have clearly shown that the beautification, master musealisation, valorization, engineering, racialization of nature, together with the war over nature were recurring rhetoric and material tools of fascist regimes.

Fascist environments - where environments mean place-based combinations of cultural and physical elements - have been explored at national and transnational scales. Historians of science and technology have shed new light over fascist modernity by investigating histories of water infrastructures (Swyngedouw 2015) and modified animals and plants (Saraiva and Norton Wise 2010; Saraiva 2017). A well-established cultural approach has focussed on rhetoric and representa-

tions of environmental transformation (Caprotti and Kaïka 2008; Armiero and Hardenberg 2013) and seemingly well-researched are histories of landscape production (Saraiva 2016), agricultural reclamations (Fernando Oliveira 1993), and autarchic policies (Gorostiza and Ortega Cerdà 2016). More recently environmental historians highlighted the role and relevance of environmental conflicts in societies that had self-portrayed themselves as non-conflictual (De Luigi, Meyer, and Saba 1995; Hamilton 2017; Guimarães 2020), the pitfall of fascist agriculture (del Arco Blanco 2021), the militarization of all societal aspects inclusive of the landscape (Gorostiza 2018), and colonialism (Biasillo 2021; Biasillo and da Silva 2021; Sollai 2021).

3 Six cases of fascist environmental transformations across and beyond the Mediterranean space

This special issue hosts six interventions that put the environment at the centre of the analysis of authoritarian regimes in Mediterranean Europe, coastal Balkans and colonised African territories.

The colonial matrix of fascism - within and outside Europe - emerges in all essays as severe exploitation of natural resources and human workforce, fostering the adoption of the categories of ecocide and genocide to interpret the fascist experience. All the authors of this special issue stress the centralization of decision-making processes and decentralization of environmental and social costs through the imposition of technological fixes originated from the complete disregard of local ecologies and knowledges. Disasters - or at least massive failures - generated by such fascist policies were always concealed by the strict censorship imposing a certain regime of memories; what could be remembered and how was, of course, a political matter. As the Spanish and Portuguese cases demonstrate, some sorts of dissent voices and narratives alternative to propagandistic ones managed to emerge in the post-war period when fascisms embedded in European processes of democratization and decolonization. For most of the time and in most cases, propaganda machines did not simply cover conflicts, but also prevented

conflicts to emerge and anti-fascist groups to connect.

In the context of regimes built on coloniality and official national narratives, all the following essays demonstrate that nature not only embedded in fascist policies and agenda - as this can be in any political regime -, but that fascist ideology cannot be separate from the creation of a "new" nature as much as the creation of the "new man". Actually, one of the distinctive aspect of fascism appeared the improvement of nature through and for the improvement of society. The following essays show that valorization and reclamation as quintessential forms of improvement sound sinister and rhetoric words when put in relation with consequent experiences of famine, dam burst, genocide, and industrial contamination.

The contributors to this special issue look at the making of fascist socio-ecologies from diverse perspectives. David Henderson and Enriketa Pandelejmoni focus on one of the pillars of any fascist socioecology, that is, reclamation. Henderson introduces an emblematic project of fascist reclamation in the Spanish province of Badajoz. His essay discusses continuities and ruptures with pre-Franco reclamation projects and clearly shows how land transformation, irrigation and settlement acted as measures to avoid a progressive land reform and to control rural population. Despite the announced social goal behind this inner colonization project, the Plan Badajoz contributed to "a massive emigration to Spanish and European cities beginning in the 1950s that has continued since". Pandelejmoni analyses the fascist occupation of Albania through the reclamation project in the district of Kavaja. That project reveals the existence of divergent proposals within the fascist administration on how to valorise the area. Many Albanian landowners refused to obey to the programme and suffered its implementation and only a limited number of Italian settlers actually moved to Albania.

As many scholars of fascist regimes have argued, reclamation was not only a matter of landscape transformation; it embodied a broader fascist project. As the case illustrated by Pandelejmoni proves, reclamation was often an occasion for erasing socio-environmental conflicts. Pablo Corral-Broto and Antonio Ortega Santos go deep

into the histories of socio-environmental conflicts during the late Franco's regime in Spain. They show the connections between violence towards the environment stemming from developmentalist theories and the emergence of environmental and social struggles in peripheral areas of Spain in the 1970s. Adopting a decolonial approach, Corral-Broto and Ortega Santos demonstrate that the fascist transformation of nature was often a colonial project of extraction and othering, both in the colonies and in the margins within the national borders. One might argue that also the well-diffused implementation of a self-sufficiency agenda, the fascist autarkic policies, was an expression of the reclamation/colonization nexus. Every inch, every resource had to be put at work in order to achieve the self-sufficiency fascism was looking for. Dimitris Douros and Dimitris Angelis-Dimakis analyse the implementation of the autarkic policies in the Metaxas regime in Greece. Its neo-physiocratic ideals aimed at increasing agriculture outputs through the mobilization of land and agrarian modernization (credit, machinery and chemicals). According to Douros and Angelis-Dimakis those elements, which were also characteristic of other Mediterranean fascist regimes, should be understood in the broader context of the "intensive environmental management (...) at the core of fascist modernist experiments". The intertwining of the colonial and fascist projects is at the core of Roberta Pergher's and Paulo Guimarães' articles. Pergher offers a condensed account of fascist actions in Libya combining the "hidden colonial history" (Ahmida 2021) - to echo Ali Abdullatif Ahmida words - of the Italian internment camps and the well-explored history of the settlement programme adopting the pivotal elements of the Libyan environment and its Italian perceptions. She reflects on the mass imprisonment and genocide of the civil population of Cyrenaica and their animals under Mussolini's regime. The building of concentration camps in the desert for nomadic and semi-nomadic populations became a central feature. This was a precondition for the second stage: the "conquest of Nature" and the agricultural reclamation of the highlands of Cyrenaica for Italian settlers. Guimarães explores the role of daily physical violence and of the development of science in the

success of the cotton exports to the metropolitan textiles industries during the fascist era, after one century of failed attempts in the Portuguese colonies. The mobilization of African peasants created new landscapes and social relationships, ending in the building of concentration camps and of insurgency in northern Mozambique.

4 Fascism and nature: a research agenda

This special issue avoids the usual question about the rate of "environmentalism" characterizing each fascist regime. For a long time this has been the main question environmental historians have tried to answer. There has been an almost arithmetic approach to the issue, an attempt to quantify the level of environmentalism those regimes had showed, building on the assumption that environmentalism is a quite fixed set of ideas and practices against which people or regimes can be measured. Instead, with this special issue we aim to explore the dialectic relationships between fascist regimes and nature. An environmental history of fascism is not only about how much conservation was developed under those regimes; actually, it is not even only the chronicle of the (many) ecological disasters those regimes caused.

We hope this special issue will foster research on the political ecologies of the fascist regimes, rather than on the allegedly ecological contents of fascist policies. By fascist political ecologies we mean the embodiment of fascist discourses and practices into the environment. The geographer David Harvey has argued that every socio-political project is also an ecological project. Therefore, the point is not to research the effects of fascist regimes on nature - proposing once again a dichotomist vision of society/nature relationships - but to inquiry into the ways in which diverse fascist regimes have produced their own ecologies, that are assemblages of practices and narratives of nature.

We believe that colonial ecologies are crucial grounds where the fascist ecological project materialized. In the colonies, fascist regimes operationalized both the naturalization of social relationships and the politicization of ecologies. The othering project, inherent to any colonial

gaze and practice, transformed people and places into something to be domesticated and shaped to reassemble the racial and ecological matrix. Making coloniality the core of the fascist experience of nature is also changing the usual Eurocentric histories of fascism. How would fascist political ecologies look like from Mozambique, Albania, or Libya? While we have tried to address this issue, it is still open the question about the divergences and similarities between fascist and liberal political ecologies in the colonies.

As historians of fascist regimes know well, colonization was a label - and a practice - used by those governments not only in the traditional sense of colonial expansion abroad, but also as internal colonization, that is, expansion of economic activities - mostly agriculture - within the national borders. Following the Italian fascist rhetoric, this internal colonialism was often called reclamation, meaning the idea and practice of remaking the ecologies of places and people. An environmental history research agenda on fascism should revisit this internal colonialism/reclamation exploring the metabolic and narrative connections between nature and race, ecologies and bodies.

Those connections were often meant to produce fascist (environmental and human) bodies; reclaimed lands for reclaimed people. More frequently, they produced instead messed up ecologies, spaces of contamination and harm. Corral-Broto and Ortega Santos explore the political possibilities coming from these messed up ecologies in Francoist Spain. Instead of looking for the allegedly fascist roots of environmentalism, these two authors have followed the opposite lead, searching for the convergences between anti-fascist movements and environmentalist concerns. A similar combination of resistance and socio-ecological unbalance recurred in fascist Mozambique. Guimarães reconstructs the fascist environmental roots of the anti-colonial insurgency against the Portuguese occupation. This seems to be a more productive and fresh path still waiting to be explored.

Finally, although this special issue has not touched upon this, we do see the relevance of researching the emergence of what has been labelled as "eco-fascism". While we do not support

the idea of a fascist root of environmentalism, we do see in contemporary society the convergence of far-right discourse and environmentalism. This is not a majority line, evidently, nonetheless, it is theoretically worth to be explored. Perhaps, rather than thinking of "eco-fascism" it would be more productive to research environmentalist authoritarianism - this more widely spread - and the continuities and fractures between it and the historical fascism.

An environmental history research agenda on fascism can be, obviously, much longer; it should include science and technology studies, reproductive policies, arts and cultural representations of nature, international and diplomatic efforts in the environmental fields. More broadly, that research agenda implies to question the vision of environmental history as a set of green themes. We wish, instead, to propose a point of view which can contribute reframing the main historical narratives. The point is not that environmental history explains everything, perhaps recurring to some quite scary environmental determinism; rather, we argue that whatever we are studying is deeply and messily intertwined with what we call nature. Social and political history can help understand the environmental history of fascism as much as environmental history can explore social and political topics. We do not need a disciplinary passepartout opening every door, but a well-furnished backpack which will allow us to move around and employ multiple tools.

The editorial team.

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"Deeply Human, Fundamentally Social": Fascism and Internal Colonization in Badajoz Province during the Early Franco Dictatorship

"Profundamente Humano, Fundamentalmente Social": Fascismo e Colonização Interna na Província de Badajoz no Início da Ditadura de Franco

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Abstract—This article explores the ambition of the Franco regimes National Institute of Colonization (INC) to remake the countryside through irrigation and settlement. It focuses on the human side of this project, arguing that Spains colonization effort was fundamentally fascist in its aim to ensure the success of a nationalized and politically loyal segment of the rural population. It argues that the agricultural engineers of the INC inserted themselves as paternalistic authorities in the countryside, managing a carefully chosen portion of the peasantry. As the INC worked to begin its large-scale colonization schemes in the 1950s, it sought to determine which towns suffered from a social problem caused by the unemployment of tenants and small-property owners rather than landless laborers. In spite of the technical rhetoric of the engineers, with their stress on productivity and rationalizing land use, this article will demonstrate that certain political and moral considerations remained paramount throughout the process.

Keywords—Colonization; Irrigation; Spain; Fascism; Modernization.

Resumo—Este artigo explora a ambição do Instituto Nacional de Colonização (INC) do regime franquista para reconstruir o mundo rural através da irrigação e colonização. Centra-se no lado humano deste projecto, argumentando que o esforço de colonização de Espanha foi fundamentalmente fascista no seu objectivo de assegurar o sucesso de um segmento nacionalizado e politicamente leal da população rural. Argumenta que os engenheiros agrícolas do INC se inseriram como autoridades paternalistas no meio rural, gerindo uma porção cuidadosamente escolhida do campesinato. Enquanto o INC trabalhava para iniciar os seus esquemas de colonização em grande escala nos anos 50, procurou determinar que cidades sofriam de um "problema social" causado pelo desemprego dos rendeiros e pequenos proprietários, mais do que dos trabalhadores sem terra. Apesar da retórica técnica dos engenheiros, com a sua ênfase na produtividade e na racionalização do uso da terra, este artigo demonstrará que certas considerações políticas e morais permaneceram primordiais ao longo de todo o processo.

Palavras-Chave—Colonização; Irrigação; Espanha; Fascismo; Modernização.

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1 Introduction

FOR Ismael Saz, Franco's regime was characterized until its late stages by opposition between two internal ideological poles (Saz 2007). One pole had its base in the church and military and sought to keep the population depoliticized, while holding onto traditional elements - the Catholic Church, the monarchy - as legitimating institutions. It was opposed by Spanish fascism, anchored in the *Movimiento Nacional*, the only political party allowed under the dictatorship, which sought popular mobilization. While leaders of both ideological currents pushed for economic modernization, Spanish fascists aimed to have economic growth serve the purposes of a "third way" political-social agenda between capitalism and socialism. Landscape transformation through a combination irrigation and internal colonization proved to be one of the most important elements of this agenda. As in Italy under Mussolini (Armiero 2014), the transformation of the landscape in Francoist Spain was aimed at refashioning the population beginning with a chosen, limited minority of new Spaniards. The regime feared the socialism and anarchism that had animated much of the rural population during the 1930s and hoped that using irrigation to create new Spaniards from a class of responsible, small-property holders would be the germ of political enthusiasm for the regime in the countryside. These concerns led to concentrated colonization efforts in areas such as Extremadura in southwestern Spain where rural political conflict had been sharp and irrigation was possible.

Scholars of the Franco regime have argued for some time about whether to consider it fascist, authoritarian, or a hybrid type of government that transformed as technocrats eclipsed the *Movimiento* in power (Radcliff 2017). Those who have argued against the fascist label for the regime (such as Paxton 2004) as a whole or for the set of landscape and settlement policies considered here claim that the regime left traditional elites in power and, in the case of rural Spain, hesitated to expropriate significant amounts of land from

large landlords until the end of the 1940s when the power of fascists within the government had begun to wane (Riesco 2020). However, strategic compromises and limited social transformation should not be surprising given fascism's malleability. In spite of fascist parties' socially ambitious written programs, Paxton points out that "once in power, fascist regimes confiscated property only from political opponents, foreigners, or Jews. None altered the social hierarchy except to catapult a few adventurers into high places". What did make the internal colonization policies of the early Franco regime fascist was the pursuit of extreme nationalism through a social program aimed at both control and the transformation of a chosen minority. They evinced an ultra-nationalistic concern for the integrity and reconstruction of the national community (Griffin 1995).

Choosing land transformation, irrigation and settlement as a means of nationalizing citizens was not accidental. Unproductive agriculture had been assigned the blame for Spain's decline since the seventeenth century (Ringrose 1995). Charles III had ordered the construction of agricultural colonies in Andalusia in the eighteenth century. Irrigation became a prominent political issue when Joaquín Costa, a politician and public intellectual, called for the transformation of the Spanish countryside through irrigation after defeat in the Spanish-American War (Costa and Ortí, 1975). Costa's ideas irrevocably tied the revitalization of Spain to the exploitation of its water resources. The political prominence of irrigation prior to the Spanish Civil War has led some scholars to posit continuity between the Regenerationist movement or Catholic intellectuals opposed to radical land reform and Franco's enthusiasm for irrigation. I argue here with Ismael Saz, however, that the ideas of the generally liberal Regenerationists were "sliced and manipulated" to fit the projects of the Franco's ministers (Saz 2007). This was particularly the case with irrigation and internal colonization as fascist influence turned irrigation from primarily an economic program motivated by an abstract nationalism into a specific moral-political program designed to encourage adherence to the regime and provide patronage to a select segment of the peasantry.

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2 Colonization: the Human Aspect

The Franco regime created the National Institute of Colonization (INC) within the Ministry of Agriculture in 1939 in order to address problems of unemployment in the countryside (BOE 1939). It was a response to the land reform efforts of the Second Republic, which had embarked on a classical land reform program based upon expropriation from large landowners in targeted provinces such as Badajoz and redistribution to landless laborers (Carmona and Simpson, 2020). The INC was primarily designed to settle internal colonists, who would become tenants of the INC, on newly irrigated dry land or reclaimed wetlands in large projects patterned after Mussolini's land reclamation and town construction projects in the Pontine Marshes. As opposed to the Italian *bonifica integrale*, the Franco regime chose not to antagonize landowners with large-scale expropriation until the 1949 (Riesco 2020). It also had a mandate for small-scale local colonization efforts that would prevent existing tenants in danger of eviction. In lieu of resolving seasonal and permanent unemployment of landless laborers as the Second Republic's land reform had attempted, the INC aimed to benefit those it deemed likely to be enthusiastic adherents of the regime. Therefore, tenants and small property owners were the intended beneficiaries of colonization.

The first director of the National Institute of Colonization, Ángel Zorrilla Dorronsoro, articulated a policy that rejected the land reform of the Second Republic and capitalism, which the Falange, the Spanish fascist party that was merged with other right-wing movements into the single political party allowed under the regime, understood as without spiritual or ethical values (Zorrilla 1941). The modernization of a nation had to consist of "*grades of development: spiritual, political, and, consequently, economic*" (Zorrilla 1941). The INC's settlement and supervision of colonists served these moral and political ends at a time when the regime unconvincingly blamed international isolation and scattered guerilla warfare in the aftermath of the Civil War for the widespread hunger of the 1940s (Hernández-Burgos 2016).

The early INC was imagined as a military

organization bringing political order to a chaotic countryside. The INC organization was at first patterned after a military organization with a series of brigades across the provinces that responded to the direction of the Director General. Its local chief engineers were ordered to maintain the highest moral standards in private as well as public matters. The regime dabbled in ruralism similarly to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: promoting the countryside as the heart of the Spain's strength in propaganda while viewing it as a space in need of control (Armiero 2011). The director general asked brigades to visit as many of their districts as possible and to always protect themselves from the countryside, the "anti-thesis" of the real Spain (Circular N. 15, 1941). Contact with the peasantry in the countryside threatened to "degenerate" the spiritual lives of his agricultural engineers. Brigades were encouraged to cultivate a lifestyle that included elite recreation such as hunting and sport.

INC workers, even office workers, were screened carefully for their political activities. The Institute offered previous office employees of its predecessor agencies, including the Institute of Agrarian Reform, the opportunity to reapply for jobs with preference over other applicants. However, they had to make sure to officially reapply and also to provide documentation of their "political-social" conduct from the Ministry of Agriculture, other official state institutions, or the FET-JONS. A handful of employees were immediately fired for a variety of causes including: serving in the Red Cross for the Institute of Agrarian Reform, fighting with the Republican side in the Civil War, being a member of the Left Republican Party during the Second Republic, being a freemason, and joining the Institute of Agrarian Reform after the Popular Front had triumphed at the polls (BOE 1941). While this was no different than other state agencies following the Civil War, it did guarantee that the INC's project was tied to its specific political ideology at a time when fascism held the upper hand over National Catholicism.

Before settlement could begin, agricultural engineers had to first study the regions that needed state assistance, with special attention paid to the classification of land with an eye towards possibilities for irrigation or reclamation. They

also had to report on an area's agronomy, the legal status of relevant properties, level of unemployment, and cultural (educational and religious) facilities (Circular N. 5 1940). This process made "the brilliant vision of the Founder of the Falange concrete through exact technical rules" by determining the proper "*unidades de cultivo*", the minimal plot sizes to support the large families who would be the beneficiary's of colonization (Circular N. 27 1941). Action would be taken if the INC determined that the land could support more tenants through rationalizing crops or supplying more fertile land.

Not just anyone could be selected as a colonist of course. The list of preferred requirements for colonists consisted of the following: they had to know how to read and write, be between 23-50 years old (unless one had served in the military), be married or widowed with children, be able to demonstrate agricultural proficiency, have no hereditary illnesses or physical defects (syphilis, tuberculosis, alcoholism), and have a record of good conduct and morality. The more children one had, the more likely one was to be chosen as a colonist since one could better serve to increase the population of Franco loyalists. These series of requirements demanded that a careful selection of colonists be carried out, a selection that would do as much as possible to weed out unfit colonists. Colonists, in order to move out of the system of "tutelage", had to earn their freedom of decision. In the "formation" classes for all colonists, they were not only to be taught practical agricultural skills, but moral and social lessons that would guarantee attention to the religious, health, and intellectual subjects necessary for a strong moral environment. These lessons would be reinforced by the spread of model farms - where successful families would be installed with the best supplies that the INC could afford. Being in the presence of these model colonist families would give new colonists a sense of what was possible.

The guiding tenets of the INC were formulated in the *Revista de Estudios Agro-Sociales* and in conferences on colonization by a series of agronomists in the Ministry of Agriculture. They helped to ensure that the labor of colonization would be "deeply human, fundamentally social" (Martínez 1944). One agronomist argued in 1944

that what the INC had to do was create a select group of farmers. He started by demanding that his readers not forget that the "goal of colonization, and at the same time its principal agent, is man". This man had to be linked to his nation, his patria. Without a sense of his belonging to Spain, the INC worried that a man would lose his identity and allegiance to the re-founded nation. The purpose of colonization, then, was "rescuing socially useful men for the common destiny of the Nation; uniting men of the countryside to the land that absorbs their efforts; linking the laborer with his fields, allowing him a dignified and progressive individual and social life". This group, who would be independent, morally upright and have a number of skills, would ideally bring stability to a countryside that had seen to be in political conflict during the Civil War and Second Republic. The ownership of a plot of land by a true "laborer", as opposed to factory work or menial laborer, meant that he had to master the climate, the land, crops and the appropriate treatment of animals. These skills were "broader, noble and more humanistic" than the unthinking operation of machinery in a factory. This property-owning life was much to be preferred to that of "those undifferentiated troops of population that fuel tumultuous mass movements" (Martínez 1944).

Another agronomist candidly stated that colonization was designed as a selection process, meant to end with a small group of responsible subjects (Gomez 1944). Even after the most careful selection of colonists, 40% should never make it through the preparation and settlement process to become true property owners, according to him. After the selection, then, potential colonists required a period of "vigilance" and "tutelage" when the INC would make decisions for them until colonists' had paid off their debts to the INC for assistance and irrigation. The outlined program, which was adopted by the INC, was one where the colonists were placed squarely under the institute's authority in a situation akin to sharecropping. Over the five years of the tutelage period the colonists had to pay back the cost of the initial livestock and farm materials provided to them by the INC. The repayment schedule was not up to the colonist; he was to repay the INC in the form of 20% of the harvest during

the first five years of land occupation. If the payment in terms of crops had exceeded that of the INC investment in equipment and livestock, then this amount would be counted as the first down payment towards the colonists' real debt: the property itself. Once the first five years were up, if the colonist had lived up to his obligations by caring for his plot of land, house, and animals and had paid off his debts to the INC (if he had not, then that debt would be added to the price of the property), the period of attaining property would begin when colonists gained the titles of their houses and lots and could begin making mortgage payments. Lest this system actually be seen as too generous to colonists, the author reminded his readers that the INC possessed an "unquestionable authority" over colonists due to their debt and legal status. They could be fined or expelled for a number of reasons. And he also outlined the strict obligations that colonists had to care for their plot, as well as their equipment and livestock. In fact, each had to devote "all of his work, and his family's" to the plot. Besides the attention paid to their plot of land, the INC expected colonists to keep up a "strong sense of morality, completion of their family obligations, a sense of decorum in their lives, and noble usage of their home" (Gomez 1944). In this way, the program adopted to manage colonists throughout the lifetime of the INC and took as its main aim the creation of new Spaniards.

3 Early Colonization in Badajoz Province: Tenants and Veterans

In practice, the fascist emphasis on moral transformation through property administration concentrated INC activity in areas where land reform had been an explosive issue during the Second Republic. The Badajoz Province, because of its poverty, size, hydrography, history of social unrest and low population density, became a principal object of INC action, and it was one of the first areas to be declared of "national interest", the initial step in allowing the INC to take action. With a history of rural activism, it was the site of some of the fiercest political conflict concerning land reform during the Second Republic, when it was one of the provinces targeted by the Land

Reform Law of 1932, and then became subject to violent Nationalist repression during the Civil War. Located above Seville, it stretches from the border with Portugal to the edge of Castilla-La Mancha region at its Ciudad Real province. The Guadiana River runs east to west all the way across the province before plunging south at the city of Badajoz and becoming the border with Portugal. The *dehesa* landscape of much of the area, made up of cork oaks and pasture, along with the dry *secano* farmland, made it appealing to INC officials who saw rationalizing land use, as well as irrigation, as the key to modernizing the peasantry. Eucalyptus forests and irrigation canals were much to be preferred over the wild-looking *dehesa* (Pinto-Correia *et al*, 2011). Eventually it became the object of the Plan Badajoz, a regional irrigation, electrification and settlement project patterned after the Tennessee Valley Authority. The groundwork for the settlement aspect of this project was undertaken in the 1940s as the INC determined its method of action and intensively studied the province. Before it began settling colonists in large zones, the INC had settled 3,720 colonists on 42 farms in Badajoz (Pérez Rubio 1995).¹




Figure 1: Towns of the Plan Badajoz. Carlos Romero Cuadrado, *Aspectos económicos ligados a las explotaciones creadas por el Plan Badajoz* (Madrid: Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, 2007), Appendix.

1. Using 1950 as a rough cut-off date.

Republican and Primo de Rivera governments. Its political mission was immediately apparent: hopeful colonists correctly understood the INC as an instrument to reward those who would be loyal to the regime. Almost all early applicants wrote to the INC to either reclaim property that was lost during the Civil War because of Nationalist sympathies or to make claims for property based on their service in the Civil War.

In Jerez de los Caballeros, the INC was faced with the task of sorting out various claims to tenancy on the three farms under its control that had first been settled during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (Carmona and Simpson 2015). One potential colonist noted that he had lost his plot only because of service on the Nationalist side in the Civil War when he had felt "the enthusiasm for sacrifice proper to every Spaniard who felt the crisis and danger through which Spain passed in those days". If the INC were to reinstate his family as tenants, protecting his mother, it would bring "consolation to a Spanish hearth and bread to a poor, sick old woman with no resources" (Carrasco to INC 1944). Another potential colonist claimed to have been harassed during the "red period" because of his politics (de la Cruz to INC 1943). Supposedly he had not been allowed to retake his plot because he was "boycotted for being a man of order". Six hopeful colonists all asked for land at a farm near Lobón and all were careful to advertise their status as Civil War veterans (Guerrero 1943, Álvarez 1943, Martín 1943, Torres Cabañas 1943, Torres Martín 1943). A few noted that they had been wounded, and others that they were fathers of large families, a designation created by the pro-nationalist Francoist government and a key criteria for potential colonists. One claimed he "had heard that the Institute was dividing [the land of] the Castillo de Guadajira with wounded veterans preferred above all others" (Torres Martín 1943), while another wrote to the chief engineer that he had "news that veterans certified as fathers of numerous families were being given plots by the National Institute of Colonization" (Martín 1943). Of thirty petitions sent between the years 1943 and 1944 concerning these two farms only five were not from veterans. All of the applications demonstrate that INC assistance was targeted at specific sections of the population: those who

had suffered at the hands of the "reds", veterans of the nationalist side (applicants were sure to highlight any medals they possessed or wounds they had received), and fathers of large families. Applicants were careful to include certifications of their political and moral conduct by persons in positions of authority - priests, city hall officials, civil guards or, in special cases, the watchmen of farms.

These efforts make clear that potential colonists and those concerned for them saw an implicit political promise in the duties of the INC. It was designed to reward loyalty to the Nationalists. Carmé Molinero has written of how the regime framed its social proposals in terms of charity rather than duty to citizens (Molinero 2005). State aid preserved the idea of a hierarchical society - Spanish subjects had more duties than they had rights. The same is true of colonization. The only segments of the population who felt they had the strength to make claims on the government were those who could demonstrate loyalty to the Nationalist cause.

Besides administering its own farms, the INC also tried to protect tenants, particularly tenants who had their own farming capital. In Badajoz, plowmen (*yunteros*) were an important part of the region's economy, being responsible for the clearing of land that doubled the farmland under cultivation from 1900-1930 (Riesco 2009). They became political symbols of the desire for land reform in Extremadura because of their discontent with landowners who turned their lands over to pasture during the 1930s and their role in the occupation of private farms, particularly in March of 1936. They came to represent all of those who worked under the leasing or sharecropping contracts that were widespread in Extremadura and necessary for the exploitation of *dehesas*. In spite of their political radicalism, they became the object of regime interest and protection. These were not the landless laborers who the INC disdained, they owned capital and were connected with the land, and could thus be part of the redemption of the countryside that had been so sympathetic to the Republican side in the Civil War.

The regime demonstrated its special care for tenants, as opposed to landless laborers, with a series of laws designed to prevent tenants from

eviction and rent raises (BOE 1940 and BOE 1942). Local cases of eviction could reach national importance. In Santos de Maimona, a small town in the southeastern portion of Badajoz Province, olive and vine-growing tenants from a number of farms fought their evictions for more than seven years leading, to the eventual intervention of the INC (García 1948). The tenants would not go along with the eviction order and took their case to court in 1941, winning through the provisions of one of the regime's tenancy laws. In 1945, two other trials in nearby towns resulted from attempts to evict similar tenants. Franco himself was informed of the cases by the mayor of Santos de Maimona in December of 1945, and, as a result, the evictions of all tenants who cultivated olives, vines or orchards were halted (BOE 1946). Eventually the case, as well as all other pending disputes over olive, vine or orchard contracts in Spain, was regulated by a new law that continued to protect these special tenants but allowed for the recalculation of rents based on the productivity of the farm and normal rent prices in the locality (BOE 1946).

The passing of this law caused the case for eviction to be thrown out, and the tenants of all three farms were able to keep their land, but it allowed rents to be raised enough to worry the INC. It carried out a study of Santos de Maimona to see if the evictions would result in a "social problem" warranting local colonization. The 53 total tenants clearly could not pay the new rent according to the INC's report of 1948 (García 1948). In order to maintain the town's equilibrium, which meant limiting unemployment in the face of a large increase in rent, expropriation was necessary. The chief engineer of the Guadiana delegation of the INC commented on his engineer's study, emphasizing that the tenants had improved the land by planting olives and vines, thus serving the national interest. Moreover, there was no hope of these colonists finding a place on other farms in the region since the three nearby farms over 100 hectares were "pasture and labor" *dehesas* instead of vineyards with no new land to be put under cultivation. In May 1949, the INC expropriated one entire farm and the parts occupied by tenants in the other two, to ensure that these tenants literally enjoyed the fruits of their

labor (García 1948). These tenants were all "good workers" and "honest and humble" peasants of good political-social character. More importantly, they had improved the land themselves through the planting of vines, confirming the ideology of the regime that private initiative by the right individuals, when given a stake in the outcome, would naturally begin productive changes and defend the nation under reconstruction.

4 Yunteros: the Solution to Badajoz's "Social Problem"

The idealized, yeoman-like *yuntero* remained the object of the INC's colonization projects over the course of the regime. Before the INC could take action it had to perform social studies of towns that were nominated by a provincial junta made up of local notables that explicitly prioritized the needs of *yunteros*. In one section of the provincial Plan published in 1948 that resulted from the first round of social studies, the Junta presented a "social history" of the province. It identified the present-day social problem as the existence of "thirty-five thousand *yunteros* who do not possess sufficient land". They were accompanied by "sixty-six thousand simple *braceros*" (Badajoz 1948). The simple *braceros*, the landless laborers, could not be counted on to lift themselves out of poverty; they had to wait for later industrialization to attract them out of towns. But the 35,000 *yunteros* were understood by the INC as those who possessed some means of production or small property but still had to lease land as tenants. Their small plots of land did not "absorb all of their labor capacity". It was this class, as underutilized as Extremadura's natural resources, that had "the strength, perseverance, responsibility and initiative" to leave poverty behind and was the key to the area's political future (Badajoz 1948).

The Junta's responsibility to commission INC social studies elicited a correspondence from the municipal authorities of the Badajoz Province. Mayors, likely to be sympathetic to the social ideals of the Falange because they were appointed by the regime, urgently sought action to cure the unemployment of *yunteros* (Pérez 1995). Local officials or priests proved themselves to be able

interpreters of the Junta's concern for the political status of the countryside. The mayor of Casas de Don Pedro explained that "THREE HUNDRED AND TEN" *yunteros* came to the local office of the state-led agricultural union to ask for land each day. In May 1950 he wrote to the Junta: "this is the problem that we have seriously before us, to find land in order to go about converting these humble *yunteros* into property owners, rapidly lessening their numbers until they've disappeared, which will be the day when Franco's word will have come true and the land will be at the service of the Spanish people, and a step will be taken towards the subordination of the economy to politics". If economic growth could be widely shared, "the strength of rural workers' bonds to the institutions of the state will increase exponentially, creating another tool to achieve social tranquility and peace" (Villares 1950). In September 1950, the priest of Mirandilla, appealed directly to the chief engineer of the INC for the Guadiana region. The priest wrote to remind him of the four hundred *yunteros* from Mirandilla who had been waiting for several farms to be parceled out to them. There had been a conflict running since 1946, when a landlord had sought to evict the tenants on his land, unilaterally ending their contracts. The tenants refused to leave and continued to farm the land while the landlord fought back by bringing in livestock to ruin their field. After a first hearing and a favorable response from the INC to their request for expropriation of the farm, "there had been only the deepest and most impenetrable silence". He went on: "These robbed men who have an aptitude for work and the largest desire to elevate their quality of lives, will be converted, without a doubt, into our worst enemy, into revolutionaries. And I believe they have good reasons [to do this]" (González to INC 1950). Here, he demonstrated his understanding that the real fear of local authorities was that those who could be made into loyal supporters of the regime might turn away from it politically due to inaction.

In its studies, the INC sought to determine how large of a population each town could support with its agricultural land fully exploited. Agricultural engineers were sent to collect information on towns' demographic, cultural, agricultural and economic situations. Economic growth would

come from the INC's technical intervention; the INC believed that the land was not adequately exploited. The "social problem" had to be met through the "intensification" of agriculture. The technical framing of the problem hid the usual political agenda. There was an anxiety shared by the regime about the political consequences of unemployment. *Yunteros*, had to be supported so their potential support for the regime could be tapped into, much as the region's agricultural and hydrographic resources needed to be more fully utilized. An ideal rural landscape emerges from the INC's studies where ownership and cultivation of the land would lead to socially tightknit communities. The INC used this ideal community as a template to restructure towns and villages, believing that adjusting the inequality of land-ownership would mitigate *yuntero* discontent. Through state intervention, the regime sought to create the physical and economic circumstances for social harmony, to defuse political unrest, and to ultimately secure the countryside for Franco by supporting a new class of landowners.

In most cases, the engineers aimed to expropriate and reorganize an adequate number of farms to guarantee employment for *yunteros*. In both Cabeza del Buey and Campanario, two rural towns in the province, agricultural engineers were sent to collect information on demographic, cultural, geographic and economic situations, combining this information with that available in state, provincial and municipal archives. Jacinto Terrón was sent to Cabeza del Buey in 1947, Jesús Castañón to Campanario in 1949. In the studies, agricultural workers were divided up into those who owned property and cultivated it, those who owned sufficient property to support their families but also augmented the income from their property by working as *braceros* or leasing other land, those who worked in agriculture and had mules or other means of production but little or no property (*yunteros*), those who had permanent jobs as agricultural workers, and those who held no property (*simples braceros*). Between 380 and 500 men were unemployed depending on the season in Campanario, leaving at least 30% of the male working population unemployed at these times. Some *braceros* visited other towns for work, but their number was discarded as negligible. Cabeza

del Buey and its surrounding villages found itself in a similar state. It was mired in even worse permanent unemployment than Campanario with 44% unemployed in the town and 60% in the town's outlying villages during various parts of the year. All of this unemployment resulted from an "excess of labor for the capacity of the local market", caused by the insufficient distribution of property (Terrón 1947). For the INC, work and property were directly linked; the key to fixing the unemployment problem would be to increase property ownership, which would naturally boost production (or at least agricultural cultivation at the expense of livestock-raising) as small owners would fully exploit their plots of land. It was the same calculus as that of the Second Republic's land reform program except now the INC only sought to remedy the unemployment of a carefully chosen segment of the rural population.

The agricultural engineers went in search of large concentrations of land, which they believed to be inherently inefficient and the cause of unemployment. Landownership was concentrated in both Campanario and Cabeza del Buey proper (excluding its surrounding cities). In Campanario, those who owned more than 100 hectares (about 250 acres) were in possession of 75% of all property. Those owners averaged 465 hectares; those who owned less than 100 hectares averaged 3.9 hectares (Castañón 1949). The story was the same in Cabeza del Buey where only the land directly to the south of the town was divided up into small parcels. The 94 owners who possessed more than 100 hectares between them totaled almost 40,000 hectares leaving less than 7,000 for the remaining 1,555 owners. Terrón also made sure to compare the numbers of absentee landlords to local ones. Although residents of Cabeza del Buey owned most of the largest farms, Terrón was keen to investigate the role of absentee landlords in reinforcing the "social problem" of the town (Terrón 1947).

To solve the unemployment of *yunteros*, large farms were targeted to be partially or fully expropriated and settled by *yunteros* as colonists. The farms targeted for forcible state purchase had to meet a number of criteria. Preferably they would be owned by absentee landlords, located on good quality soil, close to potential hydraulic works,

large enough to divide up into many plots and be currently devoted to a mix of livestock-raising and agriculture. Castañón proposed the expropriation of two farms in Campanario, La Hoya and Umbriazo, totaling 1,017 hectares between them in order to settle 150 of the town's 186 *yunteros* (Pérez 1995). The farms united a series of characteristics that made them particularly attractive for expropriation. Their soil was of secondary quality, which was irrigable. The owner of La Hoya, a woman of the petty nobility, was absent from the property and therefore not a contributor to the town's community life. The owner's absenteeism was highlighted several times; she could never be found and was contacted through a farm guard. Land was leased through sharecropping or rental contracts, and livestock, seen as less productive and less labor-intensive (making it useless in combatting unemployment), was a large part of the operation. In the end neither farm was ever expropriated. Similarly, Terrón's vision of the source of the social problem in Cabeza del Buey came down primarily to the concentration of property in a few (often absentee) landlords. These landlords also raised livestock on significant parts of their farms. In Cabeza del Buey, where the problem was more insurmountable, the expropriation and colonization of six farms was called for (Terrón 1947). Here, unlike in Campanario, the expropriation of these six farms was carried out, and they were settled in 1950 (Pérez 1995).

The studies, taken together, demonstrate the INC was acting in the Badajoz region in the interest of guaranteeing politically stable communities. Both reports hint at the fear of unrest and anger on the part of the *yuntero* population. Terrón wrote: "there exists a discontent amongst the mass of agrarian workers, particularly those who possess some means of production [*yunteros*], caused by the excessive concentration of land" (Terrón 1947). So although the root problem was unemployment, the INC really feared the political fallout from it. The understanding that absentee landlords would certainly be more concerned for the towns' social problems if they were present confirms this. The solution to the social problem was uniformly the intensification of local agriculture for *yunteros* combined with the prospect of future jobs provided by later hydraulic projects

for *braceros* (although the reports ignored that *yunteros* would also be preferred in these future settlement projects).

Organized, parceled up farms were much more desirable than wild *dehesas*. Any farm not divided up into parcels, especially if it was owned by an absentee landlord, could be subject to expropriation. In photos attached to the appendix of the Cabeza del Buey study, Terrón pointed out the border between two farms, one with the scattered brush and trees of the *dehesa* landscape typical of the region, while the other was made up of neat lines of crops.



Figure 2: The Rinconada farm, declared to be of "national interest", in February of 1949, compared to an organized farm. "Terron, Estudio social del Término de Cabeza del Buey", AHCEA.

The preference for parceled land was not due primarily to its improved economic performance, rather, many more workers were required than for the raising of livestock. Livestock-raising "deprived those plowmen of the only lands within the town's limits where they could employ their energy" (Terrón 1947). In Cabeza del Buey, the Director General of the INC even ordered that, although the amount of land ultimately expropriated was less than called for, the number of settled colonists be kept the same (decreasing lot size) to ensure the greatest number of property owners (Montero 1947).

A new class of direct cultivators would be politically reliable contributors to national wellbeing. The director of the INC noted, in his approval

of the study of Cabeza del Buey, that the usual producer lives off of his own physical efforts and "is a hard worker and has great affection for the land, and along with it, enthusiasm for his profession" (Montero 1947). Still the expropriation proposed at the end of each study never aimed to employ the entire population. In each case, proposals left the numbers of unemployed *braceros* the same. This population did not appear responsible or hardworking enough to the INC to be worthy of urgent local colonization projects. Fixed to the land through property ownership, *yunteros* could be incorporated into communities under the watch of larger, direct landowners, and attended to culturally and religiously. Their responsibility, exhibited by their ownership of "means of production", made them preferred candidates to be converted into the beginning of a new countryside.

5 Conclusion

The INC eventually set aside its enthusiasm for settling as many *yunteros* as possible on a given piece of land as more technocratic officials took charge of the Ministry of Agriculture and made productivity, instead of total production, the touchstone of its efforts. But until the end of the Franco dictatorship, the INC's colonization program took as its object the creation of new Spaniards through the transformation of the landscape. A selective targeting of regime social policy became even more restrictive. The control and paternal supervision of colonists continued through debt, fines and surveillance even as colonist rebellion to the INC grew over time (Siguan 1963). After the transition to democracy, the Badajoz Province that had seen so much colonization voted with the Socialist Party.

The combination of control and a preoccupation with national identity were the fascist hallmarks of Spain's modernization under Franco. While governments across the twentieth-century - particularly dictatorships - used irrigation, dam-building and land reclamation to build legitimacy and demonstrate modernizing accomplishments (McNeill 2000), fascist modernization can perhaps be distinguished through its intense state supervision of a chosen minority meant to help re-found the nation. The concern for national

feeling among the beneficiaries of modernization projects ties Spain to the experience of other modernizing fascist dictatorships such as Italy (Caprotti 2008). Encouraging popular adherence to the regime drove fascists and separated them from technocratic and traditionalist programs, but so did an unwillingness to antagonize property owners and an obsession with national purity, leading to a peculiar program where a relatively small group was placed under close state supervision in order to reflect the nationalizing power of a fully exploited landscape. The environmental upshot of colonization in Spain was a completely transformed and more fully exploited landscape with a limited number of beneficiaries. The traditional oak savannah of the *dehesa* with its mixed uses has given way to large agro-businesses in the lands surrounding irrigation projects (Palacín 1977). The social goal behind colonization, the creation of a small group of enthusiastic transformed Spaniards, justified expansive irrigation projects and state investment in mechanization that left the majority of the rural population untethered. Colonization and the Plan Badajoz were intended to spur repopulation of the Badajoz Province, but ended up serving to facilitate a massive emigration to Spanish and European cities beginning in the 1950s that has continued since.

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on economic change, tenancy contracts and rural political conflict during the first of half of the twentieth century in Southern Europe.

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A simple overflow? Environmental Coloniality in Francoist Spain (1950-1979)

Um simples transbordo? Colonialidade Ambiental na Espanha Franquista (1950-1979)

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Abstract—This article analyzes the emergence of the critique of the "environmental coloniality" of Spain's Francoist dictatorship, and how it connected to the foundation of several environmental injustice struggles in Spain. This coloniality can be observed in contemporary critiques of "internal colonialism", which arose during the 1970s. Green intellectuals, such as Mario Gaviria, went as far as to describe three types of environmental colonialism based on classic colonialism: space colonialism, energy colonialism and extractivism. In this article we argue that the Spanish case illustrates that the global colonial system implies a certain capacity for reversibility. In comparison to liberal democracies, the environmental coloniality of a fascist regime involves more violence and repression in the coloniality of power, knowledge, and being. Such reversibility, along with the old patterns of environmental coloniality, prompts historians to criticize the rhetoric of European economic miracles and high-modernity through the lens of decolonial environmental history. We can describe the concept of environmental coloniality from three perspectives. First is the conceptualization of the environment as an object of capitalist appropriation of scientific processes overseen by the State. This perspective can be described in terms of the commodification of nature. Secondly, and related to this first element, is the coercive nature of a fascist state that annuls any decision-making processes or social participation in the field of environmental management. Finally is a fascist state's violent repression of any form of social contestation. From these three perspectives we can conclude that environmental coloniality gave rise to a cycle of struggles for the defense of land, water, and community life; these struggles can be considered decolonial, because they proposed an alternative model to the authoritarianism of the fascist state.

Keywords—Internal Colonialism; Environmental Justice; Decolonial Environmental History; Fascism and Authoritarian regimes.

Resumo—Este artigo analisa o surgimento da crítica à "colonialidade ambiental" da ditadura franquista espanhola, e como esta se ligava à fundação de várias lutas de injustiça ambiental em Espanha. Esta colonialidade pode ser observada nas críticas contemporâneas ao "colonialismo interno", que surgiram durante a década de 1970. Intelectuais verdes, tais como Mario Gaviria, chegaram ao ponto de descrever três tipos de colonialismo ambiental baseado no colonialismo clássico: colonialismo espacial, colonialismo energético e extractivismo. Neste artigo argumentamos que o caso espanhol ilustra que o sistema colonial global implica uma certa capacidade de reversibilidade. Em comparação com as democracias liberais, a colonialidade ambiental de um regime fascista envolve mais violência e repressão na colonialidade do poder, do conhecimento, e do ser. Tal reversibilidade, juntamente com os velhos padrões de colonialidade ambiental, leva os historiadores a criticar a retórica dos milagres económicos europeus e da alta modernidade através da lente da história ambiental descolonial. Podemos descrever o conceito de colonialidade ambiental a partir de três perspectivas. A primeira é a conceptualização do ambiente como um objecto de apropriação capitalista dos processos científicos supervisionados pelo Estado. Esta perspectiva pode ser descrita em termos da mercantilização da natureza. Em segundo lugar, e relacionado com este primeiro elemento, está a natureza coerciva de um Estado fascista que anula qualquer processo decisório ou participação social no campo da gestão ambiental. Finalmente, é a repressão violenta de um Estado fascista sobre qualquer forma de contestação social. A partir destas três perspectivas podemos concluir que a colonialidade ambiental deu origem a um ciclo de lutas pela defesa da terra, da água e da vida comunitária; estas lutas podem ser consideradas descoloniais, porque propuseram um modelo alternativo ao autoritarismo do Estado fascista.

Palavras-Chave—Colonialismo Interno; Justiça Ambiental; História Ambiental Decolonial; Fascismo e regimes autoritários.

1 Introduction

AFTER the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Francisco Franco's dictatorship devised a national policy to develop and industrialize the country. After 1945, Franco's Spain became internationally isolated, and the regime developed an autarkic policy that focused on spreading propaganda about feeding the people (Barciela *et al*, 2001, Barciela 2015, Gorostiza 2016). The National Colonization Institute and the National Industry Institute were established in 1939 and 1941 respectively, and devoted themselves to "produce, produce, produce!", a slogan from Franco's speech after his victory in the Civil War in June 1939. In spite of the plans' methods and propaganda, large-scale dam and canal systems were targeted to produce energy and promote industrial and urban growth (Garrahou *et al*, 1989: 383-454). The rhetoric of autarky and its focus on discovering the great potential of unexplored lands failed to acknowledge the people's real misery and hunger (del Arco 2007). The emphasis on industry and the policy of nationalizing hydraulic enterprises far exceeded the scale and water capacity of any regenerationist, liberal, or republican plan conceived before 1939. In short, Francisco Franco ended up betraying rural communities and creating the very proletarian and urban industrial culture he had fought to prevent (Garrahou *et al*, *ibid*; del Arco, 2010).

The 1940s brought a system of slavery and forced labor, while the 1950s were marked by the prevalence of rural-to-urban migrations and cheap manpower. These factors, along with the economic opening and international assistance that occurred after 1955, combined to create what was considered a *techno-natural revolution* and a *wet dream* for Spain (Swyngedouw 2007 and 2015: 99-128). In 1964, tax-free zones were created in certain "Development Pole" cities, following advice from the World Bank (Biescas Ferrer 1977). As a "developing country", Spain also benefited from international aid for its development between the

1950s and the 1970s (Sanz 2005; Martín Aceña and Martínez Ruíz 2009; Swyngedouw, 2015: 147). These capitalist policies accelerated the country's great leap towards industrial and urban development, and consequently, to domestic crises and massive migrations from rural areas to the Development Poles and abroad (Carr and Fusi, 1979; Marín i Corbera 2008; Martín Aceña and Martínez Ruíz, 2009; Valero-Matas *et al* 2010). The Francoist planners considered traditional rural cultures "uneconomic", and the regime implemented a regulation to wipe them out (Cuesta, 2001).

Regarding environmental transformation, it was under these developmental policies that a critique against colonialism emerged as a consequence of environmental conflicts and regional inequalities. Archival and newspaper sources show that a double environmental and colonial critique arose as a result of the conflicts against coal-fired power plants, large hydraulic infrastructures, and nuclear power plants, but also against mass tourism and large-scale transportation infrastructures. The first environmental thinkers, antifrancoist writers and journalists, and organic intellectuals identified an "interior or internal colonial" situation in Spain as a consequence of the extractivism of natural resources. This colonial critique emerged between 1971 and 1979, and originated from the environmental struggles in "abandoned" regions of the country, such as Aragon, Galicia, Extremadura, and the Canary Islands.

Mario Gaviria, and José Manuel Naredo documented these struggles and described the "internal colonialism" of the Francoist regime. Gaviria was an urbanist and sociologist whose work revolved around urban and rural rights. In 1974, he published the first ecologist manifesto in Benidorm and led the first anti-nuclear campaigns with Pedro Costa Morata and AEORMA, the first green association. He also edited a book of collective scientific research in 1977, titled *El Bajo Aragon expoliado. Recursos naturales y autonomía regional*. Naredo, an ecological economist, also worked with Gaviria on the problem of pillaging and spoliation in Extremadura. Together with Juan Serna, they published *Extremadura saqueada. Recursos naturales y autonomía regional* in 1978. Both books were considered the founding works of environmental criticism against Francoism. Ed-

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uardo López Aranguren and Mariano Aguilar Navarro completed the "internal colonization" theory. López Aranguren was a professor of sociology interested in regional and national consciousness and inequality. Mariano Aguilar Navarro was a socialist and scholar in the Canary Islands. Mario Gaviria, along with these antifrancoist intellectuals, defined the internal colonialism of deserted regions such as Galicia, Extremadura, Aragon, or the Canary Islands. The inhabitants, natural resources, capital, and energy produced were taken without compensation from these peripheral regions and delivered to the industrial metropolitan centers of Madrid, Barcelona, Tarragona, Bilbao, and Seville. Outside of environmental circles, the work and activism of these individuals, has not been recognized for questioning the centralism of the transition to democracy, but rather, as we will discuss below, for theorizing about a topic that Eurocentric thinking is not yet willing to accept.

We will analyze as follows the emergence of the critique of the "environmental coloniality" of the Francoist dictatorship and how this critique connected to the foundation of several environmental justice struggles in Spain. In order to do so, we will first describe narratives of exploitation and pillaging from concerned populations during environmental conflicts. The empiric cases revolve around the following issues: water and natural resources exploitation, energy colonialism and pollution, and technological colonialism. Next, we will explain the concept of "internal" or "interior" colonization described by the environmental and *organic* intellectuals of the 1970s. Finally, we will discuss our concept of "environmental coloniality", along with its methods of decolonization and its contributions to Spanish environmental history.

2 Pillaging and plundering of water resources

Examples of "workforce coloniality" were seen during the 1940s, as canals, reservoirs, and dams were often constructed using forced labor (Acosta Bono *et al.*, 2004). After the 1950s, the labor force came largely from rural populations. These emigrant laborers were untrained and were plagued by hunger and poverty. Workplace casualties were numerous, and were falsely recorded on death certificates

as resulting from strokes or other natural causes. These workers essentially constituted a slave labor force, due to their poverty and poor living conditions (Campo Vidal 2007). Forced expropriations and evictions led to a pyrrhic economic compensation system. In many mountain communities, some property owners took their own lives (Sabio Alcutén 2011). Suicide was often the consequence of the loss of livelihoods and properties. In other valleys, many villagers engaged in long and costly legal battles and court processes, often finding themselves without defense and facing difficult legal barriers (Mairal 1993; Menjón 2006; Pinilla, 2008; Cabana et Lanero 2009; Corral Broto 2011; 2012b). Old "electricity factories" that were run by communal, neighbor, or family ownership from 1900 to 1930, soon disappeared. According to Cuesta, "the capital of the center was not interested in associating with the local capital", and "the 1000 million Kw/hour produced by the large dams of Sobrarbe, meant that the existence of an 'electricity factory' producing 4 Kw/hour on a communal property was obsolete to the development of a sector dominated by Big Capital" (Cuesta, 1999: 266).

As oral and local history has reported, some engineers stole concrete and cement to build their houses (Marías Cadenas and Corral Broto 2006; Campo Vidal 2007). Partly as a result of these practices and subsequent shortages, major disasters related to dam building occurred. The disaster in Ribadelago (León) took place in 1959. The failure of Vega de Tera dam due to poor construction killed 144 people and displaced residents living between Ribadelago and Sanabria lake. As a result, the exiled trade unions and anti-Franco political organizations criticized the national policy of building large dams. Francoist authorities suppressed information about the lack of iron and reinforced concrete in the construction of the dam.¹ Newspapers that were censored by the regime defined the disaster only as the result of "a simple overflow" of the dam.² In the rigged

1. *España Popular*, Epoca Segunda, Year XVII, num. 879, 15 January 1959, p. 1, and *passim*; AIT CNT, *Órgano Oficial del Comité Nacional del M.L.E. en Francia*. Época II, num. 717, 25 January 1959, p. 2, and *passim*.

2. *ABC*, January 10, 1959, p. 15; *La Vanguardia*, January 11, 1959, p. 5 and 16 January 1959, p. 4.

of recklessness.

Between 1964 and 1967, in Mequinenza (Aragón), women, children and men organized two demonstrations to protest the dangers of the big dam project, which was constructed on the flooded mines. The Mequinenza Ebro river dam aspired to be the biggest in Europe, along with Vaiont's dam in Italy. Local villagers questioned the Francoist celebration of "25 years of peace" in 1964 by calling it "XXV years of peace and 7 years of war against ENHER" (Gaviria, 1977: 165). Immediately, The Communist Party, together with Christian worker and youth organizations, published articles about the Mequinenza dam struggle.³ For the first time, underground labor organizations incited internal environmental activism beyond the local level, promoting meetings and protests, targeting national public opinion, and linking with similar events nationwide, such as Ribadelago, Castrelo de Minho, etc. Christian workers organizations fought for legal protection against the risks of dam failures (Corral-Broto 2013). In the 1970s, clandestine trade unions began to advocate for the improvement of living conditions on behalf of those affected by the conflicts.⁴ For the first time ever, they contested the water policy and the Ebro river transfer - a project to transfer water from Aragon to urban and industrial Catalonia (Pinilla, 2008; Corral-Broto, 2015).

These underground parties published manifestos against the river transfers and nuclear power plants that were products of the environmental coloniality of Franco's policies toward natural resources.⁵ For example, *Ebro*, a clandestine propaganda publication, qualified the expropriation of Mequinenza's dam as "premeditated and

authorized abuse" and "plunder, an insolent and brutal pillaging". In their campaign against big dams, antifrancoist trade unions and left-wing parties argued that "public investments should be made by the criteria of social profitability and ensure the development of the most backward areas".⁶ Concerning the Ebro River transfer, peasant trade unions championed "regional solidarity" in opposition to "regional inequalities".⁷ In 1971, the Communist Party called for regional justice and spoke out on the abuses of powerful regions.⁸ In addition, FRAP explained environmental injustices as follows: "they [regional elites and bourgeoisie] were never affected by emigration or concerned by environmental degradation, nor did they experience the need to reclaim development or regional balance at all".⁹ In 1977, the fight against "the colonization of the Ebro valley" was christened by Angel Delgado in the collective work entitled *El Bajo Aragon expoliado*, which was edited by Mario Gaviria (1977: 148-215).

The "plunder, an insolent and brutal pillaging" or the "colonization of the Ebro valley" could not have been implemented without repression and censorship. Following the suicides and deaths from avoidable environmental disasters, the Catholic church in Aragon gave its support to energy companies. Local priests, alongside residents harmed by the Mequinenza dam, publicly denounced the state's repression. The regional antifrancoist journal *Andalán* would also be censored due to its coverage of the struggle from 1973 to 1975. Issue 26 was censored because the journal "criticized the mayor of Mequinenza and the archbishop of Zaragoza for favoring the company ENHER to the detriment of forty needy families who were reluctant to move to the new town, and who had lost their support when the parish priest was replaced" (Forcadell, 1997: 56-60). In 1973, the parish priest was removed because during mass one day he said: "today instead of speaking about the Gospel, I am going to explain what is happening in Mequinenza so that you know the truth of

3. Local Archive of Saragossa (AMZ), Communist Party Collection, 'El partido comunista ante los problemas agrarios hoy', *Nuestra Bandera*, 53, 1967, p. 16-23 and *Juventud Obrera*, 86, September 1964 and 97, August 1965.

4. Government Delegation Archive in Aragón (ADELGA), Police Collection, box 4, April 1973; ADELGA, SIGC Collection, b. 2 and 4, March 1973 and 1 June 1976; *AIT-CNT órgano de la Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*, num. 9, IV time, December 1976, p. 3.

5. *Ofensiva*, May 1972, in AMZ, CP Collection, 'Política General del PCE. 1950-1977' files, b. 42505; General Administration Archives (AGA), Interior Collection, 'Memorias de los Gobiernos Civiles' files, b. 52/475, *Memoria del Gobierno Civil de Huesca de 1972*, 1973; *Mundo Obrero*, XLIV, 9, 8 May 1974.

6. ADELGA, Police, b. 5, subversive propaganda *Ebro*, num. 30, May-June 1973 and num. 35, March-April 1974.

7. *Ibidem*.

8. ADELGA, Police, b. 2, February 1972.

9. ADELGA, Police, b. 23, 24 April 1976.

what is happening".¹⁰ A year later, the same thing happened to the priest of Fabara, Wilberto Delso, who was active member of the assemblies against nuclear plants and large dams, and a friend of the former priest of Mequinenza (Corral Broto, 2015).

In Galicia, in the first novelized testimony against the Castrelo do Miño's dam, we can observe the same reasoning of this energy colonialism and the "cult of kilowatt hour" (see citation below). Stories about water coloniality gave rise to the "dam novels", which offered narratives of the tragedies and as "syntaxis of memory" (Moncada 1994; Llamazares 2015; López-Vega 2017):

What follows could have happened in Castrelo do Miño, in Maus de Salas, in Vegas de Camba, in Frieira, in Portomarín, in San Estaban do Sil, in the Peares, in Velle, in Montefurado, in Pontenovo, in Quereño, in Eume, in Portodemouros... That is, in any of the Galician villages where large dams were built - poverty for the majority, wealth for the minority. These dams transformed their lands, their houses and their own inhabitants into at thing so complex, so abstract, and so tragic that they called it the KILOVATIO/HOUR. We decided to title this novel "Morrer en Castrelo do Miño" because in Castrelo do Miño could have happened, as we call it, the untold story. But above all, because of what the role of Castrelo do Miño within the useless struggle sustained for years by the Galician people - always offended and subjugated - against the barbaric and alienating invasion of the dams meant - and still means. And because, in Castrelo do Miño, many things died. (Fernández Ferreiro, 1978: 7)

3 Mining and energy colonialism

The mining runoff that polluted the rivers was a source of frustration for the whole Francoist fishing elite, who enjoyed spending their weekends on hunting and fishing trips. An Asturian lawyer and friend of José Antonio Suanzes - a minister and President of the National Institute of Industry - developed an environmental conspiracy theory about the river pollution. He loved fishing for salmon, but they had all disappeared from the Asturian rivers in the 1950s due to mining and industrial pollution. In a letter to his friend and

minister, the lawyer suggested that the politicization of Asturian miners could be responsible for the black water in the river.¹¹

The complaints against the cellulose fiber industry and the coal-fired power stations were backed by top rural elites of the Franco regime, as well as by the powerless small farmers (Corral Broto 2012a). Francoism wiped out any hint of compensation and ruthlessly suppressed penalties during the July 18th pardons (Corral Broto, 2018). The regime was able to nullify any proven scientific evidence of industrial pollution, even after the thorough scientific investigations conducted on behalf of the claimants. Capitalist appropriations of scientific investigations, which were overseen by the scientists of the State, always saved industrialization. Many of the large landowners that complained about coal-fired power plants were removed from office, and they subsequently sold their land and emigrated to the big cities (Gaviria, 1977: 119-128). Mayors who let complaints proliferate were also removed from office, such as in Escatrón (Saragossa).¹² Coal mines fueled coal-fired power plants, which in turn produced acid rain and serious public health damages. Agrarian and medical experts explained and quantified the damages caused by Escatrón's coal-fired power plant, but these reports were ignored by industrial engineers, whose response demonstrated their loyalty to the cult of the kilowatt hour:

Before concluding this report, we believe that it is appropriate to emphasize the value of the wealth produced by the Escatrón Coal-Fired Power Station for Spain, considering the multiplying power of electricity in Industry, which according to economists can be considered to be of the order of 50 times its value... 720,000 (kw production) X 0.8 (price) X 50 = 2,880 million pesetas. Saragossa, February 27, 1967. The engineer.¹³

The regional archival records allow us to analyze this mining colonization at a local national

11. Historical Archive of State Society of Industrial Participation (AHSEPI), 'Archivo Altos Cargos. Presidentes Varios' Collection, 'Juan Antonio Suanzes' files, Correspondencia con Luís Álvarez Hevia, 30 June 1952.

12. Local Archives of Escatrón (AMEsc), box E.3.2.6., file, Libro de Actas files 1966-1968, 9 September 1966.

13. AMEsc, box K.1.2.3., "Urbanismo. ENCASO" files.

10. ADELGA, SICG, b. 3, October 1973.

scale. The problem with the extraction of coal and its burning in the coal-fired power stations was that these operations were conducted for export purposes. The coal was not consumed in the producing regions, which absorbed the pollution and bore the environmental damages. Barcelona, Tarragona, Sagunto, Valencia, Seville, Bilbao, and Madrid were the destinations of the electricity network. This was precisely what Gaviria and his collaborators denounced as "internal colonialism" (Gaviria 1977: 119-128). One of these collaborators was the economist and organic intellectual of the Aragonese Socialist Party, José Antonio Biescas Ferrer. Under the pseudonym *Normante* in *Andalán* press magazine, he defined the plight of the mining province of Teruel as the exploitation of its mining resources by capitalists from outside the region. Biescas Ferrer said, "the beginning of a typical colonial exploitation in which the laying of railway lines had a clear meaning [...] simply to extract increasing quantities of [iron and coal]", further explaining that this process was not intended for the development of industry in the "extraction" region. Therefore, he demanded a "fair and well-balanced regional development" plan (Figure 1). The Socialist Party affirmed in *Andalán* that "in energy matters, the party supports the socialization of the mining exploitations [...] and the creation of differentiated electricity tariffs, an old aspiration of Alto Aragon, which would mean, if implemented, the disappearance of a de facto colonial situation".¹⁴



Figure 1: "Mining colonization" described by Biescas Ferrer. Source: *Andalán*, num. 76, 1 November 1975, p. 5.

In Galicia, the As-Encobras coal-fired power plant project also shaped another "extraction region". Protesters argued that "Galicia's electricity needs are more than satisfied". The company Lignitos de Meirama S.A., together with a coal-fired power plant of Unión Fenosa, stated after the death of an activist: "under any point of view, the industrial exploitation of a deposit of one hundred million tons of lignite, capable of supplying a 550 MW coal-fired power plant for a quarter of a century, deserves the title of 'public utility'". The local priest Ramón Varcárcel, a law graduate and member of the Comisiones Labriegas, took a stand against the pro-company collaboration of the Catholic church with these words: "The Church is on the side of the system, what the hell is it going to help! We have to get rid of the Church we have".¹⁵ The cult of kilowatt hour, religious collaboration with energy companies, state repression, and low compensations were also evident in this conflict (Lanero 2013).

4 Techno-coloniality: heavy industry and nuclear plants

Peasant and underground trade unions started to mobilize public opinion about both over-polluted sites in 1972. In Monzón, a socialist activist led legal actions against the air and water pollution of Monsanto and other chemical industries located there. After the reconstruction of the UGT trade union in 1976, they linked public concerns with urban pollution and speculation in Saragossa worker districts with the rural pollution in Monzón and Sabinánigo. They asked themselves "when did [dictatorship's press and media] speak out against pollution? When did they put a stop to urban outrages? Never. This, and all exposed above, is the result of a government, a form of state, contemptuous of popular will and serving a few".¹⁶ The denunciation focused on technological colonialism, as we can see in Figure 2. During the economic openness of the 1950s, the French company Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann purchased 50% of the shares of the Hidro-Nitro company in Monzón

15. Ya, 20 February, 1977, 'Mañana, segunda ocupación de tierras de As Encobras'; *Diario 16*, 16 February 1977, 'As Encobras: volvió la calma'.

16. *El Socialista aragonés*, num. 3, March 1976.

14. *Andalán*, May 1977, p. 6.

(Huesca). According to Biescas Ferrer, the heavy chemical industry was installed there "due to the difficulties encountered by the multinationals in the existing anti-pollution legislation on the other side of the Pyrenees". Silicomanganese and refined ferromanganese were products that emitted "strong pollution during their manufacture and which are mostly exported" (Biescas Ferrer 1977, 193). Etino Química became a subsidiary of Monsanto Ibérica, a company which was set up in Monzón. Cementos del Cinca was founded in 1956 to produce cement and concrete. Monzón was known for being one of the most polluted cities in Spain. Since 1973, the provincial sanitation board tried unsuccessfully to close these industries because of their industrial pollution (Corral Broto 2011).




Figure 2: "Technological colonialism" in Monzón. Source: *Alfalfa*, num. 2, 1977.

In Sabiñánigo, the financial group of Urquijo Bank and its subsidiary, EIASA, along with industries such as CEPISA (Celulosa del Pirineo), Compañía Aragonesa de Industrias Químicas, and Fósforos del Pirineo, were all created in the Gallego River valley. The industrial pollution of the Gallego River forced the establishment of an interprovincial commission in 1957, which did not manage to stop the pollution.¹⁷ At present, this area is known as one of the most contaminated places in Spain due to the accumulation

of a pesticide composed of lindane by Inquinosa (Bosque 2019). The violence that was carried out in order to protect polluters was part of a permanent state of environmental injustice and corruption. As previously mentioned, the regime did not hesitate to absolve the polluters in the July 18th commemorative pardon (Corral-Broto 2018). According to Gaviria, these peripheral rural spaces were essential because "they become or will become a support for undesirable activities, i.e., those activities that need a lot of space to disperse pollution" (Gaviria, 1997: 94).

After the development plans of 1964, working class districts in Saragossa (Aragón), Erandio (Basque Country), Seville (Andalusia), and Barcelona (Catalonia) suffered from overcrowding, industrial pollution, and lack of decent living conditions (Hormigón, 1999; López Romo 2011; Gorostiza Langa 2014; Corral Broto 2015a; Gorostiza et Sauri 2017; Nicolás, Salgado, et Ubierna 2016, 31). In 1968, two workers in Erandio were killed in a demonstration against industrial pollution. In 1974, a local Sevillian protester died, and the following years brought similar fatalities, the last of whom was Gladys del Estal Ferreño in 1979, shot by a Guardia Civil at a protest against the construction of a nuclear power plant in Tudela (Navarre). In Saragossa, a city designated as a 'Pole of Development', four out of sixteen districts began campaigns against industrial and urban pollution in 1972, in Utebo, La Almozara, El Picarral, and Las Fuentes.¹⁸ The residents of Utebo's suburb and Las Fuentes launched campaigns against industrial hazards because of labor accidents and explosions that caused ten deaths between 1973 and 1976.¹⁹ In La Almozara, Las Fuentes, and El Picarral, a peripheral workers district association said that the regime did "not expect that workers would reach old age" and asserted that "workers are also human beings".²⁰ These associations explained explicitly in their underground press magazines "why people go away from the city buzz, looking for pines every week, on every three-day week-

18. ADELGA, Police, b. 26, 15 November 1976.

19. ADELGA, Police, b. 24, July 1976; ADELGA, SIGC, b. 4, 25 June 1976; *Andalán*, num. 92, 1 July 1976, p. 5.

20. ADELGA, SIGC, b. 4, June 1976.

17. ADELGA, Water Collection, b. 5, 18 November 1957.

end".²¹ In Barcelona, in the districts of Poble Nou, Nou Barris, Horta, and El Carmelo, neighborhood communities fought in vain against chemical industries and speculation projects (Figure 3).²² In the Valencian working landscape, there was a struggle over access to nature and outdoor recreation around El Saler and La Albufera (Hamilton, 2018). The working-class districts of Murcia and Seville, Carmona, Jaen, Granada, and Huelva also reclaimed green spaces and fought for the monitoring of industrial and air pollution and better environmental conditions (Escudero Andújar 2007; Pérez Cebada 2015; Contreras Becerra 2018). In peripheral communities from north to south, a link emerged between environmental security inside and outside the factories that were placed close to workers' housing. In 1972, the Manifest for Aragón's Communist Party asserted: "In Spain, Aragón definitely has what we could call, without any kind of exaggeration, an internal colonization situation, which will lead inexorably to the economic, social and political degradation and the fall of our region".²³



Figure 3: Protest against Fertrat chemical industry (Poble Nou, Barcelona 1975). Source: Arxiu Històric Poble Nou.

The final feature of this technological coloniality had to do with what was called "technofascism". The ambitious National Energetic Plan (PEN in Spanish) appeared in 1974. Nuclear plans were severely criticized, and the backlash against

them was considered an anti-imperialism struggle because of the financial aid and support they received from the United States and West Germany (Figure 4). In Aragón, Galicia, Basque Country and Catalonia, the opposition to these nuclear power stations was led by local communities called "antinuclear committees". Democratic coordinating committees organized maydays, festivals and anti-nuclear marches. From 1975 to 1977, rural and urban actions against nuclear projects were also supported by the Democratic Coordination committee, which claimed a "democratic management of natural resources" to respond to pillaging and plundering.²⁴



Figure 4: AEORMA's poster against nuclear plants and the Ebro River transfer. Source: ADELGA, Police Collection, b. 26, 1975.

The issue was brought to light through the lens of an environmental justice perspective. In 1977, the Communist Party analyzed environmental issues, calling them "an unfair distribution of ecological sacrifices" in the following statement:

24. *Andalán*, num. 92, 1 July 1976, p. 5; ADELGA, 'Derecho de Reunión. Conferencias y actos públicos denegadas' Collection, b. 167, 9 November 1976; *II Asamblea de Aragón*, Juventudes Comunistas de Unificación de Aragón, March 1977 ADELGA, Police, b. 27.

21. *Especial Camo Ebro*, *ibid*.

22. *Butifarra !* Num 1, 1975.

23. *Ofensiva*, May 1972.

*Unequal development allows monopolies to exploit life-sustaining raw materials, to lower prices (agrarian products, minerals, water and energy), to exploit manpower (essentially through underemployment in the rural areas, which forces people to emigrate without any requirement in terms of wage, security, and working conditions), and to enact an unfair distribution of ecological sacrifices (polluting industries, nuclear power stations, experimental military camps). If these kinds of explorations were to disappear, it would end monopolist capitalism as well.*²⁵

5 Internal colonialism and environmental coloniality

Paradoxically, the first use of "internal colonialism" in Spanish politics came from Ledesma Ramos, who was the founder of Falange, the fascist party (Love 1989). He used the concept of "internal colonization" to describe Rio Tinto SA as having "an atmosphere of colonial exploitation that is irritating to the moral dignity and economic interests of the Spanish". Ramos first used the term "internal colonialism" in Spain to describe the conspiracy between the Spanish liberal regime and English government officials and industries in Rio Tinto (Ledesma Ramos 1940). However, the theory of internal colonialism emerged in Spain out of the concepts developed by environmental and sociological thinkers such as Gaviria, Naredo, Biescas Ferrer, Beiras, López-Aranguren, and Navarro, as we have discussed above.

Gaviria analyzed the specialization in "areas producing natural resources, raw materials, and energy, called residual rural spaces, and areas transforming and consuming these resources". The latter were considered developed areas. "Specialization", said Gaviria, "goes against the complex balance of ecosystems; there is a flow of goods in a colonially organized manner, and as a consequence, there is some way to rationalize this system, such as land use planning" (Gaviria, 1977: 93). He asked himself, "how can a population oppose a polluting activity, which is basically a

colonization operation on its air, for example?" In addition, he answered, "that the water belongs to those who work it, the minerals belong to those who live above them, and the air belongs to those who breathe it. This is a way of establishing a popular, regional and local sovereignty over the so-called national sovereignty, which in the end was nothing more than the making of concessions of water, electricity, or mines to the dominant classes and groups" (Gaviria, 1977: 96). He thought that "the concrete regional autonomy should be based on its own natural resources".²⁶ For him, a new democratic society should overcome "the internal and external imperialist aspect of Spanish capitalism" (Gaviria, 1977: 97); and this new society should seek "new energies, mainly solar, and treat renewable and non-renewable resources with the utmost ecological care (soil, fauna, flora, food, health, pleasure, etc.)" (ibidem).

The Galician economist and politician, Xosé Manuel Beiras, also expounded upon the issue of regions and nationalities in Spain. According to Beiras, there "is a manifestation of the uneven development of capitalism. This gives rise to the combination of different forms of class exploitation with the phenomena of internal colonialism".²⁷ The socialist and scholar Mariano Aguilar Navarro theorized that in the Canary Islands "the germ of a mixed colonialism could be constituted, since in it can be detected deformations of internal colonialism and new versions of classic colonialism. In the Canary Islands, the regional problem is associated with a conflictive and tense situation".²⁸

The concept of "internal colonialism" emerged within these environmental struggles and continued to be used until the 1980s (López Aranguren 1977; Hind 1984; Love 1989). González Casanova had already stated in the 1960s that the relatively interchangeable nature of the notion of colonialism and colonial structure was not only international but also intranational (2006). He analyzed the hierarchical relationship between center-periphery inequalities, between urban and

26. *Pueblo*, 27 April 1977, p. 6.

27. *Andalán*, num. 68/69, 1 and 15 July 1975, p. 16.

28. *Pueblo*, 14 February 1977, and *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, num. 126, 12 February 1977, p. 39, Mariano Aguilar Navarro, «Entre el colonialismo y el olvido».

25. AMZ, CP Collection, 'Política General del PCE. Antes de 1977' files, b. 42505, 1976.

rural inequalities, and between metropolitan and colonial societies. In Spain, the theories of Gunnar Myrdal and Eduardo López Araguren influenced the understanding of environmental coloniality that was first described by Gaviria, Naredo, or Biescas Ferrer, and was subsequently diffused in various regions by local press magazines such as *Andalán* (Garcés Sanagustín, 1997: 109-36). Beyond Spain, criticisms of "internal colonialism" in the management of natural resources emerged from similar struggles against environmental coloniality that occurred in different places at the same time, such as Hawaii, California, Arctic Canada, Québec, and Brittany (Blackford 2004; Libecap 2007, 12-13; Sandloss et Keeling 2012; Bécot 2015).

We propose here a concept of "environmental coloniality" based on the coloniality of Franco's modernity, which contains the three aspects of the modern-colonial world system: coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being (Wallerstein, 1974 and 2008; Escobar, 2000; Dussel 2000; Mignolo 2000; Lander 2000; Escobar, 2006; Castro-Gómez et Grosfoguel 2007). The modern colonial matrix enhances disparities between who gets knowledge, power, and identity. The rural residual and urban peripheral spaces, according to Gaviria, were colonized by ideals of mainstream progress, which were based on energy colonialism and its new gold - the kilowatt hour over community life. We have proven that an environmental coloniality existed in Francoist Spain, which also proves that González Casanova was right. Paradoxically, a country that initiated colonialism underwent a reversal of this system in order to achieve the same growth rate as Western society.

We must acknowledge that thinking of coloniality as a non-reversible phenomenon has evident analytical limits. The environmental struggles described here, along with the internal colonialist interpretation of Francoist Spain, have shaped the West as a space and subject of colonial appropriation. We must take a post-colonial, critical, and decolonial approach to studying Europe and the West, because the colonial matrix makes, remakes, and unmakes power, beings, and knowledge, especially when it comes to natural resources and the environment (Escobar 2006;

Corral 2013). In other words, the modern colonial project was designed to reconquer and subdue the West itself, because commodity frontiers are always in a state of constant mobility (Moore 2000).

The environmental coloniality of Francoist Spain helped to delineate the differences between the environmental coloniality of liberal and democratic countries. We have seen that a *hard* environmental coloniality implied the supremacy of the kilowatt hour regarding scientific expertise, lack of compensation, and environmental violence and repression. In the case of hydro-power dams, France and Italy were examples of *soft* environmental coloniality, because, since the 1930s, French electricity companies were compensated financially for any expropriation or complaint. In the Alps, compensation policies focused on inhabitants' permanence and tourist development during the *houille blanche* developmental era (Dalmasso 2008). Environmental disasters in France (Malpasset Dam, 1959) and Italy (Vaiont Dam, 1963) were not followed by media censorship (Huber et al 2016). The brutal actions of the *Guardia Civil* from 1968 to 1979 demonstrated the violent culture of repression, which originated in the famous *año de los tiros* of Rio Tinto. This environmental struggle occurred in 1888 (Chastagnaret, 2017), and was still ongoing during the Francoist regime, at least until 1979. A social and environmental history of the Francoist regime shows that behind the "simple overflow" was an old matrix that, like a *boomerang* effect, was eliminating livelihoods, extracting natural resources, and reproducing a new commercial obsession - the kilowatt hour. The brutality of the state, the total defenselessness of the laborers, and the laziness and negligence towards those affected by environmental damage created a higher degree of environmental coloniality between an authoritarian, a fascistizing or fascist regime, and a democratic one.

6 Conclusions

The environmental coloniality of Francoist Spain was what led to new struggles during the transition to democracy. Environmental coloniality had a degree of achievement and structural violence

that depended on regional and political economic issues. The colonized peripheries included urban areas occupied by the working class, the countryside, the mountains, and the fishing areas. The countryside - the provinces that Francoism tried so hard to win over - betrayed him. This led to the victory of the moderate UCD and socialist PSOE at the first national democratic elections in 1977, and in local democratic elections in 1979, even in eminent agrarian and landowners' provinces (Táboas 2018).

Colonialism and authoritarianism are intertwined in the political system of Francoism, in that they all point towards a developmentalist model, typical of Capitalist Modernity. In this model, natural resources exist for the purpose of being extracted and used for manufacturing goods. This is only possible through "violent discipline of labor" and fascist repression of any kind of protest against the privatization of nature and the expulsion of inhabitants from the territories (environmental refugees). This scenario is a good example of coloniality of power and being, which is complemented by "technofacism", in which the knowledge of the territories is erased by the scientific management of the territory and orientated to the needs of the internal and external market. It is a techno-industrial model of territorial management that involves the disappearance of traditional biocultural knowledge that is highly valuable for community sustainability, such as agricultural and livestock knowledge. This process of epistemicide is an essential part of the coloniality of knowledge imposed by capitalist modernity. Coloniality of the territory is evident through the imposition of industrialization or energy production projects located in peripheral territories within the State. This phenomenon followed the model of environmental (in)justice in the 70s and 80s. Finally, social resistance led to a cycle of struggle within Franco's regime, which has not been studied until now, and which challenges the dominant historiographical narrative of "absence of social protest". In fact, there were struggles for resources with evident environmentalist profiles that anticipated and linked other (de)colonial struggles, and that set the precedent for the environmentalist movements of the Political Transition.

Francoist Spain developed a higher degree of environmental coloniality regarding undercompensation, repression, and violence. These were the aspects that characterized Francoist environmental coloniality: first, and materially speaking, a significant decrease and undervaluation of economic compensation for environmental damages; second, the increased repression of environmental unrest, which ranged from removal of officials from office to police control and repression of public disturbances; and, third, the more widespread misuse of civil and criminal justice (Cabana and Lanero 2009; Corral-Broto, 2015).

Mario Gaviria, Biescas Ferrer, José Manuel Naredo, López Araguren, and Mariano Navarro discovered and developed the concept of the *boomerang* effect of the modern-colonial world-system, the pillaging of natural resources, and internal colonialism. Working class organizations and rural and urban peripheral residents helped define environmental justice, rights, and citizenship against Franco's environmental coloniality. They also fought against government secrecy and private environmental policies by promoting a democratic environmental public sphere in order to manage natural resources as common goods in a way that was inter-regional and well-balanced. Finally, they linked internal risks and catastrophes inside and outside the factory. In this way, they envisioned jobs integrated with better environmental conditions. To paraphrase Gaviria, proper care for ecological systems - *cariño ecológico* - will end the colonial rule of extractivism and pollution.

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Italian fascist modernisation and colonial landscape in Albania 1925-1943

Modernização fascista italiana e paisagem colonial na Albânia 1925-1943

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Abstract—Environmental history and landscape transformations vis-à-vis agricultural modernization policies such as the reclaiming of land hardly features in studies on the Italian fascist annexation of Albania. This paper focuses on the main features of Italian economic and landscape efforts in Albania during the fascist years through a general overview of the Italian period with respect to economic and land reclamation works, and an exploration of Italys colonial policies in the modernization and regeneration of Albanian landscape. Its scope includes Italys interwar interventionist efforts in Albania in economy and land reclamation, but not the substantial literature on Italian contribution to the transformation of Albanian urban landscapes during the interwar period. The urban planning of Albania by Italian architects, engineers, and urbanists that developed from 1920 to 1939 has been dealt with extensively in scholarship regarding Albania.

Keywords—Albania; Fascism; Landscape; Reclamation; Colonialism; Italy; Società Littorio.

Resumo—A história ambiental e as transformações da paisagem face às políticas de modernização agrícola, tais como a recuperação de terras, dificilmente figuram nos estudos sobre a anexação fascista italiana da Albânia. Este texto centra-se nas principais características dos esforços económicos e paisagísticos italianos na Albânia durante os anos fascistas através de uma visão geral do "período italiano" no que diz respeito às obras de recuperação económica e fundiária, e explora as políticas coloniais italianas na modernização e regeneração da paisagem albanesa. O seu âmbito inclui os esforços intervencionistas italianos entre guerras na Albânia em matéria de economia e recuperação de terras, mas não a literatura substancial sobre a contribuição italiana para a transformação das paisagens urbanas albanesas durante o período entre guerras. O planeamento urbano da Albânia por arquitectos, engenheiros e urbanistas italianos que se desenvolveu de 1920 a 1939 tem sido amplamente abordado em estudos académicos relativos à Albânia.

Palavras-Chave—Albânia; Fascismo; Paisagem; Reclamação; Colonialismo; Itália; Società Littorio.

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"Non vi è dubbio che se potremo lavorare in pace entro alcuni anni saremo in possesso della più ricca regione d'Italia/There is no doubt that if we can work in peace, within a few years we shall possess the richest region of Italy." (Ciano, Diario, August 19th, 1939)

1 Introduction

THE conquest of Albania by fascist Italy on April 7, 1939 was the culmination of the longer insistence on political and economic domination of Italy upon Albania. During 1925-1943, within the framework of several bilateral agreements the presence of Italian economic-financial investments in Albania grow heavenly. Italian investments were related to the modernization of Albania and establishment of joint Italian-Albanian companies. The economic and political investment of Italy was wrapped in a colonial "civilizing" facet, that culminated with the military occupation of Albania, turning the country into a hybrid form of Italian colonial domination.

This paper focuses on the main features of Italian economic and landscape modernisation efforts in Albania during the fascist years through a general overview of the formal and informal Italian rule, known in Albania as "*koha e Italisë*" (Italian period), as a reminiscence of the period from 1925-1943, when most of the economic, agrarian and building enterprise in Albania was undertaken by Italian companies. The paper will explore first the "Italian period" with respect to Italy's colonial policies toward Albania and concrete initiatives of modernization and regeneration of Albanian rural landscape. My aim is to investigate the Italian colonialism in Albania, specifically in the context of agricultural modernization programs such as the reclamation of land. My interest lays in analysing how Italian agrarian interventionism in the Albanian landscape was shaped by a "civilisation mission". Secondly, using archival research, I will expand my analysis particularly on the district of Kavaja (1939-1943), as a case-study for understanding the importance that Fascist Italy put on economic valorisation of its imperial communities. Borrowing Rodogno's insights (Rodogno 2014) on Italian '*spazio vitale*' in the context of rural Albania, I will try to expand my overview on Kavaja district, previously owned by the Albanian state and some local landowners, and turned three months after the occupation of Albania, in summer 1939, over to a private Italian company. It served as a model for constructing a Fascist civilizational core with trustworthy Italian colonist and Albanian settlers, whose duty was to

valorise the use of landscape and undertake vast land reclamation.

2 Italian political and economic expansionism in Albania prior to annexation

Italian colonial ambitions over Albanian territories began already during the Ottoman rule, in parallel with Italian expansionist policy in North Africa. The earliest Italian efforts (1910-1911) in achieving economic aims in Albanian provinces of the Ottoman Empire included projects on the exploitation of forests in the northern region of Mirdita, land reclamations, bridge construction, and the building of a railway line across the Balkans to the Adriatic coast. Such projects did not materialize due to the outbreak of the war in Libya (Lampe and Jackson 1982, 208; Bosworth 1975, 583-4). Albania proclaimed its independence in 1912, and Italian diplomacy played a crucial role over the recognition of Albanian independence and supporting the new constitutional principality of Albania under a German Prince (Duka 2007, 34-36). After entering First World War in 1915 Italy agreed to divide up Albania between Balkan countries, leaving a small autonomous state in the central regions under its mandate. (Vickers 2001, 87; Duka 2007, 89). Following the end of WWI (1918-1920), Italy's ambitions in Albania became clearer in the town of Vlora which became the centre of the Italian political protectorate over Albania and plans were even being discussed for moving Italian peasants from the region of Emilia with the double purpose of easing the demographic weight in Italy and bringing civilization (Bego 2017, 108-9). Italians were opposed by a local insurrection supported by the Albanian government and were forced to leave Vlora's possessions in early September 1920, but obtained recognition from the League of Nations to defend Albania's borders, granting thus the right of a de facto protectorate upon Albania.

In the years to follow the relations between Italy and Albania improved and both countries moved swiftly in reaching agreements on trade and infrastructure by giving Italian companies privileges in oil and mineral resources' exploitations, in the state-bank sector, public works,

forests concessions and in regulating the migration of workers with the Government of Ahmet Zog (1925) who became 1928 King Zog I of Albanians (Pastorelli 1966, 52). The 1925 loan agreement established the Società per lo Sviluppo Economico dell'Albania (SVEA - Society for the Economic Development of Albania), which was responsible for the management of the Italian loans to Albania. Throughout the late 20'ies and 30'ies SVEA loans were used in expanding the Italian investments into Albania economy by awarding mostly to Italian companies' public works as construction of roads, railroads, ports, public building and land reclamation and swamp draining projects. SVEA loans were used to create a political and economic dependency of Albania towards Italy, which became extremely vulnerable to Italian political pressure. Italian advisors were hired in the Albanian public administration, as in the military, education, economic sectors (Mëhilli 2017, 24; Pula 2008, 575).

In 1925 with a SVEA loan was established the Albanian National Bank, which issued the Albanian currency Lek (ALL), and functioned as well as Albania's state treasury (Roselli 2006, 30-34; Fishta 1971, 4). Plans were made for the construction of new roads and bridges along the Tirana-Durrës, Shkodër-Elbasan, and Durrës-Vlora lines. Of particular importance was the construction of public and military buildings, villas, royal palaces, and ministerial offices in the capital Tirana, where work was regulated in accordance with the plan designed by Armando Brasini and Florestano di Fausto (Menghini 2013, 43). Engineer Luigi Luiggi was responsible for the Port of Durrës project and drafting the swamp reclamation plan over an area of about 3 km² around Durrës for the eradication of malaria. This plan aimed to (1) transform "the dead swamp into a living lagoon" by building a system of canals consisting of a main canal connected to secondary canals to allow the entering of salty sea water into the lagoon, thus preventing the reproduction of mosquitoes; and (2) to fill part of the marshes with materials excavated from streams and the dredging of the port, thereby transforming the marshy lands into "perfectly reclaimed and cultivable land that will generate great agricultural income and become a source of wealth for farmers and the country"

(Godoli, 2013, 56). Land reclamation and swamp draining works were part of Italy's 1930s efforts to enable the future settlement of Italians and the establishment of several experimental agricultural farms alongside Albania's western lowlands of Durrës, Shijak, Kavajë, and Vlorë (Arkivi Qendror Shtetëror/National Central Archive - later cited as AQSH 1943, Fondi (F.). 462, Dosja (D.) 4. Viti (V.). 1931 Fleta (F). 1-6).

According to Fischer, SVEA money gave the impression that the Italians were using it to carry out a series of works in the interest of Albanians, but roads and bridges were built for Italian military purposes, mainly towards the borders with Greece and Yugoslavia. The port of Durrës was expanded to the extent that upon its completion ships larger than usual merchant ships could be anchored (Fischer 1984, 104). Pula instead considers that Italy made the most significant inroads into Albanian social and political life. Italy's use of Albanian state apparatus, to introduce fascist forms of social organisation, meant that by 1939 annexation, Albania was primed for fully fledged fascism (Pula 2008, 575).

Landscape investments and agrarian investments and land reclamation were carried out by "Ente Italiano Attività Agraria" (EIAA-Italian Agency for Agricultural Activities), which was the largest company operating in the agrarian sector, with the aim of developing experimental farms and settling Italian colonists. It obtained a concession of 3,000 hectares of land in the Shijak plain in 1926, and was granted the right to purchase and export agrarian products directly from Albanian producers and cooperatives (Trani 2007, 30).

It is possible to get a sense of the kind of reclamation project Italians had planned by analysing a model of contract between farmers and EIAA that is preserved in archival folders of Central Archive in Tirana. EIAA drafted a contract for sharecropping in 1931 that would to be valid for 7 years. The contract was signed in Rome by the EIAA and the Office for Internal Migration and the National Confederation of Fascist Unions (AQSH, F. 462, V. 1931, D. 4, Fl, 1-15). According to this contract, the settler (called *mezzadro*/sharecropper) or *colono* was the head of an entire farmhouse household, which included the settler's relatives and kin. Family units would

migrate to Albania only to settle in the EIAA's farm where adult men between 18 and 65 who were able to work the land were called work units, while boys from 15-17 and women up to 65 years old and suitable for work were considered half units. The entire family was committed to work the land and to share their products and profits with EIAA. EIAA was responsible for land reclamation works, plantations of vines, orchards, and olive groves, for the chemical fertilization of the new plantations, the excavation of new places, as well as the execution and maintenance of new embankments. The settler was obliged to cultivate the land as an expert farmer with the "diligence of a good family man", in conformity with directives issued by the company management, in order to obtain the right to participate in the division of products in return for the work performed. He was required to dedicate his own work and that of his family members to the farm, to take care of livestock, and to work on individual crops, as well as the harvest and conservation of the products up to the moment of their division. The settler had to take care of the orderliness of the house, the stable and related works, as well to supervise the farm to prevent any damage and usurpation. He could keep for his own back yard a poultry farm of 50 heads, 2 pigs, and 2 milk goats. The settler was granted a small plot of land in the vicinity of the farmhouse for planting a vegetable garden for family use. Everything produced therein remained the sole responsibility of the settler. The company gave each farmhouse a premium of Lire 2000 maximum and Lire 1000 minimum as compensation for food for the first year (AQSH, F. 462, V. 1931, D. 4, Fl. 4-14).

After almost a decade from the inception of EIAA, in May 1935 the Italian Minister in Tirana Mario Indelli proposed to the Albanian government the settlement of Italian peasant labourers near Shijak and Durrës, where EIAA had its concession along with a package of several loan agreements (Pearson 2004, 370). On March 19th 1936 the Berati-Indelli Agreements was signed in Tirana which foresaw: (a) the payments by the Italian government to Albania in liquidation of the 10-year loan of 1931 over a two-year period; (b) the funding of the Albanian state budget deficit; (c) the capital refinancing of the Albanian

Agricultural Bank through an agricultural loan over a three-year period; (d) a loan for the tobacco monopoly over a two-year period and two loans for the port at Durrës were agreed upon (Roselli 2006, 61, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - AMPJ 1936, D. 13). Tomes notes that these agreements (13 in total) "represented Albania's capitulation to Italian fascism. Albania became an Italian colony. Its chief port Durrës threatened to become another Massawa, the jumping off place for the next Italian imperial adventure" (Tomes 2003, 180).

Following the agreement, Italy announced in April 1936 that "300.000 Italian colonist would settle in Albania shortly", while denying that concessions were granted for Italian colonization (Pearson 2004, 379). In August 1937 Count Ciano envisaged his colonial vision for Albania in his Diary:

"I have persuaded the Duce to give 60 million to Albania over the next four years for works of various kinds... We must create stable centres of Italian influence there. Who knows what the future may have in store! We must be ready to seize the opportunities that will present themselves. We are not going to withdraw this time, as we did in 1920. In the south we have absorbed several hundred thousand Albanians. Why shouldn't the same thing happen on the other side of the entrance to the Adriatic?" (Ciano 2006, 28)

Meanwhile EIAA General Director sent a letter to the Albanian Undersecretary of the Ministry of Economy Terenc Toçi in 1937, in which he asked to accommodate in its new farm of Rushkull new Italian settlers as the Albanian peasant workers "were not motivated to work". But, in order to do so, the Albanian Agrarian Law represented an obstacle, banning the existence of property with an unproductive area of more than 40 hectares and nationalized the surplus of each property. The expropriated parts were to be redistributed to citizens with no land, or whose land did not meet their family's needs (Roselli 2006, 128). EIAA, land reclamation works could not be carried out by poor rural families, they required a certain capital investment which the society would issue only if the Ministry of Economy would displace Albanian peasant labourers and accom-

moderate Italian peasants in Rrushkull as it had done with the concession in Shijak. EIAA claimed that its "experiment at Rrushkull is unlikely to succeed unless one wants to tackle the problem of replacing current farmers with more suitable and well-intentioned Italian colonial families" (AQSH, F. 462, V. 1937, D. 4, Fl. 1-3). EIAA reminded Toçi of the work undertaken for the modernisation and development of agrarian lands in its own territories. 1926-1937, EIAA invested 25 million Liras for the creation and development of modern agrarian farms in Shijak, and sought to extend its territories to create a farm in Rrushkull, which would become the first modern agrarian farm in Albania (AQSH, F. 462, V. 1937, D. 4, Fl. 4).

Nevertheless, until 1939 land reclamation and regeneration of Albanian rural landscape were realised at a slow pace. The land distribution with most of land in the hands of few landowners was an obstacle in expanding the projects for agrarian modernization. EIAA's project was extended to a few areas, mainly in Rrushkull and Shijak (AQSH, F. 462, V. 1943, D. 28, Fl. 2-6).

3 Annexation and colonial endeavour

On Good Friday, April 7th 1939 Italian troops landed on the Albanian coast without any formal declaration of war. Italian bombers over the Albanian sky scattered leaflets in Albanian with messages like, "Italian troops who have been your friends throughout centuries have often demonstrated that friendship to you" (Pearson 2004, 443). The occupation took place in two days, whilst King Zog, his wife, and their 2 days old infant fled to Greece.

On 12 April 1939, the National Constituent Assembly proclaimed the abrogation of the political regime theretofore in force, as well as the abrogation of the constitution of 1928; created a puppet government vested with full powers; and expressed the desire for the creation of a union between Italy and Albania, offering the Crown of Albania to the King of Italy in the form of a personal union. The royal decree of 18 April 1939 established an Under Secretariat for Albanian Affairs in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by Zenone Benini (Roselli 2006, 99). This was soon followed by the 3 June treaty according

to which Italy would manage the foreign affairs of Albania and represent it abroad. This hybrid union was mainly implemented by the newly created office of the Deputy General of Albania (*Luogotenente Generale*), by the Albanian Fascist Party (AFP), and by the assignment of permanent Italian counsellors in Albanian ministries. The Viceroy, who represented the exiled King, held the right of sovereignty. While Italy controlled the Albanian government through its appointive powers, the government was controlled from within by the permanent Italian counsellors, who were active in every ministry (Papa-Pandelejmoni 2014, 435).

Mussolini promised the Albanian people that he and fascist Italy would bring Albania justice, order and prosperity, as he was known for keeping his word! (Straneo 1940, 7; Gurakuqi 2018, 82). An agreement had been reached previously about the fusion of the two armies, the fascist organizations, and the customs union, as well the equivalence of the Albanian Lek to the Italian Lira.

The union between the two countries in reality it can be seen as a colonial dependency within the Imperial Community, as the two countries shared the head of state, the fascist political regime and diplomatic representation, and had unified their customs and armies (Mai 2003, 84). Albanian citizens in Italy and Italian citizens in Albania were entitled to all civil and political rights that they enjoyed in their respective countries (Ambrosini 1940, 64). Albania was ranked as a privileged Italian colony in comparison to African colonies subordinated to Rome, although granted the fact, that from a formal, legal point of view, the union of Italy and Albania was bound by international law, and was an agreement between sovereign bodies. Albania formally maintained territory, people and sovereignty, but substantively it emerged immediately that it was subordinate to Italy (Villari 2007, 160).

Mussolini made efforts at not identifying Albania as a colony and insisted that Albania's independence was being preserved, although would be Fascistised and Italianised (Pula 2008, 576). Italy's Mediterranean expansion was portrayed as the natural continuation of ancient Rome's "civilizing mission" (Ben-Ghiat, Fuller 2005, 2). The bilateral connection between Italy and Alba-

nia was justified within the Italian-Mediterranean '*spazio vitale*', a kind of equivalent to the German's *Lebensraum*. The *spazio vitale* according to Rodogno was organised hierarchically on racial principles, at the lowest level consisted of the indigenous peoples of Africa, and at the apex stood the Italian imperial race (Rodogno 2005, 322; 2006, 48-52). Within the vital space Rome would impose the 'new order' (*ordine nuovo*) and organize a community both for peoples of which it was made up and for those other peoples, which, though less civilized, would nevertheless grow and develop, like those who previously belonged to the Roman Empire. (Rodogno 2006, 48). Within the Imperial community fascist revolution would create the new man accomplishing Mussolini's revolutionary endeavor to create a new world. The new Italian men would illuminate the world with their art, educate it with their knowledge, and give robust structure to the new territories with their administrative technique and ability, with their enterprise and organization of trade (Rodogno 2005, 321-323). Hence fascist rhetoric propagated that the Italian government spent millions of liras over the past years to help Albania in every way. The country was presented as exotic and attractive, the "*Oriente sotto casa*", a fascinating country like a bazaar, and at the same time its considerable natural resources were not even exploited, waiting instead for the older brother, Italy, to put them to use (della Rocca 2001, 215). The reclaiming of Rome's glory through imperial conquest and the 'perpetuation and expansion of Italianness [in the world]' through a parallel work of 'spiritual penetration' constitutes a central element of fascist ideology (Ben-Ghiat 2006, 385). That's why in order to legitimize this imperialist project Italian academics and politicians downplayed Albania's cultural, social, and political cohesiveness and its viability as an autonomous national entity, legitimising Italy's entitlement as Albania's natural protector, while unearthing its resources (Mai 2010, 83). The fascist axioma was progress through Fascistisation.

The Albanian historian Dëzhgiu points out the importance of the strategic fascist *spazio vitale* in the Balkans, where Italy sought to create a "continental autarchy" by controlling the region's wealth. Through vital space narrative Italy sought

to control the wealth of the Balkans for its war economy and the creation of the "Imperial Community". Albania with its rich natural resources would be useful for the autarkic Italian economy. It was a country with many great economic opportunities, and its agricultural areas were considered of a great development potential. At the same time, Albania was important to Italy because of its geographic position, serving as an economic bridge to Eastern Balkans (Dëzhgiu 2005, 146). Pula considers the Italian rule in Albania 1939-1943 as a colonial form of domination. Italy's expansion in Albania is a feature of colonialism, as it was accompanied by the settlement of acquired lands by colonists. Italy considered Albania to be a territory open to Italian settlement. Further Italy dominated largely in controlling Albania with its heavy Italian military presence; the political sphere by establishing an institutional structure that gave ultimate political power to Rome; and economy through the control of state finances, the flow of capital, and the exploitation of labour and natural resources (Pula 2008, 577).

To the core of the Fascist imperialism stands the idea of '*valorizzazione*' (valorisation), by which was meant an economic mission to civilise the economies of the countries that would belong to Rome. The 1939 valorisation endeavour in Albania was associated with an extensive policy of both public works and integral reclamation (Rodogno 2005, 319). Economic, urban, industrial and agricultural programs were drawn up aiming to civilised and modernize Albania. In May 1939 Jacomoni met in Rome with Benini, and other high officials to discuss concrete economic and technical plans for Albania (Gurakuqi 2018, 100). In a study report submitted to Mussolini in October 1939, Benini outlined Albania's natural and economic resources, underlining the importance of accomplishing large land reclamation works in Durrës, Shijak, Tiranë, Vlorë, and Fier by the end of 1941 (Amendola 1939, 23; Sakja 2016, 174; 34; Milo 2014, 63). While the reclamation of the Durrës swamp was in progress, which completion was scheduled for 1941. Reclamation works had been carried out in Myzeqe, and a large experiment on land reclamation was started in the Kavaja (Figure 1). It was expected that complete regeneration of rural landscape would affected

over 200,000 hectares of land (Sakja 2016, 176). Benini's optimistic report hoped that extensive investment in Albania would bring both economic and political benefits for the next 10 years.



Figure 1: Fascist reclamation plans in Albania proposed by Benini (Annuario del Regno di Albania, 1940, 110).

Fascist redemption of nature, man and society were the core of the reclamation and valorization that Italians aimed in accomplishing in Albania. The agrarian-human-cultural reclamation scheme was expressed in the redeeming efforts on landscape and people. Reclamation was essential in the improving the physical, economic and cultural condition of the country by transforming landscape and people at the same. The new Fascist state in Albania would take an engineering role in imposing to people and landscape its regenerative vision of a civilized and developed country. This transformative vision was reflected in many articles published in the newspaper *Fashizmi*, the official newspaper of AFP and *Ekonomia Kombëtare* (National Economy), the official newspaper of the Ministry of Economy. In 1940 article of *Ekonomia Kombëtare* entitled "The Fascist regime and the Albanian peasant" the focus was put on the goal to

improve the rural environment and the Albanian race:

"To improve the Albanian village and farmers living conditions a huge reclamation work is required. The reclamation work in Albania is a difficult task, but even more difficult is the regeneration of the Albanian village, and the pulling out of villagers from the misery. In order to be aware of his important role and his mission in the society, the peasant (katundari), must be rescued from the plagues and diseases to enter into the human civilized world. He needs to be redeemed from damnation of past landowning beys; to be aware about his role and mission in the society, but particularly he has to be devoted and love the village and his land, in which he has tied himself with boundless bond. What Fascism is about to accomplish in Albanian lands is one of the largest crusades, which will be mentioned in history. Is not only about improving the economic conditions, but is a matter of rescuing a nation, a whole race."

The transformation of nature into a modern landscape and of peasant into a Fascist 'new man' were the goals of the environmental reclamation policy. Fascism built its own blood and soil narrative in which the racial quality of people was embedded in the national landscape, a result of both natural and racial/historical forces (Armier 2011, 14). Fascist integral reclamation was the way out from misery and corruption as it has occurred in the Italian soil.

"The redemption of Albanian nation and its people would only come from Fascism and duce. Soon the same transformation that have been visible in Pontine Marshes or Sicily would be real in Albania too!" (*Ekonomia Kombëtare* 1940, 22)

Albanian historians assume that Italy with its economic policy and exploitation of the country's natural resources practically turned Albania from mid 20-ies into its colony. The fascist strategy of Rome in its essence was not only the creation of a military base in Albania for further expansion into the Balkans, but also the use of Albania's natural resources and economic potentials (Milo 2014, 61). Italian officials planned to make use of the potentials that Albanian rural landscape presented

to bring "extinguished" Italian settlers in and to overcome centuries-old agrarian backwardness (Dëzhgiu 2005, 148-49). The need to increase the production capacity in Albania made the Italian occupation authorities realize the need for more Italian labourers in Albania. That was the reason why the Italians requested that large tracts of land belonging to Italian companies be given to Italian citizens. This would ensure the accommodation of Italian settlers in Albania, who would bring about the disruption of the political status quo of local Albanian interests in favour of Italian interests (Gurakuqi 2018, 147). Hence in Albania an Italian colonial system of domination was built up. Italy maintained a large military presence, established an institutional structure that gave ultimate political power to Rome, maintained metropolitan domination over the economic sphere and opened the country to Italian settlers (Pula 2008, 577-578). Rome established in Albania a kind of a protectorate order based on cultural diffusion and not on the Nazi racial order that Germans placed in Europe. The cultural circles propagated the Albanian-Italian bond. Italy's pursuit in Albania embedded within the colonial project, was characterized by deeper economic integration and an intricate system of institutions aimed at binding to Rome (Mëhilli 2017, 24). Saying that, Italian colonisation project went along Mussolini's demographic view. Mussolini defined the demographic problem as "an aspect of public health", believing that the population strength was the basis of the political, economic, and moral power of the state. (Podestà 2012, 255). The reclamation of land and the repopulation of countryside areas in Italy and in its colonies by peasants, not contaminated by urban hedonism, would have maintained the characteristics of strength, vitality, and sobriety, which represented values of fascist Italy. The demographic colonization would prevent Italy from the consequences of bourgeois degeneration of urbanism: hedonism, consumerism, poor fertility, and pacifism (Podestà 2012, 256). The peasant colonial families would be placed in new rural villages created in Africa and Albania where they would obtain their own farms, tools, and supplies. This is the reason why the organic family unit should have become the basis for migration to the colonies: to preserve and expand the Italian race,

culture, and lifestyle (Podestà 2012, 256).

Although Italians had vague ideas about Albania offering Italy territory for settlers, a project for the demographic colonization of Albania drafted by Italian specialists was submitted to Jacomoni on August 1st, 1939, to bring up to 2 million Italian settlers to outnumber the local population (Berend 2006, 126). An Italian-Albanian society was established for this settling. Known as Littorio, it was responsible for the agrarian assessment of 10,000 hectares of land in Kavaja area (Gazetta Ufficiale Albanese, October 14th 1939). This colonial program foresaw the accommodation of Italian settlers alongside development of cultural and educational programs. Only through such triple reclamation scheme as Ben Ghiat called it, namely *bonifica agricola*, *bonifica umana*, and *bonifica culturale* could Italy aimed at remaking nature according to an ideal optimum, the purification of culture on a nationalistic basis, and engineering of the 'new Italian men' (Ben Ghiat 2011, 4).

Cultural reclamation imposed the rise of educational programs for both Italians and Albanians. Archaeological excavations were undertaken to find the '*Romanità*' of the new territories. Several Italian cultural and cinematographic entities were given the exclusivity for both the creation and management of cinemas, and the distribution of journalistic and documentary films produced by LUCE Institute (Trani 2007, 69-70). The fascist lifestyle was propagated in the journals and magazines; the foundation of cultural institutions of various kinds, as Dante Alighieri Society, "Scanderbeg Foundation" spread Italian language, culture and academic life Likewise, *Società geografica italiana* promoted a study mission to deepen the knowledge of the Albanian territory and population. The Royal Academy of Italy was used as a propaganda tool in appointing several Albanian personalities as its members, and creating a Study Centre for Albania. Scholarships for Albanian scholars and students to research and study in the Italian universities were another tool in increasing Italian influence (Trani 2007, 70-72).

Apart from the urban transformation of the capital centre, Italians built in Tirana a "Pater" village named after the Milanese company of the Swiss engineer Dario Pater producing prefabricated buildings, with 500 homes for Italian fam-

ilies (Santojanni 2008, 80), composing from the aerial view the DUX. An agricultural enhancement program was started, in which the farms resulting from the integral reclamation were organized. A flat area with fertile land near Tirana was chosen and divided into two zones, where 900 Italian and 2,000 Albanian families were to settle. The houses, arranged in groups, were located at the centre of the farms and formed 6 villages, with a population of 8,000 units spread over nearly 36,000 arable hectares (Santojanni 2008, 80).

4 The district of Kavaja - as a model for the agricultural colonization of Albania

On October 8th 1941, Ciano mentioned in his diary a gift that the Albanian government wished to give to the Italian General Ugo Cavallero, the commander of the Italian army in the Greco-Italian War. Ciano noted:

"The Albanian Government's intention to offer to General Cavallero some Albanian soil. At the time I thought that it had to do with the custom and made no objection. But when I learned that the offer was not symbolical, since it had to do with a grant of almost twenty-five hundred acres of land in Fieri, I definitely opposed it. This did not please the interested parties, who are now trying to twist things around with a letter from [Prime Minister] Vërlaci announcing the accomplished fact. But Cavallero is not grateful to me. Quite the contrary. But... when bread is being rationed and the people are hungry it is not the time to announce that Cavallero is celebrating... a present of a few millions" (Ciano 2006, 543)

The Albanian government seemed inclined to generosity in giving land presents to high Italian officials and duce himself. Four months after the occupation, on August 4th 1939 the Albanian council of ministers took a decision to donate to Mussolini 10.000 hectares of land between Kavaja and Shkumbin, in gratitude for duce's interest towards Albania and its people. With this donation the Albanian government expressed its respect to duce who planned to spend 2 billion Liras for the development of the country and use this land

as he deemed appropriate in the interest of the common good (AQSH F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 33). The decision was followed on the same day by another one, regarding the expropriation of privately owned 4000 hectares in this land donated to duce. The whole land would be under the supervision of the aforementioned *Littorio*, which for the district of Kavaja established a land transformation and reclamation company, *Impresa di Trasformazione Agraria e Lavori di Bonifica in Albania* (ITALBA), for settling of Italian family units and vast land reclamations (AQSH F.161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 26).

Previously the land reclamation and the settling of Italian colonist family units in Albania was proposed in a memorandum to the Albanian government from Rome on July 31st 1939. This memorandum on "Demographic colonisation in Albania - with Italians and Albanians repatriated from abroad" foresaw that Albanian settlers from Kosovo and Italian family units from abroad and from Puglia would be accommodated in the districts between Durrës, river Shkumbin, Peqin, and the Adriatic Sea. Albanian peasants who possessed land in this area would move in other territories or turn into employees (AQSH F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 3-4). The start of the colonisation was set for September 1st and for that the national road Durrës-Peqin needed to be completed urgently. Italians proposed to acquire the management of the "Near-East" American School of Agriculture in Kavaja, by replacing its American personnel with Italian instructors while keeping the Albanian teaching staff. An agricultural experimental station was to be built near the school, which could immediately begin its work with irrigation and forage production, thereby encouraging the transition to intensive cultivation and the enhancement of the livestock throughout Albania (AQSH F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 5). Littorio sought influence over the district of Tirana too, which extended to the coast along the Vorë-Shkodër road. The company would try to purchase lands between Ishmi and Mati rivers (ca. 11,000 ha) through direct negotiation with the landowners. In order to start the reclamation works needed to fit the territory for colonization, Littorio urged the government to accelerate the works on the Vorë - Mati Bridge road (AQSH

F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 7). It demanded to expand its land acquisition with further 2850 hectares of arable land between Durrës-Shijak-Kavaja. For that it demanded the support of Jacomoni in granting the management of the land, which was partly shared among private landowners (1000 ha), the municipality of Durrës, (600 ha), Red Cross (600 ha), and the remaining 650 ha of the Ministry of Interior (AQSH F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 6).

Littorio was adamant to expand its land colonization across the entire territory to promote the technical and social elevation of Albanian peasants, who would be able to access land ownership through work. Its work would offer new and stable homes to Albanians and Italians repatriated from abroad, as part of the Fascist initiatives for the creation of a "Greater Albania". For this, it sought the Viceroy's permission for educational programs which would accelerate Albanians' progress to the renovating system of fascist Italy. Through land reclamation and sanitary works the company would contribute in eliminating serious causes of mortality such as malaria and the decay of the Albanian race, ensuring a healthier and more fruitful work in the field of production. The company's activity would further contribute to the autonomy of Albanian food production and to economic autarchy, providing support through an intensive culture and irrigation of the territories. Ultimately, Società Littorio would be a tool of the General Lieutenancy for implementing Mussolini's "highest social justice" for the working people, redemption of the land, the men and the race" (AQSH F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 8). Therefore redemption of environment and the economic valorization would impact powerfully the life of the inhabitants and would transform the Albanian landscape. It was believed that environmental factors had an influence upon the new fascist man, who would live in a civilized and modernized rural landscape. As family units became the core of the Fascist colonization, in order to accommodate the colons' family units, it was necessary to create the necessary civic services for the colonists. Hence the constructions of clinics, schools, nurseries, kindergartens as well churches were indispensable and were entrusted to the Catholic priests and nuns (AQSH, F. 195, V.

1940, D. 561. Fl. 3).

Nevertheless, Litorio's colonization program for entire Albania was opposed by Jacomoni and Giovanni Giro, the Inspector general of AFP. Since for both of them this was the first colonizing experience, they did not wish to give the impression of seeking a purely Italian colonization of Albania. Therefore, the company had to arrange the Albanian peasant population living in Kavaja district and treating them equally with the Italian settlers sharing thus equally the farmhouse, farm units, and employment's contractual conditions. They proposed allowing Littorio to operate only in Kavaja and to administer 10.000 hectares of lands that the Albanian government donated to duce, in order to establish ITALBA there. Jacomoni authorized Littorio to start reclamation on state-owned arable land, and only after the government would reached an agreement on land acquisition and compensation with Albanian private owners, the company would start reclamation work on the expropriated plots. The foreseen intensive reclamation work and regeneration of the landscape was better to be implemented on a much smaller area of land, as it would allowed the population living in the district to live and work comfortably. Jacomoni encourage the company to increase the construction's cost for each colonial house from the foreseen Lit. 42,500 each, as in Kavaja "the company must give a sense of certainty that the Roman colonization being carried out there was both economically and politically solid and safe" (AQSH, F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 12-13). Jacomoni wanted the total control over company, he warned ITALBA and Littorio to allow any governmental initiative to interfere, control and orient the company's projects (AQSH, F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 14-15). Meanwhile Giro encouraged the Italian and Albanian settlers to get agrarian loans in order to buy their property within the district, and discouraged the company to transfer to other districts the small Albanian landowners without setting up property rights avoiding social and political consequences (AQSH, F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 23-24).

Littorio and ITALBA concession in the district of Kavaja was composed by the villages: Reth-Kalush, Balaj, Greth, Shelk, Kërcukaj-Gosë, Zhabjak-Zeleshtik, Ukshton, Rreth, Maskaresh,

Shar-Dushk and Stan i Ri (AQSH, F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 19-21). In November 1939, ITALBA took under its administration another district of 5500 hectares in Fier-Shegan that was donated to duce by the Albanian government (AQSH, F. 161, V. 1939, D. 438, Fl. 27). By 1943 the company accomplished the reclamation only of marshy land in Kavaja and Durrës plain and established there 600 colony units. These lands were given to the company only in the form of concession and any demand on land acquisition was refused by Jacomoni and Giro, who both wanted to avoid any turmoil by Albanian landowners, who were refusing to sell their property to the Italian companies.

The archival sources reveal that many Albanian landowners refuse to obey to valorisation's program. In Rrushkull dissatisfaction had arisen between EIAA and the peasants since September 1939. The villagers complained that the company had occupied part of their lands, blocked the road to their lands, transferred their yards, and made it difficult for them to keep livestock, putting thus pressure on villagers to impose new contractual terms (AQSH F. 252, V. 1939, D. 243. Fl. 79).

Although during 1939-1943 many Albanian peasants agreed to work as employees of Littorio and EIAA, others preferred to work in urban reclamations and construction. The phenomenon of switching from peasant to labor workers was very profitable for them as the salaries were increased and their economic situation improved. Whilst Italian colonists, who abandoned their colonies due to profitable jobs in the cities were threatened with repatriation to Italy (F. 161, V. 1939, D. 454, Fl. 8-12). EIAA and ITALBA demanded additional Italian settlers from Italy to work in their farms in Shijak, and Kavaja, and the return of Italian settlers who were working in cities where they were better paid. (F. 161, V. 1939, D. 454, Fl. 5, 8-12).

1940-1942 Albanian peasants were dissatisfied about the amount of financial obligations they had to pay off back to the companies and to state. The villagers were complaining about expropriations of their lands due to irrigation works carried out by Italian companies. They were unsatisfied about the unpaid work that they were forced to perform in the reclamation works for both

EIAA and ITALBA, which prevented them to work on their own lands. The reclamation work was limiting the access to their properties. The bank short-term loan was another tool that the EIAA used in forcing the villagers to mortgage the land and in case of non-refundable loans to cede it to the company. As the consequence in Kavaja and Shijak peasants rebelled and set fire on the grain products, clashed with gendarmery, and were punished with interment and expulsion due to sabotage (Dëzhgiu 2005, 149-162).

The Italo-Greek war affected the works of EIAA and ITALBA as many villagers from the southeastern areas on the border with Greece moved in the Myzeqe Plain and in Durrës. They settled in the lands, which previously lived Albanian settlers from Kosovo, the latter had left for Kosovo, after the unification of Kosovo with Albania in August 1941 (Dëzhgiu 2005, 155-156). But after 1942 many suffered unemployment, especially in southern Albania due to the dire situation that the war created.

In the end no matter what the Italians did, their reputation among the Albanians suffered. Their outwardly beneficent measures for local economic reconstruction, including the reclamation of land, mortgage, and loan facilities for farmers were perceived by the Albanians as a mere preparation for an extensive Italian colonization. The methods employed by the banks in granting agricultural loans and arranging mortgages seemed to Albanians to be designed to acquire the best lands for eventual distribution to Italian settlers who, thanks to the new constitution, were now able to own land in Albania (Fisher 1999, 95).

The irruption of capitalist economy associated with reclamation, property rights problems and dissatisfaction among Albanian and Italian companies, the limited access and the use of land were shaping the colonial landscape. From the planned 2 million Italian emigrants that were programmed to settle in Albania, after the end of the war, according to the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the country were around 27.000 Italians, most of them military and specialized workers (Papa-Pandelejmoni 2017, 131).

5 Concluding remarks

Although a latecomer to the European colonialism, Mussolini adopted its expansionist policy in Albania. In addition to ideological and economic arguments in developing its own expansionist needs through investing in Albania, Italy would at the same time transform the landscape and push the Albanian society towards modern capitalism. Before the Italian occupation of 1939, Mussolini's policy forced Albanian state to make continuous economic concessions and allow the intervention of Italian capital and companies, and settling of Italian colonists. After 1939 Albania became a satellite of Rome, integrated into the imperial Roman community. Mussolini imposed the application of the fascist model on politics and economics. The system of valorization through Italian companies aimed the fascistisation of the society and lifestyle. The integral reclamation model of people, culture and economy was the essence of the fascist narrative through which the civilization of the Albanian society was aimed according to the model that Rome imposed. Precisely economic valorization was a tool that fascist Italy unfolded on the Albanian landscape. Fascist rural modernisation policies and reclamation were seen as a redemption of landscape and people. Albanian landscape had to be redeemed, the reclamation of nature and people had to be accomplished through technical and modernisation of Albanian peasants and the settling of Italian colonists.

Land reclamation and the improvement of the rural environment in the districts of Shijak (1926-1943) and Kavaja (1939-1943) were the starting point of a series of plans for the economic valorization of the rural landscape in Western low plains, aiming the regeneration of the rural economy, and of the physical and moral conditions of the people. Agrarian economic policies, through the creation of large Italian farms, installation of Italian and Albanian settlers coming from abroad, expropriation of small Albanian owners, agrarian loans, reclamation works would have economic and physical impacts on the landscape and on the people until Italo-Greek war stopped the reclamation programs.

Belonging to the imperial community, economic autarky, rhetoric on the civilization and

redemption mission through the colonization and rehabilitation program, the presence of the Italian army, are indicators of the construction in Albania of a hybrid model of Italian colonization rule. Investments in the landscape with the aim of modernizing and transforming the rural environment, faced difficulties due to the fragmentation of properties; complicated contractual relations on concession and ownership; revolts and clashes between villagers and gendarmes and the lastly due to war effects. The desire to transform the Albanian nature according to the fascist reclamation model, created a kind of a hybrid environment, where the Italians were in the role of colonizing-civilizing primacy, striving for the modernization of the landscape and uncivilized people.

The hybridity of the Italian period was characterized even more by the Italianization of the economy and the landscape which notably was embraced till the beginning of Italo-Greek war, and by the financial benefit of Italian investments in the reclamation works. The dichotomy between tradition, with the fragmentation of land ownership, and modernity, with the collectivization of land holdings to be transformed from reclamation programs into modern farms, was another characteristic of relations during the Italian period.

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Perceptions and Uses of the Land: Agrarian Rhetoric and Agricultural Policy in Greece under Metaxas' Regime (1936-1941)

Percepções e Usos da Terra: Retórica Agrária e Política Agrícola na Grécia sob o Regime de Metaxas (1936-1941)

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Abstract—This paper aims to explore the ways in which the concepts of 'Nature' and 'Land' were incorporated and mobilized in the rhetoric of the dictatorial regime established in Greece by Ioannis Metaxas on August 4, 1936. Firstly, it examines the links between the construction of a national landscape and the emergence of a novel nationalist ideology in interwar Greece. Then, it looks into different ways in which politicized ideas of nature informed agronomic researches and practices and were translated in Metaxas' political thought and policies. These ideological connotations of Land and Nature inscribe themselves in the philosophical and economic doctrine of the 'peasantist nationalism'. Based mostly on radical agrarianism and neo-romanticism, this discourse gained momentum in the early 1930s and permeated autarchic economic and agrarian policies, especially after the collapse of parliamentary rule. Along those lines, Metaxas' dictatorship and its perceptions of the environment arguably align with features and trajectories of the authoritarian regimes that flourished all around Europe in the interwar period.

Keywords—Agrarianism; Land; Nationalism; Greece.

Resumo—Este texto visa explorar as formas como os conceitos de "Natureza" e "Terra" foram incorporados e mobilizados na retórica do regime ditatorial estabelecido na Grécia por Ioannis Metaxas a 4 de Agosto de 1936. Em primeiro lugar, examina as ligações entre a construção de uma paisagem nacional e o surgimento de uma nova ideologia nacionalista na Grécia entre guerras. Em seguida, examina as diferentes formas como as ideias politizadas da natureza informaram as investigações e práticas agronómicas e foram traduzidas no pensamento e políticas de Metaxas. Estas conotações ideológicas da Terra e da Natureza inscrevem-se na doutrina filosófica e económica do "nacionalismo camponês". Baseado principalmente no agrarianismo radical e no neo-romantismo, este discurso ganhou impulso no início dos anos 30 e permeou políticas económicas e agrárias autárquicas, especialmente após o colapso do governo parlamentar. Nesta linha, a ditadura da Metaxas e as suas percepções do ambiente alinham indiscutivelmente com as características e trajetórias dos regimes autoritários que floresceram em toda a Europa no período entre guerras.

Palavras-Chave—Agrarismo; Terra; Nacionalismo; Grécia.

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1 Nationalism, Fascism, and Nature

ONE of the various approaches of environmental history concerns the study of "deliberate human efforts to regulate the relationship between society and nature, and between social groups in matters concerning nature" (McNeill and Mauldin, 2012). This theme certainly includes the ways in which political ideologies shape, affect, and determine human attitudes and policies towards the natural environment (Hughes 2006). However, the environmental perspective should not be considered as a lens that could be applied to other topics of history; more than this, it is inherently and inextricably entwined with them (Isenberg 2014). Aiming to bridge environmental and political history, this paper examines certain aspects of human thought and attitudes towards nature; it investigates the ways in which perceptions of the natural environment were incorporated in authoritarian agendas, shaping ideologies and promoting certain policies towards the land.

More specifically, our study focuses on the abstract ideological conceptions of the quasi-fascist regime established in Greece by Ioannis Metaxas from 1936 to 1941¹ concerning the natural environment and sketches the conversion of these ideas into major political and economic projects, such as public works and corporatist legislation. We claim that the ideology of peasantist nationalism, already predominant before the establishment of the dictatorship, reached a new peak and was institutionalized as a hegemonic ideology under Metaxas' rule, in a process which ultimately led to significant environmental transformations.

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1. In short, the dictatorship established in Greece by the former General Ioannis Metaxas on August 4, 1936 was the culmination of a prolonged political and constitutional crisis after the country's bankruptcy in 1932, with its deeper roots lying in the legacies of the cleavage of the National Schism. The demise of Greek parliamentarism should also be placed in the wider context of the rise of authoritarianism, both a symptom and a consequence of the crisis of liberal democracy in interwar Europe. See: Chatzivassileiou 2010

It is widely accepted that nationalism is fundamentally and deeply rooted in the soil, as national identities are forged on the basis of the human bond with the place someone inhabits. During the process of identity formation, the imagined "land" signifies "unique cultural traits, primordial roots, and a community of fate". In this view, experiencing the national landscape "makes the belonging seem natural, real, and tangible" (Herb & Kaplan, 2017). Romanticist perceptions of the "national soil" were commonplace in any ultranationalist, fascist, or far-right political movement in inter-war Europe. According to their rationale, the notions of nature and soul were strongly connected; the "racial quality" of a people was thought to be "embedded in the national landscape".² This very landscape, in turn, was considered "as a by-product of both natural and historical forces" and allegedly expressed the "people's spirit" (Armiero and von Handenberg, 2013).

From this perspective, the soil was "organically tied" to the national body (Biasillo and Da Silva, 2021). In the national socialist "Weltanschauung", nature was celebrated as the sacred habitat of the German "Volksgemeinschaft" (Lee and Wilke 2005; Pois 1986). Introduced in the early '30s by the agronomist Richard Walther Darré, the "Blut und Boden" concept indicates the crucial position which the "religion of nature" held in Nazi ideology. This slogan "laid the foundations for a Nazified rural land ethic", endorsing the dissolution of the industrial societal and economic order and its replacement by an agrarian one (Lovin 1967; Lekan 2004).

The "cult of the peasant", advocating "a retreat into the unspoiled landscape, away from a society rapidly becoming industrialized and urbanized" (Mosse 1987) was not confined in Germany alone. The propagandistic celebration of the rural lifestyle was also lying at the core of Italian fascism as well. Agricultural labour was seen as a revitalising element in opposition to urban activities and ways of life, while cities were portrayed as "sterile" and "pathological" environments. Such premises led to the promotion of concrete, though controversial, initiatives, which

2. On the construction of a "national landscape" as a process by which "a nation-state decides to seize and alter a parcel of land to assert its control over a region" see also: Vlachos 2021

-in brief- can be reduced to the concept of "ruralizzazione" (Caprotti & Kaïka, 2008). In Mussolini's terms, the desired "regeneration" of the country's soil went hand in hand with the revitalisation of its people. This vision implied "both the return to some pristine origins and the creation of a completely new and human-made future" (Armiero 2014).

As recent studies suggest, the fascist "ideology of the land" should not be merely regarded as a reactionary or conservative conviction. As a matter of fact, it formed a distinct path in the "quest for modernity" (Fuller 2007); in that respect, significant projects like land reclamation works, were indeed part of what Tiago Saraiva (2016¹) has described as an "alternative modernity". The efforts of Salazar's "Estado Novo" to manage Portugal's natural resources serve as a typical example of the modernist dimension of these developments. In this Iberian version of fascism, the soil was transformed into a "national economic resource" by technology and ideology alike. Agrarian ideals were also embedded in the context of "traditionalist corporatism", which Salazar's dictatorship embraced (Saraiva 2016²; Guimarães 2020).

As for the Greek case, despite some essentially different characteristics that defined its particularity, the "4th of August" regime was substantially influenced by the fascist and the national socialist paradigm, sharing several ideological components, such as anti-parliamentarism, anti-liberalism, anti-communism, and corporatism. It also promoted the principles of radical agrarianism, idealizing the peasantry and rural life (Ploumidis 2016). In that sense, although we should not overlook the significant differences between the agrarian aspects of fascist and authoritarian regimes (chronological diversity, the role of agriculture in each country's economic development, differentiation of their rural structures and class stratification, varying degrees of political mobilisation of the peasantry, technological and scientific potential, clashing expansionist interests), arising from the disparate national frameworks, the Greek dictatorship follows most of the norms respecting the agrarian policies of the interwar "fascisms": ruralism, self-sufficiency as an essential goal, state interventionism, a technocratic approach to the agrarian sector, paternalistic cor-

poratism, militarism, as well as the prevalence of an agrarianist discourse (Fernández-Prieto, Pan-Montojo, and Cabo 2014).

In regard to the structure of our paper, its first, introductory section sets out the economic and social background of interwar Greece, highlighting the significance of agriculture for the country's development and the rise of agrarianism as a modernizing agency in the late 1920s. Following, the main part of the essay is two-fold; at first, it delineates the bedrock of Metaxas' peasantist ideology, as well as the basic features of the regime's agrarian discourse. Secondly, based essentially on quantitative evidence, it shows how these ideological features materialized into certain economic policies in the agricultural sector. Since it examines the ideology, the discourse and the policies of the "4th of August" regime, apart from revisiting the already plentiful literature on the nature of Metaxas dictatorship, our paper relies on key primary sources, such as newspapers, journals, the dictator's speeches, as well as state officials' works on agricultural and economic policy.

2 Rural economy and the rise of agrarianism in interwar Greece (1922-1936)

In the early 20th century, Greece was going through major social and economic transformations. The consolidation of national integration after a decade of wars and territorial adjustments (1912-1922) demanded new modes of governance and the expansion of state regulation and planning. Entering the interwar period through the cataclysmic aftermath of the Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922, the country was facing an unprecedented refugee crisis. In these circumstances, dirigisme, already thriving in post-WWI Europe, seemed essential for the state authorities (Liakos 2020).

At the same time, Greece remained a predominantly agricultural country. The drastic measures of the agrarian reform which was finalised after 1922, in the face of the urgency of the refugees' settlement, contributed greatly to the

regulation of the agrarian issue³, which in turn led to the appeasement of social tensions in the Greek countryside (Mavrogordatos 2017; Dertilis 2019). These developments had a significant impact on the country's social stratification; there was neither a "strong landed upper class" nor a rural proletariat that could have turned into a potential revolutionary mass (Zink 2000). Instead, by the early 1930s, the partition and distribution of the erstwhile Ottoman lands had resulted in the creation of an abundant stratum of smallholders. Fully dependent on the land they worked, these agrarian populations undeniably developed a special bond with their natural surroundings (Franghiadis 2007; Kostis 2019). The significance of the agrarian reform was evident to the political elites as early as 1920, when Eleftherios Venizelos himself underlined its conservative essence. The redistribution of land, he claimed, would prevent the danger of "seeing the peasants and the industrial workers of the cities coming together to violate the rule of law, attempting to shake its foundations".⁴

At the same time, the peasants, constituting the majority of the country's population, were well aware of their critical function, claiming that they "held the country's economy in their own hands".⁵ However, the extreme fragmentation of the land distributed by the agrarian reform combined with the underdevelopment of Greek agriculture resulted in the poor income and living conditions of the small landowners. According to their discourse, these people were suffering great injustices; high taxation and inadequate tariff protection were leading large masses of peasants towards starvation, in contrast with the privileges

enjoyed by the "parasitic bourgeois classes". Such grievances blamed the state apparatus for showing "an immoral indifference and contempt for the agrarian productive class" (Συνεταιριστής 1927). In the political arena, though, the minor agrarian parties established mostly by cooperative syndicalists during the 1920s were all short lived, with the exception of the Agrarian Party of Greece (AKE), which achieved notable parliamentary representation until its dissolution at the end of 1932 (Panagiotopoulos 2010).

The feeble and somewhat stagnant process of industrialisation in the early 1920s meant that the Greece's prosperity was to depend on the growth of its agricultural production and the increase of its income.⁶ The shift towards the agrarian economy was also propagated by the emerging technocratic elite of agronomists, who believed that the enhancement of agriculture was necessary from a social point of view as well, as it was the only way "to fight the alarming development of urbanism and its consequence, parasitism". In that context, the attempt of the fascist regime to achieve Italy's grain sufficiency (Battaglia del Grano⁷) was imitated by the Greek officials as well (Ploumidis 2011).

After Venizelos returned to power in 1928, his modernising vision of making Greece "unrecognisable" marked the intensification of state interventionism in the agrarian economy. The Liberal government undertook some ambitious land reclamation projects, focusing particularly on the newly integrated northern region of Macedonia. These public works, promising to yield plentiful arable land, were seen as the most essential tool for the country's economic growth, which rested on the increase of agricultural production. According to the Prime Minister, the effort to support agriculture, which was the "most important source" of the country's wealth, would prevent the peasants from "leaving the fields and moving to the cities, where the parasitic occupations thrived" (Mazower 2009).

3. In the first quarter of the 20th century, the agrarian issue in Greece was related to the unequal distribution of land and the presence of a large number of tenant farmers. It was mostly linked with the region of Thessaly, where the large ownership prevailed. Macedonia and Epirus, the regions annexed to Greece after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 had also a similar land tenure system but unlike Thessaly, there had not been any social tensions. The land issue was largely settled with the radical agrarian reform of February 1923, emerging as an outcome of the settlement of more than a million refugees in the country, after the defeat in the Asia Minor campaign.

4. This was part of a speech of Venizelos in Patras, several days before the elections of 1920. See: *Ελεύθερος Τύπος*, 26/10/1920, 2.

5. *Συνεργατισμός* 1930, 90; 1931, 534-536; *Δελτίον Γεωργικού Επιμελητηρίου Μεσσηνίας* 1929, 27.

6. In October 1928, the Minister of Agriculture, Ioannis Kanavos, stated in a press interview that the products of the Greek soil "were the basis of our whole economic life". See: *Ελεύθερον Βήμα*, 4/10/1928, 3.

7. On Italy's quest for self-sufficiency in grain, codified in the "Battaglia del Grano" slogan, see: Carillo 2021, 566-597.

The campaign of reinforcing the agricultural sector employed a plethora of educational methods, such as the circulation of journals, newspapers, and booklets, aimed at "the enlightenment of the peasants, the dissemination of knowledge about all the agricultural sectors and the raising of the cultural level of the peasants, so that they can cultivate their fields in a more scientific, efficient and productive way" (*Αγροτική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια* 1935, 243). Special branches of agricultural schools were also founded, in order to impart the adoration of the soil to the children. This educational process was totally in accordance with the dominant doctrine of anti-communism, typified by the "Idionymo" legislation (1929), which penalised communist propaganda. The commitment of the youth to their homeland was thought to alienate them from "virulent Bolshevik ideas" (*Αγροτική Ζωή*, 1929, 15). Apparently, the political discourse of the agronomists as well as the state policies headed towards building a conservative class consciousness in the peasantry in order to tackle urbanism, a phenomenon which purportedly led to communist leanings (Ploumidis, *ibid.*, 147).

During the early '30s, the devastating repercussions of the Great Depression inevitably struck the Greek economy. Subsequently, the default of April 1932 brought about the suspension of the land reclamation projects in Northern Greece. As a result of the crisis, Greece turned towards a new economic pattern. The collapse of global trade and the significant fall of the imports quota led to the expansion of the domestic markets and strengthened state interventionism (Franghiadis 2020). Given the grim prospects of the economic crisis, the ideological premises of the agronomists developed into a dire political necessity. Following the moratorium on the Greek debt, the devaluation of the drachma, along with the exhaustion of the exchange reserves foreshadowed the state's inability to import grain and other essential goods. Therefore, extra-ordinary measures of economic protectionism together with a further boost to agricultural production were the greatest objectives in the pursuit of rural self-sufficiency (Kostis 2019; Ploumidis, *ibid.*).

3 Peasantist nationalism and the corporatist aspirations of the Metaxas regime

As mentioned above, romanticist views contrasting urban and rural everyday life, abounded in the interwar agrarian discourse:

*"The extravagant costumes and the varied furniture of intelligent seamstresses and craftsmen... are completely absent from agricultural communities... A luxurious piece of furniture... cannot compare to the blissful feeling of lying down on the grass... The multi-talented, overweight and unhealthy bourgeois... cannot experience the pleasure of the sun-baked, robust and rosy peasant, who lies down on the greenery after a laborious day of ploughing or gardening..."*⁸

Several years later, this kind of rhetoric developed into a fundamental feature of the Metaxas regime's ideological nexus, aptly described as "peasantist nationalism". As the dictator himself noted, the peasants were "the healthiest part of the Greek society in body and soul, and the incomparably more numerous. Therefore, its prosperity reflects on the whole population". The rural world was also regarded as "the first and foremost producer of goods and therefore of our national wealth" (Metaxas 1969a). The moral dimension of the agrarian class was also reflected in its contribution to the safeguarding of the traditional values and the territorial integrity of the country. For that matter, the peasantry was deemed to be the basis of the social pyramid and Metaxas was at the top of it as the "First Peasant" (Ploumidis 2011).

The economic and social priorities of the regime were also arrayed in a romantic discourse that idealised rural life and praised the virtues of those who made a living through such occupations. The land was described as the people's "mother", who nurtured them, producing all the necessary goods. The peasants, its labourers and servants were also pictured as "the eternal source from which the residents of the cities spring" (Metaxas, *ibid.*, 305). In his public speeches, Metaxas pointed out that the primary cause for

8. *Αγροτική Ζωή* 1929, 4.

agriculture's well-being was the peasants themselves. It was only "when they loved the land like their child and feel that the land loves them back" that they "could they fulfil our agrarian ideals". This was the reason why he put in an extra effort to "alleviate the peasantry of their hardships" (ibid., 209-210).

In this regard, it is obvious that nature and human beings formed an organic unity in the regime's discourse. In the first issue of the newspaper of the National Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives, Babis Alivizatos (Deputy Governor of the Agricultural Bank of Greece, General Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture, and a close associate of Metaxas in the drawing-up of agrarian policy) claimed that, above any technological and industrial progress, there was an inextricable link between nature and humans: "In agriculture, everything is life, pulse, and motion; from the weakest grass, which, has its own biological cycle, to the peasant, who digs with his knobbly hands deep into the soil in order to unveil its treasures; from the humble farmer, who is still struggling with the plough, to the agronomist who seeks to enlighten the countryside with the force of Science" (*Αγροτικόν Μέλλον*, 26/11/1938).

Metaxist journals were also propagating the opposition to urbanism. The following abstract from *Νεολαία* (2/12/1939), the journal of EON (National Youth Organisation) is quite typical of this rhetoric:

"While prosperity was all around us... we ran after illusions. We imitated other countries that favoured industry, while we neglected our fields and hills. For many years nobody was motivated to plant a tree, which is a source of health and an obstacle against floods and natural disasters, a source of wealth and fruitfulness. Our mentality towards our fatherland led us straight to catastrophe. The peasants... left the countryside to work in the cities' factories... Subsequently, unemployment rose, while on the other hand, the land was left uncultivated and unexploited".

As state officials asserted, the urging to youth's agricultural labour "was not just a slogan aimed at the economic exploitation of the land; it was also a spiritual call". According to George Mylonas, the chief of the "Ideological Enlighten-

ment" Department of the Central Administration of EON, Metaxas's orders "provided us, townspeople, with the opportunity to get in touch with Mother Earth and its workers, by assisting them in cultivating their lands and at the same time cultivate our soul and theirs as well". Moreover, agricultural labour helped people to familiarise themselves with "the countryside, the mountains and the plains, the rivers, the forests, the sea, which all have their own history and share a special beauty; thus the love for our homeland can grow inside us" (*Νεολαία*, 7/10/1939).

The ideals of peasantist nationalism were embedded in the amalgam of the "Third Hellenic Civilization", an eclectic ideological mix advocating national regeneration through the adherence to traditional values (see the slogan "Homeland-Religion-Family") against the modern "plights" of individualism and materialism (Sarandis 2012, 47-50; 62-64). Conforming to his organic perception of the state, Metaxas' efforts aimed at ensuring capital-labor cooperation, hence social and political stability, through the institution of collective labor agreements, social insurance and welfare. Moreover, placing science and technology "in the institutional framework of organized scientific regulation", his ultimate goal was to increase national production and achieve Greece's self-sufficiency (Bogiatzis 2012). From that point of view, the dictatorship followed and expanded the path of venizelist modernisation, not only in the field of agriculture, but also in the anti-communist struggle, intensifying the "Idionymo" legislation (Beaton 2020).

In order to earn the support of the peasantry, Metaxas also promoted measures, such as the relief of its debts, part of a wider populist agenda, that is emphatically underlined in the relevant literature (Vatikiotis 2005). According to Mandatory Law 677 (1937) on the settlement of peasants' debts, all the delayed interest payments for private debts, which had arisen before 1 January 1935, were written off, while, at the same time, the main debt would be paid off in 12 annual instalments at an interest rate of 3% (Alivizatos 1938). Furthermore, Metaxas subordinated every kind of collective organization to the regime. As stated in Mandatory Law 1154, published in 28 March 1938, all the agricultural co-operatives were to

be incorporated in the newly-established National Confederation of Agricultural Co-operatives of Greece (NCACG). This confederation ought to contribute to the implementation of the policies mapped out by the Ministry of Agriculture. Some of its more crucial tasks were the overall management, organisation, direction, and representation of co-operatives, the co-ordination of their action for the improvement of production conditions, as well as the diffusion of the co-operative idea.

The regime also introduced a new type of collective organisation in the countryside. According to Mandatory Law 1481 (1938), the "Houses of the Farmer" replaced the formerly ailing agricultural chambers and fell under the NCACG in administrative and financial terms. Their main objectives had to do with the study of any agricultural, livestock, or forestry issue, the submission of expert opinions and reports, the advancement of the occupational training of farmers, as well as the improvement of living conditions in the countryside (*Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως*, 26/11/1938, issue 440, 2687-2693). The establishment of the "Houses of the Farmer" was the most important effort of the regime to apply corporatist theories to the rural space. However, the spread of this particular form of collective organisation and of the corporatist ideas in general was extremely limited in Greece, compared to other European countries. The influence of religion and the Orthodox Church as a form of collective entity, as well as the inadequate industrial development of the country are regarded as the main factors impeding the spread of corporatist ideals (Ploumidis 2014).

4 Agricultural transformations: self-sufficiency policies and technical works

Overall, the centrally planned agricultural policy of the regime aimed at "the formation of a strong, mentally balanced, morally and spiritually healthy rural class, and its confinement in the countryside" (Ploumidis 2011). These principles were in fact translated into concrete policies. Inaugurated after the crisis of 1932, the trend towards economic nationalism intensified under the dictatorial regime. As his ultimate goal was to achieve autarchy, Metaxas prioritised the growth

of agricultural production over the industrial sector, which had to be limited to the processing of agricultural goods (Metaxas, *ibid.*). The intensification of land cultivation was also "an urgent and imperative need" (Alivizatos 1938), due to the advanced fragmentation of the agrarian property, the relative scarcity of land fit for cultivation, and the rapid growth of the country's population.

The global economic crisis brought every country face to face with common problems, such as a colossal market crisis, the sharp fall in rural income, and new challenges, such as the adoption of protectionist measures and the support of national production. The Metaxas era (1936-1941) marked, in our view, the first systematic effort to turn such theories into practice. Two critical parameters illustrate the reasons behind the adoption of the discourse of self-sufficiency and the enhancement of the national productive forces by the "4th of August" regime. On the one hand, the pursuit of autarchy was thought to contribute to national regeneration and the country's economic independence. On the other, as the entanglement of Greece in a new European war seemed quite probable, Metaxas sought to prepare in case of the containment of the country's commercial relations and - by extension - the suspension of its imports.

However, the vision of a self-sufficient rural economy was in contrast with the structural deficiencies and the delayed agrarian development of the Greek countryside. In order to confront this situation, the regime employed specialised scientific and technical personnel which could contribute to the regeneration of the countryside. As Metaxas stressed at the end of 1937, the Ministry of Agriculture gave "the maximum attention to the re-organisation of the agronomic sector and makes every effort to employ an adequate number of agronomists not only in the capitals of the prefectures, but also in small municipalities and villages" (Metaxas, 1969a). In Alivizatos' (1938) view, the agronomists' work was rather a "social and national enterprise"; their mission was not confined to giving advice on cultivation and other technical issues; on the contrary, they were the agents of a "superior ethical culture", able to forge a strong bond with the agrarian population, besides contributing to the enhancement of Greek agriculture (*Δελτίου* A.T.E. 1938).

Another aspect of the regime's agrarian policies concerned the introduction of new kinds of crops and the reduction of the single-crop farming (Metaxas, 1969a). Above all, the eradication of the monoculture, as well as the replacement of fallowing with crop rotation, were registered in the general framework of the production's improvement process, the greater variety of agricultural products and the expansion of cultivated lands. Given that in regions like Thessaly, 1,000,000 stremmata (100,000 hectares), that is to say, almost 30% of total cultivated areas, remained uncultivated due to fallowing, Metaxas considered imperative the intensive work of the peasants for the maximum exploitation of the land (ibid., 141).

The pursuits of Metaxas regarding the increase of the cultivated areas seemed to have been achieved to some extent. As shown below in Table 1, they increased in 1936 and 1937, but decreased slightly in 1938. This development, however, should be registered in the context of an upward trend displayed throughout the interwar period. According to the same table, the cultivated areas doubled between 1922 and 1938. The urgency of the Asia Minor refugees' settlement should undoubtedly be related with the expansion of the cultivated lands, as well as with the intensified efforts to carry out the land improvement works, an issue to be analysed later.

Table 1: Cultivated areas in thousand hectares, country total, 1922-1938.

Year	1922	1927	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Cultivated areas	12,452.6	15,200.8	15,446.3	17,789.3	19,319.1	19,209.7	20,810.9	21,444.9	21,909.5	23,156.0	24,155.0	24,095.5
Index 1922=100	100	122.07	124.04	142.86	155.14	154.26	167.12	172.21	175.94	185.95	193.98	193.50

Source: ELSTAT, *Annual Statistics of Agricultural Production of Greece, 1922-1938*.

On the other hand, the attempt to introduce new crops had some positive results, but less than Metaxas himself desired. Table 2 reveals the relatively small changes which took place during the 1930s regarding the introduction of new crops. Wheat was the dominant crop throughout this period, while the other cereals continued to account for a significant amount of the total cultivated

lands. Following the serious drop in tobacco cultivation after the crisis of the early 1930s and the sharp fall of its exports, 1936 shows a considerable increase which, however, did not continue in the years to come. The areas used for the cultivation of animal feed, cotton and rice increased after the establishment of the dictatorship, but their proportion in the total cultivated lands remained particularly low.

Table 2: Cultivated areas of basic crops in thousand hectares, country total, 1922-1938.

Crop	1922	1927	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Wheat	4,298.6	4,989.0	5,007.8	5,795.4	6,111.3	6,069.7	6,933.4	7,918.5	8,467.6	8,358.5	8,566.5	8,617.4
Barley	1,489.8	1,883.7	1,446.0	2,172.8	2,240.3	2,169.1	2,243.4	2,130.6	2,062.8	2,066.8	2,119.9	1,954.5
Maize	1,659.8	1,970.5	2,034.9	2,211.3	2,509.3	2,655.9	2,616.3	2,396.5	2,254.3	2,586.6	2,792.1	2,800.5
Oat	692.0	1,031.6	1,023.5	1,371.3	1,404.2	1,341.6	1,381.1	1,359.4	1,321.5	1,354.7	1,454.9	1,369.6
Rice					10.6	12.6	11.5	10.4	12.9	13.1	18.1	37.0
Tobacco	320.0	923.1	1,012.2	966.7	844.6	633.8	775.8	732.6	803.2	1,106.8	953.2	841.3
Cotton	74.9	145.8	202.4	204.0	185.8	202.9	291.4	366.9	446.4	623.7	721.8	685.8
Animal feed	355.7	532.4	627.6	459.3	689.5	865.3	881.5	857.2	948.6	1,144.6	1,209.3	1,329.1
Vineyards	1,224.1	1,144.0	1,371.3	1,467.4	1,605.6	1,656.1	1,702.3	1,695.2	1,798.6	1,824.0	1,970.8	1,852.4
Current	708.3	641.9	590.1	685.6	692.0	700.1	735.5	736.0	757.6	785.3	778.5	796.9

Source: ELSTAT, *Annual Statistics of Agricultural Production of Greece, 1922-1938*.

Inextricably linked to the process of expanding the cultivated lands was the effort to improve the cultivation methods by introducing new machinery and a more systematic use of chemical fertilizers. The state officials placed particular emphasis on the need to replace the traditional wooden ploughs with modern tools, which would simplify and accelerate the farmer's work. As seen in Table 3, the 1929-1939 period shows a fall in the numbers of the wooden ploughs employed, as well as a parallel increase in the use of other machines: iron ploughs and harrows, seeding machines, petrol powered ploughs and sprinklers. This trend was certainly observed throughout the 1930s and did not confine to the years of the dictatorship.

Table 3: Agricultural Machinery, country total, 1929, 1939.

Type of machine	1929	1939
Petrol Powered Ploughs	700	1,578
Iron Ploughs	241,548	333,775
Wooden Ploughs	286,534	270,198
Iron harrows	20,321	42,700
Seeding Machines	181	9,500
Lawn Mowers	454	910
Lawn Presses	1,061	3,635
Threshing Machines	606	1,072
Combine harvesters		42
Granaries	1,562	4,800
Winnowing machines	123	5,810
Sprinklers	83,691	145,000
Maize Shelters	75	3,109

Source: Evelpidis 1944, 37.

The progress made since 1936 is better shown in Table 4, which presents the range of the value of imports of agricultural machinery from the late 1920s until the late 1930s. Following a slight decline in 1936, the Metaxas era marked a sharp rise in the imports of agricultural machines, especially ploughs and harvesters. A similar trend may also be detected in the consumption of fertilizers. As Socrates Petmezas notes, despite the fact that the quantity used per hectare was low by the European standards, a systematic utilisation of the chemical fertilizers had been observed since 1920 and especially after the mid-1930s (Petmezas 2012).

Table 4: Imports of Agricultural Machinery (value in GRD), 1913-1938.

Year	Harvesters	Threshing Machines	Ploughs	Other Machines	Total
1913				72,130	72,130
1924	348,200	130,100	121,750	6,424,315	7,024,365
1925	3,009,500	233,350	161,500	10,669,260	14,073,610
1926	5,268,850	2,757,000	2,854,600	11,715,375	22,595,825
1927	7,193,800	7,322,400	6,591,586	12,535,280	33,643,066
1928	11,548,550	18,441,925	4,411,050	21,307,735	55,709,260
1929	8,402,250	7,670,000	8,500,300	17,334,085	41,906,635
1930	4,728,400	7,094,900	11,519,750	13,988,202	37,331,252
1931	1,745,557	2,229,547	7,627,067	11,950,062	23,552,233
1932	280,130	689,620	8,356,847	8,568,937	17,895,534
1933	2,234,000	1,820,519	7,507,645	5,759,867	17,322,031
1934	734,270	7,342,392	11,038,036	14,076,505	33,191,203
1935	2,234,390	19,019,341	31,050,105	18,122,481	70,426,317
1936	3,363,849	16,871,821	30,736,127	14,149,407	65,121,204
1937	4,099,737	22,050,634	53,866,330	22,651,361	102,668,062
1938	6,916,352	15,341,630	78,920,110	34,226,776	135,404,868

Source: ELSTAT, *Statistical Yearbook of Greece*, 1930-1939.

Table 5 reveals the considerable increase in the imports of chemical fertilizers from 1936 onwards. As in the case of agricultural machinery, the period from 1929 to 1932 was characterized by a continuous decrease in the amount of fertilizers' imports. It is worth mentioning that the amount spent in 1929 was just surpassed in 1936. In this instance too, a steady increase in the value of fertilizers' imports is observed during the dictatorship years, reaching its upper interwar limit in 1938.

Table 5: Imports of Chemical Fertilizers (value in GRD), 1913-1938.

Year	Super phosphate	Other fertilizers	Potassium sulphate	Potassium chloride	Total
1913	--	518,375	--	--	518,375
1924	--	--	--	--	--
1925		69,181,603			69,181,603
1926	5,678,848	19,508,400	6,900	4,000	25,198,148
1927	21,048,585	7,465,000	26,480,050	27,500	55,021,135
1928	37,303,750	6,375,250	14,736,600	58,600	58,474,200
1929	28,482,445	4,807,700	26,582,200	250,000	60,122,345
1930	22,360,489	772,100	8,772,120	5,800	31,910,509
1931	8,390,410	54,100	17,135,570	67,950	25,648,030
1932	1,099,985	121,450	9,073,200	643,300	10,937,935
1933	--	23,464,950	16,656,800	47,700	40,169,450
1934	--	39,269,058	14,267,902	605,662	54,142,622
1935	--	40,380,589	14,827,970	3,261,700	58,470,259
1936	--	53,480,179	22,495,000	1,014,000	76,989,179
1937	--	45,688,930	33,164,200	129,600	78,982,730
1938	--	54,117,332	27,936,040	15,920	82,069,292

Source: ELSTAT, *Statistical Yearbook of Greece*, 1930-1939.

Regarding the public works promoted by the "4th of August" regime, the Mandatory Law 358 (1936) ratified the agreement for the financing, design, implementation, administration, and management of hydraulic works throughout the country. Moreover, Mandatory Law 485 (1937) "on the approval of the grants from the Agricultural Bank of Greece (ABG) for the projects in progress" boosted the accomplishment of these infrastructure works (Alivizatos 1939).

The overwhelming majority of these projects concerned the regions of Central Greece, Thessaly and mainly Macedonia (ibid., 622-623). As far as the latter is concerned, the land improvement works were highly significant for many reasons. Firstly, the plains of Macedonia were covered at about 60% by lakes, swamps, marshes and flooding. Thus, these projects would improve the sanitary conditions in the whole region, limiting the infection and death rate of malaria and tuberculosis. Secondly, as noted before, the land reclamation projects were linked to the colonization of the refugees, a high number of which settled in the rural areas of Macedonia. Finally, the borderland status of this region, combined with the large number of Slavic speakers who remained there after its annexation to Greece in 1913, illustrates the paramount impact of these works in the process of the country's national integration.⁹

The first contracts for the hydraulic works in the plains of Thessaloniki, Drama and Serres were signed in the mid-1920s, but the actual works had not yet started until the end of the decade. Consequently, the first arable lands were available only in the early 1930s. The hydraulic projects continued after August 1936, when the dictatorship initiated the maintenance and improvement of the works, the utilization of the revealed lands, as well as the improvement of the mountainous areas, assigned to the Special Fund of Hydraulic Works of Macedonia. According to our sources,

9. During the interwar years, the issue of the Slavic minority's integration into the Greek state was entangled with the nationalist fears of a revisionist Bulgaria coveting the region of Macedonia. This potential threat led to the rejection of the Politis-Kalvov protocol by the Greek Parliament in 1925. According to this protocol, the Slavophones in Greece were to be characterized as "Bulgarians". See: Ploumidis 2011, 247-250; Mavrogordatos 2017, 244-245.

15.000 hectares of land were revealed in the three aforementioned plains, flood protection projects were implemented in 8.000 hectares and irrigation works were carried out in 15.000 hectares from 1937 until 1941. Apart from these projects, aimed at the improvement of the water and soil conditions of the Macedonian plains, particular emphasis was also given to the reforestation of the mountainous areas, the improvement of mountain forests, the implementation of technical works for the fixation of the torrents' slopes, the retention of debris and the prevention of erosion (Settas 1961).

Apart from the legislative measures, the intensification of the technological modernisation of the countryside and the most efficient use of land is also illustrated by the considerable increase in the medium and long-term loans from 1936 to 1939, as seen in Table 6.¹⁰ This amount of money was intended mainly for the carrying out of irrigation, drainage, flood-prevention and drying projects.

Table 6: Total amount of medium and long-term agricultural loans in GRD, 1930-1939.

Year	Total amount of medium and long-term agricultural loans	Year	Total amount of medium and long-term agricultural loans
1930	17,175,863	1935	80,186,489
1931	35,837,944	1936	147,753,782
1932	20,857,944	1937	315,269,929
1933	26,655,762	1938	416,381,163
1934	47,684,230	1939	417,893,000

Sources: Tserpes 1938, 71; Papagaryfallou 1973, 188; ELSTAT, *Statistical Yearbook of Greece*, 1930-1939.

The outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 escalated the regime's appeals for a nationwide struggle to achieve self-sufficiency. In a warlike tone, Metaxas compared the cultivation of the land to military service; both were essential duties of the people. As the war theatre expanded into the Mediterranean during 1940, disrupting trade and food supplies, the Greek economy inescapably fell under emergency conditions. Agricultural production had to increase significantly in order to ensure the sustenance of the country's

10. According to Catherine Bregianni, the increase in the granting of loans during the Metaxas era should be interpreted in the light of the fluctuations of the exchange rates in the 1930s. (Bregianni 2007, 340-341).

of crops had to be put into production (Metaxas 1969b).

After 1939, the regime's propaganda concentrated its efforts on endorsing the "battle for national autarky", conducted with "the harrow and the plough" (*Νεολαία*, 23/9/1939). Except for naturalist tales concerning the Greek landscape, which were published systematically in its pages, the journal of EON introduced (as early as 1938) a special section entitled "Rural Life", in order to contribute to the agricultural education of the youth by giving out "valuable practical instructions" concerning fauna and flora, fruit and vegetables, gardening, cultivation methods, and stockbreeding (*ibid.*, 22/10/1938).

Following Italy's attack on Greece on 28 October 1940, Ioannis Metaxas proclaimed an "agrarian call to arms" in parallel with conscription for the Albanian Front. In his words, two battles laid ahead of the people: "the first is the battle in Albania; the second is the cultivation of the fatherland". Concerning the latter, he insisted that "we must rely mostly on our own products and import only a few". Therefore, it was the duty of the civil population to cultivate the land of the conscripts. This effort "should be systematically intensified so that no property would be abandoned". Calling upon their solidarity, he required that "those who are left behind and their families as well must help those who are leaving" (Metaxas, *ibid.*).

5 Conclusions

In conclusion, we would like to focus on two points. First, as far as the Metaxas regime's discourse regarding nature is concerned, we can ascertain that it was infused with traditionalist ideals inherent in the conservatism of the dictatorship. Nonetheless, as presented in the introduction, the "reactionary" qualities of the "ideology of the land" are no longer sufficient means of interpretation concerning the fascist attitudes towards the environment. Therefore, the aforementioned policies of the Metaxas regime should be embedded in the broader context of the "intensive environmental management", which was "at the core of fascist modernist experiments" (Saraiva 2016²).

This brings us to our second point. The pursuit of self-sufficiency, Metaxas' highest aspiration,

was essentially linked to economic prosperity and national independence. Examining the regime's policies enacted to this end, we detect not just a mere continuum, but rather a critical and qualitative peak of the interwar tendencies. Except for the early 1930s, the use of machines and fertilizers followed an upward trend throughout the interwar period. The cultivated areas were also growing at a steady rate, while the basic crops remained largely the same; the attempts to introduce new crops had a limited degree of success. Finally, the process of technical modernization of the countryside through the implementation of land reclamation works, which had begun in the mid-1920s, continued after the establishment of the dictatorship. From 1936 to 1940, the contribution of the Agricultural Bank of Greece to these works was particularly decisive, significantly increasing the medium and long-term loans, which were intended for the completion of technical projects and the improvement of the agricultural infrastructure.

After the outbreak of the Second World War, the discourse of peasantist nationalism was thoroughly militarised. The politics of national self-sufficiency aimed at securing the sustenance of the Greek population, but rural autarchy never reached its full potential. Neither did the corporatist vision of Metaxas, as the dictatorial regime inevitably collapsed after the Wehrmacht invaded and occupied Greece in April 1941. On the whole, the Greek quasi-fascist experiment was, in Mogens Pelt's (2014) terms, an "unfinished business", although it undeniably made its mark on the regulation of the human-nature relationship.

To sum up, Metaxas' "authoritarian paternalism" was common to the royal dictatorships of the Balkans. His regime consisted of "a patchwork of elements borrowed from the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany and his own idiosyncratic theories of corporatism" (Gallant 2017). The agrarian and economic policies of the regime regarding the land can be identified as an escalation and climax of their venizelist counterparts during 1928-1932 (Panagiotopoulos 2020). Above all, the convictions of its leader and his associates were strongly influenced by the authoritarian paradigm in Italy, Germany and especially from Salazar's "New State", but they were channeled accordingly to fit the idiosyncrasy of the Greek economic and

societal order, resulting in a "hybrid" political phenomenon (Kallis 2010). In any case, by the time Metaxas passed away in late January 1941, the agrarian transformation of Greece that he envisaged was far from fulfilled.

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Killing Fields: Environment, Agency, and the Fascist Conquest of Colonial Libya

Campos de Morte: Meio Ambiente, Agência, e a Conquista Fascista da Líbia Colonial

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Abstract—The article seeks to reflect on the question of "nature's agency" in histories of violence. It thus revisits the choices and outcomes of Fascist policy in Libya by foregrounding the colony's ecology. The determination to win a war on inhospitable terrain led to the regime's decision to set up concentration camps for Bedouin tribes and their herds in the desert-like and semiarid areas of Cyrenaica, which in turn had a murderous effect on humans and animals. From there, the article moves on to the second phase of Italian conquest, when the defeat of the anticolonial resistance turned into a "conquest of nature", with the agricultural reclamation of the highlands of Cyrenaica for Italian settlers. These agricultural centers and their people, which might at first sight seem bucolic and benign, were just as injurious to the Bedouin ecology predating the Italian occupation as were the concentration camps. The conclusion ponders the moral imperatives in writing histories of Fascist violence and the openings for environmental history.

Keywords—Italy; Libya; Fascism; Colonialism; Genocide.

Resumo—O artigo procura refletir sobre a questão da "agência da natureza" nas histórias de violência. Assim, revisita as escolhas e resultados da políticas fascista na Líbia, colocando em primeiro plano a ecologia da colônia. A determinação de vencer uma guerra num terreno inóspito, levou à decisão do regime de criar campos de concentração para tribos beduínas e seus rebanhos nas áreas desérticas e semiáridas da Cirenaica, que por sua vez tiveram um efeito assassino em humanos e animais. A partir daí, o artigo segue para a segunda fase da conquista italiana, quando a derrota da resistência anti-colonial se transformou numa "conquista da natureza", com a recuperação agrícola das terras altas da Cirenaica para os colonos italianos. Esses centros agrícolas e o seu povo, que à primeira vista poderiam parecer bucólicos e benignos, eram tão prejudiciais à ecologia beduína anterior à ocupação italiana quanto os campos de concentração. A conclusão pondera sobre os imperativos morais em escrever histórias de violência fascista e as aberturas para a história ambiental.

Palavras-Chave—Itália; Líbia; Fascismo; Colonialismo; Genocídio.

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1 Introduction

IN the early 1930s, the southern rim of the Mediterranean was the site of genocide.¹ The tragedy unfolded in one of Italy's colonies, along the desertic western shore of the Gulf of Sidra and the semi-arid coastal areas of northwestern Cyrenaica. By late fall 1930, Benito Mussolini's regime had forced two thirds of the civilian population of Cyrenaica, around 100,000 people - men, women, children, the elderly, most of whom lived nomadic or semi-nomadic lives - into 16 separate camps. Some of the largest camps were located on barren land with no permanent settlements nearby; many prisoners walked over 1,000 km to get to their designated camp. Upon their release in 1932 and 1933, according to official Italian sources at least 40,000 people had lost their lives, but credible estimates put the number between 50,000 and 70,000.² Moreover, nearly 90 percent of the herds perished.

The Fascist regime, and indeed its liberal predecessors, had been almost permanently at war with the anticolonial resistance in the colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica since Italy's 1911 occupation of the former Ottoman territories (Del Boca 1986 and 1988). The Fascists attributed the failure to quell the fighting in Cyrenaica to support for the guerilla war allegedly coming from the civilian population in the form of fighters, food, and tithes. To sever the link between combatants and civilian backers, the regime forced civilians into camps. Implemented under harsh environmental conditions, this policy decimated the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes of Cyrenaica, and ended the resistance.

The environment - the climate, landscape, vegetation, and animals - having for years appeared to aid the local tribes in their fight against the invader, now abandoned them. Indeed, it seemed

to side with the perpetrators, as survival in the barren confines of the camps became a daily challenge and the maintenance and care of herds impossible. Escape and hiding in the open spaces surrounding the camps was likewise impossible. How is one to write an environmental history of such an event and indeed of Fascist colonial rule in Cyrenaica in the 1930s?

This article revisits the choices and outcomes of Fascist policy in Libya by foregrounding the colony's ecology. It starts with reflections on environmental historians' use of the concept of agency in constructing an integrated history of humans and the environment. It then moves on to examining the regime's determination to win a war on inhospitable terrain, the decision to set up concentration camps for the Bedouin tribes and their herds in the desert-like and semiarid areas of Cyrenaica, which in turn had a murderous effect on humans and animals. From there, it discusses the second phase of Italian policy, the "conquest of nature", when the defeat of the anticolonial resistance was followed by the agricultural reclamation of the highlands of Cyrenaica for Italian settlers. These new settlements, which at first sight seem bucolic and benign, were just as injurious to the Bedouin ecology predating the Italian occupation as were the concentration camps. In pursuing these intersections between agriculture and atrocity under Fascist rule across the Mediterranean, the article briefly considers the parallels between the regime's interventions and the recourse to concentration camps and genocide by other European colonial powers and settler societies. In the conclusion, it asks how environmental history might rewrite the story of Italian fascist interventions in the Mediterranean. While the Italians impacted the Libyan environment in massive ways, the Libyan environment, not to mention Italian perceptions of it, determined the shape and form of Italian policy. What role then can, and should, we ascribe to "nature"?

2 Agency and the environment

In a recent special issue of the *Journal of Genocide Research*, environmental historian Tim Cole reflected on what environmental history can bring to the study of the Holocaust. Expanding the

1. The use of the term genocide is no longer controversial in relation to the treatment of the civilian population of Cyrenaica in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In his magnum opus on Italian colonialism, historian Nicola Labanca follows the description of the encampments, violence, illness, and hunger with a striking and quite uncharacteristically spare sentence - "Fu un genocidio." ("It was a genocide"). Labanca 2002, 175.

2. The number of 40,000 dead out of 100,000 deported emerged from official Italian documentation. A first article on the deportations was published in 1973 by Giorgio Rochat. On the controversy over the number of deaths see Wright 1969, 42 and Ahmida 2005, 44.

range of actors to non-humans raises, as Cole acknowledges, "ethical" questions, requiring environmental scholars to "steer a line between making the claim that nature mattered and matters, without this being mis-read as either excusing human behaviour on the part of the perpetrators, or downplaying human experience on the part of the victims" (2020, 274). A strong tradition within environmental history has long sought to establish the "impact" the environment has had on human behavior, and that might strike one as a valuable approach also in relation to genocide, but Cole asserts that "during the Holocaust, murder - and attempts to evade murder - were enacted in and through natural environments, with the natural environment playing a more active role than the language of instrumentalization or even 'impact...on conduct' would suggest" (275). Cole not only posits that the environment was exploited by perpetrators in their quest of annihilation, and at times utilized by victims to survive, but claims that the environment had a more active and independent role that needs acknowledging. Recognizing that "the environment shaped the genocide (and not only conduct during the genocide) in important ways" (275) while at the same time rejecting the notion that the environment caused genocide, Cole advocates exploring "the room between causation and instrumentalization" (276).

In mapping out the terrain of agency and impact, the existing historiography on the environment has followed two distinctive paths. Much early classic work on the environment emphasized humans' destructive impact on nature. Donald Worster's path-breaking *Dust Bowl*, for example, explored the interrelationship between environmental and socio-economic change, and above all the deleterious consequences of capitalist commodification (1979). Here, humans, and their misguided culture of environmental exploitation, are the agents who brought about ecological collapse. But alongside this emphasis on the human footprint, from the beginning environmental historiography has also sought to recover the "agency" of nature.

But is this to give nature too much credit? "Environmental historians", as John Herron put it, "endeavor to give the natural world agency,

but antelopes - and rocks and trees and bugs and rivers can't talk" (38). The problem is not just the absence of "talk", but the elusiveness of agency, intention, and responsibility outside human actors. Debates on this question within environmental history peaked in the early 2000s and found a preliminary answer in the recognition that what needed rethinking were not so much the limits of nature's agency, as that of humans (Nash 2005). Challenging the notion of the "self-contained individual confronting an external world", Linda Nash for instance advocated history-writing where nature not only "influences and constrains human *actions*" but also shapes "human *intentions*", to arrive at the ways in which human thinking and planning emerge within the natural environment and in interaction with it (67-68). In this context, Actor Network Theory offered a helpful framework for rethinking human agency by locating it within ever-changing relationships with nonhumans and by widening the scope of "actants" inside these human-non-human networks (Latour 1993).

More recently, scientific theories of the Anthropocene were underlining how massively humans have affected the planet (though also revealing nature's power to destroy humanity)³. Even if the Anthropocene itself is too undifferentiated and global a concept to guide historical analysis of the specific moments and processes that led to a new, manmade, geological age (Bonan 2018), scholars informed by scientific analysis have called for a radically altered understanding of what agency is and does, in order to capture the interrelationship of all things human and non-human (Iovino 2018). Worster himself has shifted emphasis, trying to find a new synthesis. Noting that "environmental historians have focused mainly on the human impact on nature", he has called on "historians [to] follow the natural sciences by taking the environment more seriously as a force in human life" (Worster 2010). This call is reflected also in efforts to root global histories in local particularities and produce studies "politicizing the received nature of our environment and bodies" and highlighting "the multiple viable ways of

3. This article cannot do justice to the massive literature on and influence of either ANT or Anthropocene-inspired theories of history. On the latter, a good place to start is Gosh 2017.

life" and the many ways in which environmental and human change are interrelated (Thomas 2014, 1605).

Rich and valuable though these debates have been, "the 'power problem' of environmental history" (Herron 2010, 38) has not been resolved. Already in the 1990s Elizabeth Blackmar warned that environmental history risks "letting people off the hook for the history they have wrought" (1994, 4). The moral stakes are all the higher for historians who investigate histories of mass violence - from genocide, to slavery, colonialism, and war. How should we conceptualize the environment's role when it comes to the killing, mistreatment, and exploitation of millions? Is there any mileage in moving away from "anthropocentric thinking", when studying Fascist violence, war, and genocide? To speak with Cole, what room is there between perpetrators' "instrumentalization" of nature and nature's "causation" of atrocity?

3 Italy's war against the anticolonial resistance

Well before the 1911 invasion, advocates and opponents of Italy's colonial enterprise in Libya had endorsed conflicting images of the Ottoman territories of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Colonial activists presented Libya as a lush oriental garden; opponents labeled it a "*scatolone di sabbia*", a "big sandpit". Fascist propaganda later combined these two images, the sandpit and the garden, depicting Libya as a desolate but productive land awaiting the arrival of experienced and toiling Italian farmers who, like their Roman ancestors, would turn the desert into a blooming garden (Davis 2007).

First, though, the anticolonial resistance needed to be defeated. When Mussolini was appointed prime minister in 1922, he confronted a highly unstable situation in Libya. The regime took to the challenge with unrestrained violence, embroiling itself in a protracted military conflict. By 1929, the resistance seemed defeated in Tripolitania but persisted in Cyrenaica, where the Sanusiyya, a Muslim political-religious order,

commanded the allegiance of local tribes and dominated the vast majority of the territory.⁴

To break the anticolonial resistance, the Italian forces waged an all-out war against the population by targeting the environment and its resources. The Italian forces, under Pietro Badoglio's governorship and the military command of General Rodolfo Graziani, carried out raids against civilians and their habitat. They destroyed grain stores, poisoned wells, and bombed and machine-gunned tribal camps from the air, killing people and their animals. In his memoir, Italian aviator Vincenzo Biani wrote about the air attacks in Libya: "Below, a teeming mass of people fleeing in all directions, vainly looking for shelter; the earth had transformed, in an instant, into a minefield detonated by a mysterious force, one both wild and destructive."⁵ Biani described targeting fleeing camel herds and machine-gunning them down: "Many collapsed to the ground, exposing their obese bellies and flailing their long legs in the air, the only means for them to say they were sorry to die. But nobody mourned them."⁶ Nor did the Italians refrain from using mustard gas in bombarding tribal camps and oases. In a report detailing the interrogation of a prisoner, an Italian colonel noted that the prisoner recounted that "he saw many victims of the gas attacks. Many had bodies covered in sores like those caused by bad burns ... at first their bodies were covered in large blisters, which burst after a few days, leaking a colorless fluid, and leaving behind raw flesh."⁷

The Italians forced one tribe after another to submit, starting with the less nomadic ones, who

4. The Sanusiyya was a Muslim religious and political order that took on a central role in the anticolonial resistance against the Italian invader. Founded in Mecca in 1837, it relocated several times and eventually established its headquarters in the oasis of Kufra. But in the late 1800s, it expanded from Fez to Damascus and Constantinople and into India; however, the order had arguably its greatest influence in Libya. In Cyrenaica and in the southern parts of Tripolitania, the Sanusiyya became the single most powerful political force, holding almost complete territorial sovereignty. Ali Abdullatif Ahmida has termed the Sanusiyya a "de facto state" (2005). For a different interpretation, arguing that the order positioned itself as more influential locally than it actually was, see Ryan 2018.

5. Vincenzo Biani, *Ali italiane sul deserto*, cited in Salerno 1979, 63.

6. Ibid., 64.

7. Reproduced in Salerno 1979, 69.

were more connected to the coastal towns. Not incidentally these were also the tribes that, in the words of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, the British anthropologist and expert on the Sanusiyya who in 1949 penned an influential study about the order, "lacked the forest covering of the plateau tribes and the desert wastes into which the tribes of the Sirtica could retire" (1949, 176). After submitting to the Italians, the tribes were sometimes still able to support the guerrillas. Some guerilla fighters captured by the Italians carried Italian identity cards, suggesting that they were officially registered as part of the population that had ostensibly been subdued, and as such were able to draw rations from the Italians (164). The tribes that had stopped supporting the resistance were often raided by their own fighters, making a mockery of the protection the Italians allegedly granted those who had surrendered.

In such circumstances, every Bedouin became an enemy to the Italians - or this is how the Italian leadership chose to assess the situation. In a memo to Minister of the Colonies Emilio De Bono, Governor Badoglio wrote "the population sides in every which way with the rebellion, supplying it with the means to live and fight."⁸ In describing the complicated situation the Italians faced, and alluding to the brutal methods they came to employ, the perceptive anthropologist Evans-Pritchard resorted once again to the imagery of Cyrenaica's landscape and vegetation: "In this semi-darkness of suspicion and uncertainty, this twilight of confidence, when every human being was a foe, the friend behind no less than the enemy in front, every thicket an ambush, and every crag and boss a sniper's nest, the campaign became distorted to unreality" (1949, 165).

To interrupt any support or communication between the guerrillas and the civilian population, Badoglio, in a letter to General Graziani on 20 June 1930, argued that it was necessary:

firstly, to create a broad and well-defined territorial barrier between rebelling formations and subjugated population. I am not unaware of the magnitude and gravity of such a step, which will mean the ruin of the ostensibly subjugated

*population. But now our path has been set and we must follow it to the end even if the entire population of Cyrenaica should perish. It is thus imperative to concentrate the entire subjugated population in a restricted space, in order to be able to surveil it adequately and to ensure that we are in complete control of the space between them and the rebels.*⁹

The conquerors' genocidal mindset is evident. With anything less than total victory unacceptable, the utter destruction of the enemy was not only thinkable but put into action.

A few days later, on 25 June, Graziani ordered "the complete evacuation of the Jebel with the transfer of all the populations under its first plateau, from Tolmetta to the east" (Graziani 1932, 101). The Jebel Akhdar was the most fertile area of Cyrenaica, a mountainous plateau in the northwestern part of Cyrenaica, running from Benghazi nearly 300 km east towards the city of Derna. It was covered in forests, and it was one of the few areas where agriculture was possible. It was mostly used as a herding ground by nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes, though they also engaged in seasonal sowing. The climate of the Jebel is mild and generally warm and temperate. Rain falls mostly in the winter, with relatively little rain in the summer. The average temperature in Bayda, the major city of the Jebel, is 15.3°C and the yearly rainfall is around 540 mm. The Köppen-Geiger classification categorizes the climate here as Mediterranean or dry summer climate (Csc). By contrast, the area to which the people of the Jebel were eventually evacuated was desertic.

The Italians initially concentrated the semi-nomadic and nomadic population not too far from their habitual ranges, below the first plateau of the Jebel closer to the shore - an area more eroded, drier, and less fertile than the upper planes. Reporting on this first concentration of civilians in the inhospitable periphery of the settled, administrative centers of northwestern Cyrenaica underway in early July 1930, Badoglio gleefully informed De Bono that "the entire population has been suffused with a sense of true dismay and

8. Badoglio to De Bono, 1 July 1930, reproduced in Rochat 1981, 118.

9. Reproduced in Rochat 1981, 116-117. My emphasis.

disorientation."¹⁰ Then, following decisions made in late August to further increase the distance between the tribes and the fighters, the majority of the concentrated populations were moved again in the fall and winter to the Sirtica desert between Benghazi and el-Agheila in the Gulf of Sidra in western Cyrenaica (Rochat 1981, 125).

The camp at el-Agheila (al-'Uqaylah) at the southern end of the Gulf of Sidra held 34,500 prisoners and was mostly reserved for the families and relatives of resistance fighters; the nearby camp at Marsa al Brega (Marsā al Burayqah) held 20,000 prisoners.¹¹ With an average temperature of 20.9°C (and an August average of 26.7°C) and an annual rainfall of 143 mm, the climate there is classified as hot desert (BWh).¹² The next two camps in terms of size, Soluch (Suluq) with 20,000 prisoners and Sidi Ahmed el-Magrun (El Magrun) with 13,000 prisoners were located south of Benghazi, in the semiarid regions of southwestern Cyrenaica, where the climate is classified as hot semiarid steppe (BSh) with an average annual temperature of 20.4°C and an annual rainfall of 257 mm.¹³ For the prisoners, the camps represented a drastically altered relationship to the environment and its characteristics, as they were moved from a dry Mediterranean climate to a desertic and semiarid one.

About 100,000 people, that is two thirds of the civilian population still in Cyrenaica (many had already fled the violence to Egypt), were eventually rounded up and sent to one of the 16 concentration camps in northwestern Cyrenaica and the Sirtica desert (Ahmida 2021, Ebner 2018, Ottolenghi 1997, Salerno 1979). To arrive at the camps, the populations endured long and exhausting marches and many died or were killed in transit. For the survivors, the experience was one of displacement, forced confinement, and physical and mental suffering.

10. Bagoglio to De Bono, 7 July 1930, reproduced in Rochat 1981, 121.

11. The numbers of camp prisoners are from the website "I campi fascisti. Dalle guerre in Africa alla Repubblica di Salò": http://campifascisti.it/pagina.php?id_pag=1 (last accessed 12/22/2020).

12. The climate data is for neighboring Ajdabiya which lies further inland: <https://en.climate-data.org/africa/libya/al-wahat/ajdabiya-3456/> (last accessed 12/22/2020).

13. <https://en.climate-data.org/africa/libya/benghazi/benghazi-550/> (last accessed 12/22/2020).

General Graziani did not mince words when he described the camps: "all camps were surrounded by double barbed wire; food rationed; pastures restricted and controlled; external movement limited to special permits." The tribes, he added, were subject to "measures of extreme severity, delivered without compunction or mercy, that rained down on them inexorably" (1932, 104). Noting that the tribes initially had been allowed to graze their herds freely, Graziani contended that it had been necessary to restrain such habits in order to avoid the herds falling into rebel hands. The government was ready "to act in cold blood and reduce the populations to the most wretched hunger if they do not submit once and for all to our orders" (105). Malnutrition and illness were widespread. Tribal herds were wiped out. To survive, the prisoners were forced to work for the Italians, mainly in road and railroad construction.

The camps clearly were an act of war; they were a strategy to defeat the resistance. As anthropologist Evans-Pritchard later explained, "the Italians were fighting a people, not an army, and a people can be defeated only by total imprisonment or extermination" (171).

4 The camps

The camps transformed the desert into a prison and weaponized Libya's ecology against its autochthonous population. The Libyan resistance fighters had been using their knowledge of the territory against the Italian invaders, engaging them in skirmishes and then dispersing and hiding in their natural habitat. The Italians had felt constantly at a disadvantage because of their enemies' knowledge of the terrain and their refusal to face the Italians in open battle in the Jebel Akhdar, the stronghold of the Sanusiyya. This is how Badoglio described 'Umar al-Mukhtar, the leader of the resistance, and his fighters, in a memo to De Bono: "A perfect knowledge of the territory, especially of the vast forested area and the wadis of the highland, favors them in every move. His tribesmen are people who for years have not engaged in any other profession than that of the rebel. They are by now used to this life of adventure, vagrancy, and fighting, ennobled by

the halo of heroism."¹⁴ No doubt, there is a certain romantic vision of the rebel built into Badoglio's assessment, but he correctly identified the ways in which knowledge of the topography aided the local guerilla fighters not least because the terrain made mechanized warfare impossible.

The Bedouins were in fact fighting in small bands of at most 100-300 men. Evans-Pritchard estimated that toward the end of the war the active guerrillas never numbered more than 600-700 men at any one moment (169). The bands were organized by tribes and were refurbished with men by each tribe, but they also could include men from other tribes, and even men from outside Cyrenaica who had come to fight the European infidel. The bands were small and mobile, attacking incessantly but unpredictably, and relying on surprise and speed. Again Evans-Pritchard provides a good sense of what this meant for their opponents. For the Italians, he wrote, "there were no fixed points of opposition. It was indefinite and disseminated" (171). Or, even more pointedly: "The enemy was ... protean and ubiquitous. It was like fighting mosquitoes. They have to be killed one by one and there are always a few left. Next sunset they are back again in the same numbers as before" (180). "The rebellion was like a fire creeping deceitfully over the whole of the vast territory of the Colony" (172).

After the establishment of the camps, it was the conquerors who would break the resistance by using the landscape to their advantage. From the wadis, crags, and forests of the Jebel Akhdar, the regime moved the civilians to the openness of the desert: no place to let the herds graze, no place to meet and aid the fighters, no place to hide if escape was attempted. The opening stanzas from the poem "No Illness But This Place" by Rajab Hamad Buhwaish al-Minifi, interned in the El-Agheila camp, render the hardship of displacement. Given that the poem is one of the few primary sources from the prisoners, it deserves to be quoted at length:

I have no illness but this place of Egaila,
the imprisonment of my tribe
and separation from my kin's abode.

No illness but endless grief
meager provisions
and the loss of my black red-spotted steed

Who, when strife broke, stretched her solid-flesh neck,
impossible to describe,
her peer does not exist.

I have no illness except my threadbare state
and this unbearable longing
for Aakrama, Adama and Sgaif,

And for the pastures Lafwat, best of places,
which, even when parched
bursts grass green for the herds.

I long for Aakrama and Sarrati,
I wish I were there now.
I'll be grateful to reach them alive.¹⁵

The stanzas powerfully convey the longing for a lost ecology, one where land, animals, and humans coexisted peacefully and productively.

The camps, at least in so far as we have pictorial documentation, conform to the archetype of concentration camps - well-ordered rows of bare dwellings, in this case tents, in otherwise empty, desolate land. An Italian medical doctor's description captures the attitudes that helped bring the camps into being, paradoxically inverting what was life-giving and what was deadly. Before the native population had been coerced into the camps, he wrote, their "typical tents of goat and camel wool," "hidden along the ridges of the Jebel and punctuating the cavities of the Marmarica region and the basins of the pre-desert" had been the "living caskets of an untamed people, and impediments to the expression of the most civilized peoples." But now, he claimed, the "endless lines" of the tents in the camps "align under the flaming sun of the desert, almost blueprints of future cities."¹⁶ In capturing the shift from the Jebel of ridges, cavities, and basins to the flaming sun of the desert, he hinted at future settlements in

14. Badoglio to De Bono, 1 July 1930, reproduced in Rochat 1981, 118.

15. <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/23985/Rajab-Buhwaish,-No-Illness-But-This-Place> (last accessed 12/22/2020).

16. Dr. Tedeschi from Derna quoted in Graziani 1932, 117.

this most inhospitable of environments (on which more in a moment). He managed to imply that the nomadic lives of the tribes had been somehow deathly, and that the dead zones of the tents in the camps presaged the civilization to come.




Figure 1: El Abiar concentration camp (Rodolfo Graziani, *Cirenaica pacificata*, Mondadori, 1932).

To the gaze of the perpetrator who photographed them from above, the camps presented themselves as ordered and disciplined. At the time, the aerial view was establishing itself as a new form of domination of the landscape - for reconnaissance, for terror bombing, but also as an all-knowing, all-encompassing view. But while the perpetrators were indeed free to take aerial photographs of the sites they had created, the sense of omnipresence and omniscience that such images created was an illusion. The aerial panopticon captured what was in fact a response to a reality far short of total control. Moreover, the apparently modernist operation, orderly and efficient, was anything but; the seeming orderliness of the aerial view hid extraordinary misery below.

Crossing Libya from Tunisia to Egypt in 1930, Danish traveler Knud Holmboe met a group of prisoners in an early Italian concentration camp near Sirte. "Never have I seen such poverty", he wrote. "The women had only torn rags wrapped around them, and the men looked just as bad. Starved children came running up, begging for coins" (Holmboe 1937, 87). Holmboe also described an early concentration camp near Merj, between Benghazi and Darnah, which he travelled through in late April/early May. At that point, the order of mass concentration camps had not

yet been given, but some subjugated tribes had already been relocated, concentrated, and their movements confined and controlled:

The camp was immense. It contained at least fifteen hundred tents and had a population of six to eight thousand people. It was fenced in with barbed wire, and there were guards with machine guns at every entrance... The Bedouins gathered around us. They looked incredibly ragged... Many of them seemed ill and wretched, limping along with crooked backs, or with arms and legs that were terribly deformed (191-192).

Prisoners suffered from hunger and deprivation. There was little to no sanitation or medical assistance. There were punishments and executions. Again, a few stanzas from Rajab Hamad Buhwaish al-Minifi offer a sense of the prisoners' experience:

I have no illness except the hearing of abuse
denial of pleas
and the loss of those who were once eminent.

And women laid down naked, stripped
for the least of causes
trampled and ravished, acts no words deign describe.

No illness except the saying of "Beat them"
"No pardon"
and "With the sword extract their labor",

thronged in the company of strangers,
a base living -
except for God's help, my hands' cunning stripped.

No illness but the swallowing of hardship
my imagination pining
for our horses, sheep, beasts of burden.¹⁷

As already noted, between 50,000 and 70,000 people died in the camps. The animals in their care perished in extraordinary numbers, too. The inmates were forbidden from allowing their animals to graze freely - doing so was seen as an act of passive resistance and the animals confiscated and sold. Historian Giorgio Rochat reports with some confidence that 90-95% of goat, sheep, and

17. <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/23985/Rajab-Buhwaysh,-No-Illness-But-This-Place> (last accessed 12/22/2020).

horses died and perhaps 80% of cattle and camels (1981, 161).

Italy's fight against the Sanusiyya and the people of Cyrenaica was far from the only colonial conflict against local guerrillas in the late 19th and early 20th century that saw European forces imprisoning the local population in camps. Recent scholarship has emphasized the ways in which the "imperial cloud" of the European powers included lessons about the use of camps (Forth and Kreienbaum 2016). The Italian genocide in Libya was little different from actions perpetrated by other western powers, starting with the concentration of civilians in 1896 in the Spanish war against Cuban insurgents, continuing with the forced transfer of civilians to camps by the Americans in the Philippines in 1901, of the Boers by the British in South Africa around the same time, and of Africans by the Germans in South-West Africa a few years later (Pitzer 2017). Appalling as the genocide perpetrated against the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica is, what the Italians were doing was not all that different from other, similar atrocities perpetrated by modern colonizers in similar situations of armed resistance in harsh, difficult climates and challenging topographies (Lal 2005). Though not specifically citing the examples above, Graziani noted that when he had doubts about the cruelty imposed, he remembered that other Europeans had already done the same: "...as far as colonial conquest goes", Graziani remarked, "there was nothing new to learn". (1932, 110). He furthermore referred to classical Roman examples of Caesar and Tacitus and to Machiavelli's *Prince* to justify the ruthless treatment of the "rebels".

What Graziani and other colonizers had recognized, whether explicitly or implicitly, was the interconnectedness of humans and their habitat. They understood that an effective way of defeating the rebellion was to break that link. And they generally understood the genocidal consequences of such a course of action, as Badoglio's readiness to accept the demise of "the entire population of Cyrenaica" attests. They could have chosen other solutions - they could have deescalated, negotiated, retracted - but did not do so. To emphasize that point it is worthwhile noting that not all colonial overlords were ready to go the route of uncompromising warfare against civilians. In her

global history of concentration camps, Andrea Pitzer points out that the Spanish Governor of Cuba Arsenio Martínez-Campos recognized how effectively concentration camps might contribute to defeating the Cuban insurgence in the late 1900s, but refused to employ them. After he was recalled to Spain, his replacement, Captain General Valeriano Weyler, had no such compunction (Pitzer 2017, 28-29). In Libya, five different governors fought the resistance between 1923 and 1933 but only Badoglio, and his deputy Graziani, decided to imprison the civilian population, well aware of the costs in human and animal life. It is hard to know if Graziani was fooling anyone when in a meeting with journalists in Benghazi in June 1931, he claimed that just as the Bedouins "lived before under a tent with their herds, so they live now in the new encampments".¹⁸ He further specified that the camps were not "concentration camps as such" because they did not collect people who lived in permanent settlements; rather, the undertaking was a "mere movement of nomadic populations which in the new home retain their life habits, even if circumscribed and controlled". Not only that, he concluded, in their new homes they could better take advantage of the state's economic and sanitary assistance.

The camps proved the winning strategy in Italy's war against the resistance. Weakened by the internment of civilians, the anticolonial struggle was dealt the final blow by the death of its leader 'Umar al-Mukhtar, whom the Italians seized and publicly hanged in September 1931. For a brief moment it looked as if the camps might become a permanent solution to maintaining Italian control over Cyrenaica, thereby recalling the assessment of the medical doctor who had envisioned the camps as "blueprints for future cities". In July 1932 Badoglio charted the course of action for Graziani, which among its seven points included the following: "Give every active attention to the concentration camps so that they can be maintained without difficulty and the native convinces himself, or better grows accustomed, to considering that as his permanent location. Help tie them to the land with the construction of

18. Graziani quoted in Rochat 1981, 169-170.

housing and the assignment of landholdings".¹⁹ The vision that Badoglio outlined was one of native reserves established in a different natural environment than the one to which the indigenous population was habituated, and one based on an entirely new relationship of the population to the land.

At the time of Badoglio's writing, however, some camps were already being demobilized. The continued imprisonment of the relatives of exiled sheiks who themselves had been pardoned and released was no longer tenable. Moreover, in the case of the Soluch camp, widespread contagious disease made it expedient to break up the camp once the resistance was crushed. Maintaining permanent settlements in those taxing environmental conditions was entirely unrealistic. The desert environment, which had aided the Italians in subjugating the tribes, now upended the Fascist plans, as it could not serve as a permanent reservation for the nomad population. Moreover, the camp population represented a much needed and cheap labor force for the planned Italian agricultural settlement projects in the Jebel, even though local police forces and the small Italian population of Cyrenaica was entirely against a return of the imprisoned tribes (Rochat 1981, 176). Thus, in 1932 and 1933, the population was released from the concentration camps.

Yet the violation of the people and their habitat did not end with the concentration camps. When the survivors of the camps were released, they were encouraged to disperse. They could not, however, return to the Jebel Akhdar, Cyrenaica's most fertile area, where the Italian state was about to start a colonization program for Italian peasants. The tribes were expected to live off their herds in the steppe sloping toward the desert and on the narrow, semiarid coastal belt, with restricted passageways between these two areas through the more productive lands reserved for Italian settlement.

5 From camps to villages

Much has been made of the relationship between the concentration camps and the agricultural set-

tlement program. Because Fascist violence towards Libya's native population is reminiscent of settler colonialism's exterminatory warfare in other parts of the world (Veracini 2010, Gott 2007, Wolfe 2006, Krautwurst 2003), it might seem plausible that here, too, a grab for settler land resulted in the brutal submission and dislocation of the native population. However, the dearth of settlers ready to take possession of the land and the central role of the motherland in the persecution of the native population should give us pause before making hasty conclusions about a "logic of elimination" (Wolfe 2006, 387) driving also Italian settler colonialism. In Libya, settlers were not so much the cause of war and genocide as their consequence. The concentration camps, and the ensuing genocide, were a means to break the anticolonial resistance. They were a last-ditch attempt to win a war that had been confounding the Italian army for years. Mass settlement was hardly on the cards when the decision to displace the native population was made.

Though hailed as a destination for Italy's landless peasants already before the 1911 invasion, the Italian government over the following decades had in fact made few provisions for settlers. This is as true of Italy's liberal governments as of the Fascist regime. When Mussolini visited Libya in 1926, he praised the pioneering spirit of Italian colonizers, but none of his public speeches pictured Libya as a mass destination for struggling Italians or envisaged a mass settlement program of the kind that would be implemented in the late 1930s (Pergher 2018, 50). As we will see, when the settlement program eventually was set in motion, it was a response less to the demographic needs of the motherland than to the security needs of a recalcitrant colony.

For the chief military commander Graziani, the core goal, something he insisted on repeatedly, was to secure Italian domination: "the territory's security and peacefulness" had to be "protected above all other considerations" (122). He believed Italy needed to control the territory directly, rather than via alliances with local leaders and proxies, who could not be trusted. To him, the nomadic and semi-nomadic populations of Cyrenaica constituted an "imminent danger" (122): "Rejecting every kind of discipline, accustomed to

19. Badoglio to Graziani, 29 July 1932, reproduced in Rochat 1981, 173.

roam in often immense and desertic territories, strengthened by their mobility and ease of relocation, suffused by the mystique of independence, always ready for war and looting, the nomads have always reacted against any government imposition" (120). The Bedouins were thus not given free reign even after the resistance was crushed. On the contrary, Graziani deemed it "necessary to rigorously and forever control and curb" their movements and delimit their territory, which, most importantly, should not include the one area that could support some agriculture, and thus the settlement of Italians, namely the Jebel Akhdar (122). Comparing the "the nomads' passage" to "that of a destructive swarm of locusts" (123), Graziani believed they needed to be "forever excluded" from the Jebel and confined to pre-desertic areas, "making room for the thousands and thousands of Italian peasants" (123). Rather than recognizing the nomadism of the Bedouins as a necessary adaptation to the environment they inhabited, Graziani saw them as the cause of an environment he deemed infertile and inhospitable. This line of reasoning was a recurrent trope in European thinking, as was Graziani's prejudice against nomads as a security threat. (Isenberg, Morrissey, and Warren 2019; Atkinson 2000).

To solve the security problem both in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Italian authorities came to see the settlement of large numbers of Italian landholding families as the preferred option. Already in 1928, when the resistance had been defeated in Tripolitania but not yet in Cyrenaica, the general secretary of Tripolitania, Maurizio Rava, maintained that settlement of the metropolitan population would mean "absolute security forever" (1928, 214). In 1932, when the resistance was at long last defeated also in Cyrenaica, Alessandro Lessona, then undersecretary of the Ministry for the Colonies explained in Fascism's foremost journal *Gerarchia* that "demographic colonization" would be the "means" to assert Cyrenaica's "Italianness" in the aftermath of the war against the Sanusiyya (1932, 268).

Before the Italian invasion, local arrangements of land use in Cyrenaica involved nomadic herding of livestock, dispersed sowing of seasonal crops, and gardening of small plots in oases. There were no large commercial farming enterprises. Most

of the land was held communally rather than owned privately. No doubt the Italians desired to exploit the colonies of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica from the beginning, but initially they sought to establish large estates employing native labor.²⁰ During the 1910s and 1920s, few Italians settled in Cyrenaica, and even fewer entrepreneurs invested in agriculture due to the ongoing war against the Sanusiyya. Shortly after the resistance was defeated, the Superior Colonial Council described a vast land expanse in Cyrenaica to be given to an Italian officer: "In the entire region there is no enclosed land; now and then the natives sow negligible quantities of barley. However, the raising of livestock, in particular sheep, holds the greatest importance. There is no permanent population".²¹

Though regime propaganda praised Libya as the solution to Italy's presumed overpopulation problem, agronomists recognized that the colony could not fulfill that role. Already in 1927, Armando Maugini, who in due course became one of the regime's key consultants in the colonization program, had reflected on a possible settlement plan and clarified its purpose.²² To him, Libya - and that included the yet-to-be-subjugated Cyrenaica - could not offer a meaningful outlet for Italy's landless masses; other lands would have to fulfill that purpose. The regime's task, rather, lay in securing Italian rule in North Africa. Political and military authority would not suffice to hold the colony; Italians would need to live there: "we need to populate it rapidly, put the colony on a firm footing, and hasten the conquest of the land" (Maugini 1927, 154). Maugini's hope was that the highlands of Cyrenaica would eventually provide work and prosperity for at least 100,000 Italians (148), who through their presence would safeguard Italian sovereignty. His colleague Filippo Cavazza went a step further, arguing that Italian settlers would not just secure

20. Archivio Storico Diplomatico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASDMAE), Archivio Storico Ministero Africa Italiana (ASMAI), III, Opere Pubbliche, b. 73, fascicolo (f.) Colonizzazione della Cirenaica: "La colonizzazione e la valorizzazione agraria".

21. ASDMAE, ASMAI, Consiglio Superiore Coloniale (1923-39), busta (b.) 17, seconda sezione, n. 27, 23 April 1934.

22. Maugini was an agronomist and tropicalist who starting in 1924 directed the Istituto agricolo coloniale italiano (Italian Agricultural Colonial Institute) for forty years.

but in fact transform the North African colonies of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania: "Nobody can fail to recognize how much more Italian Tripolitania will be the day that, in addition to the 50,000 natives, 100,000 industrious Italian citizens will live there" (Cavazza 1927, 78). By "counterbalancing" the indigenous population, Italian settlers would at last secure the territory for Italy (78). In a new world premised on the idea of national sovereignty, the regime believed that in the long run cementing sovereignty and quelling any type of insurgence required the presence of large numbers of Italian settlers outnumbering the native population (Pergher 2018).

It was only in 1928, when agronomists and colonial administrators started to see settlement as a way to hold on to the colony, that a new law bound concessions of public land to private entrepreneurs to the hiring and settlement of Italian families.²³ The next step in the state's commitment to fostering the immigration and settlement of Italian farmers was a 1932 decree establishing the Agency for the Colonization of Cyrenaica (*Ente per la colonizzazione della Cirenaica*, ECC), under the charge of the Commission for Migration and Internal Colonization (*Commissariato per le Migrazioni e la Colonizzazione Interna*) and the Ministry for the Colonies, and financed by various state institutions and private banks. The agency was to succeed where wealthy landowners had dragged their feet: bringing Italian families to Libya. In his speech to parliament, Mussolini anticipated great possibilities in "underpopulated" Libyan territories. Passing over in silence the role that concentration camps had played in creating that underpopulation, he described the land in glowing terms as ripe for "orderly waves of colonists" who in the "shortest time possible" were to become the "owners and citizens of what must become a new Italian region".²⁴

In 1934 the ECC extended its activity to Tripolitania. It was now renamed Agency for the Colonization of Libya (*Ente per la Colonizzazione della Libia*). In that same year, the Fascist National Social Security Administration

(*Istituto Nazionale Fascista della Previdenza Sociale*, INFPS) also took on an active role in the Libyan settlement program. The creation of the ECL and the empowerment of the INFPS marked a radical change in pace and style of land management in Libya.²⁵ The colonial government, which had previously limited its activity to acquiring government property and granting land to entrepreneurs, devised and coordinated an increasingly ambitious state-financed settlement program. After the government handed over public land at no cost to the two institutions, they carved it up and planned villages and individual family farmsteads ranging from 15 to 30 hectares in size. While the government built roads and dug wells, the ECL and INFPS financed and oversaw the construction of villages and farmsteads. Each farm was equipped with tools, furniture, animals, seeds, and food stocks. As Evan Pritchard put it, "in this smiling country of the juniper, the lentisk, and cypress began to spring up the little white Italian farms" (219). These new efforts, however, only yielded four villages of barely 300 families in Cyrenaica, of whom a considerable number requested repatriation soon after their arrival.²⁶

Then, in 1937 the state became more directly involved in financing the settlement program. In what was termed a project of "intensive demographic colonization" (*colonizzazione demografica intensiva*), the state not only provided land and infrastructure as before but also granted subsidies and favorable government loans to the ECL and the INFPS for the construction of additional villages. Thirty percent of the reclamation costs were borne by a state subsidy that was credited entirely to the settlers; the remaining seventy percent were covered by a favorable state loan. More than twenty villages were built across the coastal areas of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica and named after the "heroes" and "martyrs" of the Risorgimento and of Fascism. Each village had a center with a church,

25. On the settlement program, see Pergher 2018, Cresti 2011, Cresti 1996, Segrè 1974.

26. By the end of 1937, these early state-supported settlement programs, however, remained rather small-scale and yielded meager results, counting about 7,000 settlers dispersed in 2 villages with nearly 250 farmsteads in Tripolitania and 4 villages of just short 300 families in Cyrenaica (Cresti 2011, 149-150). On the difficulties and setbacks of the early program, see Cresti 2005.

23. Law 7 June 1928, n. 1695 and law 29 July 1928, n. 2433.

24. Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 34-36, f. 17/1/842, sottofascicolo 5: 17 November 1932.

Fascist Party building, school, and store grouped around a piazza - resembling the agricultural centers of the Agro Pontino, where Fascism had launched its most renowned internal land reclamation and resettlement program (Caprotti and Kaïka 2008, Stampacchia 2000, Folchi 2000). The farmhouses were built on the land plots assigned to each farm, dotting the landscape and quite a distance from the village centers. The setup was thus quite different from the Italian regions where many of the settlers originated, where the farmers lived in the village and often covered some distance to arrive at their fields.

With their churches and schools, the villages were planned to be inhabited by complete family units rather than individuals. The program in fact foresaw the recruitment of families with at least two adult sons able to work the farmstead.²⁷ By transporting entire families, the regime aimed to create instant, settled Italian communities. The hope was that settlers would immediately feel at home in Libya and not contemplate return migration. Rooting settlers permanently was in turn seen as crucial in meeting the authorities' prime objective of asserting Italian dominion. As the president of one of the settlement agencies explained, "the entire coastal area must be transformed into a prevalently Italian area, in which the Arabs will be reduced to an increasingly negligible minority, by withdrawing little by little toward the interior".²⁸ The project foresaw the settlement of one hundred thousand Italians in the course of just five years. The ultimate goal was the relocation of half a million Italians.

The rigid regulation of the settlers' lives was meant to strengthen their tie to the land and farmstead. Fascist policy prohibited family members from seeking employment off the farm, while also excluding all use of indigenous labor on the farm. The state was thus seeking to control family behavior and determine the division of labor within the "frontier" household. After all, the state had made a huge investment, and the settlers

had to repay what appeared to already belong to them; in fact, the farm would become their property only after 30 years of hard labor (Palloni 1945). This was a much more managed approach to settlement than most western powers who sent settlers to their borderlands had adopted in the past.²⁹ They had generally not made the family the mandatory unit of settlement, nor had they given such generous subsidies.

This tightly managed program also involved the creation of new territorial demarcations and barriers. In planning the colonization of Cyrenaica, Governor Italo Balbo followed Graziani in believing that settlement went hand in hand with a clear policy of segregation. Only the Italians would inhabit the highlands of the Jebel Akhdar, "so that not a palm of the 'Green Mountain' [would] escape us".³⁰ The Bedouin tribes were restricted to the northern and southern fringes of the fertile Jebel that had been their former heartland. As Evans-Pritchard remarked, "all that was left to them in northern Cyrenaica were the narrow coastal belt, the more rugged parts of the first terrace which would not yield to Italian methods of cultivation, and the bleak southern slopes of the plateau" (199). Circumscribed corridors across the plateau enabled the Bedouins and their herds to transit between the two areas. Thus, even after the camps were cleared, land use continued to limit the native population's freedom of movement and excluded it from what was to be Italian-dominated space. Indeed, the new arrangement threatened the Bedouins' existence. Without access to the more fertile highlands of the Jebel Akhdar, it would take only a year of drought to make survival in the two semiarid areas assigned to them untenable. As with the camps, the Italians' spatial policy was once again creating a situation in which "nature" would inevitably turn against the native population.

27. Archivio Storico Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale, Carte Colonizzazione Libica, f. 21: Report by the Office for Insurance and Unemployment, no author, n.d.

28. Archivio Storico dell'Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale, Carte della colonizzazione libica, f. 129: Meeting 30 July 1937.

29. For other settler colonial projects, see Cavanagh and Veracini 2017.

30. ASMAE, ASMAI, Gabinetto archivio segreto, b. 70, f. Colonizzazione demografica in Libia: Balbo report on the reclamation work in Cyrenaica, 4 August 1938.




Figure 2: Motorway "Litoranea libica" and D'Annunzio village (*I Ventimila. Documentario fotografico della prima migrazione di massa di coloni in Libia per il piano di colonizzazione demografica intensiva Anno XVII-1938, Tripoli 1939*).

As with the concentration camps, also here it is the aerial images that provide the most extended and dominant view of the Italian intervention on the territory. From above, the agricultural centers and farmsteads seem to indicate an orderly and coordinated use of an otherwise "virgin" territory: to the colonizer's eye the land was empty, uncultivated, and unused. The centers looked modern, well-ordered, efficient, and their white-washed walls sparkled in the North African sun. Yet once again the aerial image is an illusion. The pictures of the gleaming new settlement villages belied a fertile land that nonetheless was not suited for intensive cultivation. Tied to a fallacious interpretation of ancient Roman history, which envisioned Libya as the empire's breadbasket, regime propaganda portrayed dormant fields in need of laborious Italian migrants (Munzi 2001). But this mega project, like so many others of its kind, was built on misconceptions about the environment and the ways in which humans could thrive long-term in particular climates and terrains.

6 Conclusion

In this condensed account of Fascist actions in Libya, the environment has played a significant

role. The Fascists saw Libyan land as unproductive, and its people as poor husbands of the soil. They harnessed the desert environment to crush the resistance, and they profoundly altered the ecology of the highlands to ready them for Italian settlers. But how exactly should we assess the role of the environment in the genocide and the settlement program?

In reflecting on the transformation of Germany's waterways and landscape from the eighteenth century to the present, David Blackbourn noted that "the human domination of nature has a lot to tell us about the nature of human domination" (2006, 7). An approach that seeks to explore assertions of power through the analysis of environmental practices, policies, and discourses lends itself well for the study of Italian fascism, both in the metropole and the colonies. As environmental historians have shown, the Fascists sought to manage, manipulate, and harness nature in the interest of the nation, the race, and the economy (Armiero and Hardenberg 2013). Fascist discourses and policies in relation to nature betray the regime's megalomania, its obsession with conquest, its uncompromising attitude as well as the limitations to knowledge, understanding, and funding that often thwarted Fascist projects. Libya offers a powerful example of all this. The regime intervened forcefully and violently in the ecology of the Jebel Akhdar, removing and internmenting its inhabitants and bringing in settlers to establish an agricultural society that was supposed to embody past bucolic virtues and yet was modern in its outsized planning, employment of machinery, and utter destruction of the native environment.

Important as this kind of "impact" analysis is, it leaves agency firmly in human hands. Thinking in terms of Tim Cole's spectrum of "instrumentalization - causation", it sticks very much to the former end, laying out how the regime instrumentalized, misunderstood, and misused the environment for its own goals. Yet "nature" was never merely an instrument of policy. As this short overview of the genocide and the settlement program has shown, the environment influenced intentions, outlooks, and choices. While it did not determine Fascist policy, it constrained and shaped the options open to the regime. To use

Linda Nash's framework, Fascist thinking and planning emerged within a particular environment and in interaction with it - or perhaps we should say from within one particular environment and in interaction with another. For, the Fascists' approach was shaped as much by notions of fecundity and barrenness, of waste and exploitation that they brought with them to Libya, based on their experiences in a very different kind of environment back home. Their lack of understanding of local conditions, first and foremost the logic of a nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyle in this environment, helped to exacerbate the impact of their policies, as did their general willingness to overreach. These characteristics in turn reflected a general sense of colonial superiority, and also an inability to recognize and yield to nature's power - a modernist hubris that seems to have afflicted western countries especially in unknown and misunderstood colonial lands.

For all that, it remains fair to say that the environment was a key factor in the Italian inability to crush the resistance in Cyrenaica with traditional warfare. The difficult terrain made guerilla warfare possible and mechanized warfare and deployment of large armies impracticable. The Italians' perception that "nature" was siding with the resistance in turn dictated their actions. Graziani's ruthless strategy mobilized the environment against the resistance. In short, environmental history enables us to provide a fuller, more realistic picture of the Fascist conflict in Libya and what it meant for all human and nonhuman actants involved (Armiero 2008). Most importantly, it helps us get a clearer and more differentiated sense of the indigenous population's experience of the camps, of the transformation of their habitual grazing and sowing lands into Italian agricultural enterprises, and of their residual existence after defeat and expulsion by the Italians. Much work remains to be done in that respect. For instance, how did the decimated herds recover after the genocide? What did spatial confinement to the narrow, arid coastal belt and the pre-desertic slopes of the Jebel toward the Sahara mean for the surviving Bedouins? And given that the Italians were defeated by the Allies a mere 10 years after the beginnings of the colonization program and most settlers left the colony after the war (with

the last few expelled by Muammar al-Gaddafi in 1970), what happened to the trees the Italians had planted, the fields they had tilled, and the wells and drains they had dug? That the Italian settlements were heading for trouble was apparent already in the first few years, when drought made it difficult to farm (Biasillo and da Silva 2019, 167-168). But we need to learn more about how the ecology of the Jebel Akhdar changed following the Fascist intervention.

Aside from the important empirical work that undoubtedly needs doing, the question of how to allot "agency" remains a moral one. Can and should we see the environment as *cause* or as *agent*? In recent historiography, historians have often invoked the notion of agency in an effort to give voice to the subaltern and thus to right, ever so slightly, some of the wrongs of the past. It has thus become a moral endeavor as much as an analytical one, an effort to recover the experiences of those to whom harm was done or who have been silenced. Such usage challenges the image of the passive or powerless victim, but it does not seek to remove responsibility from the perpetrator. When we turn to the environment, however, and ask about *its* agency, that kind of usage no longer feels quite so apposite. To talk of an agentic environment surely makes sense only if we are claiming that the environment has real power and determining (or co-determining) human behavior and outcomes. But that in turn reminds us of Elizabeth Blackmar's concern from the 1990s. Do we really want to let the Fascists "off the hook for the history they have wrought" (Blackmar 1994, 4)?

If historians of Fascism have for the most part focused on the "impact" on the environment rather than the environment's "agency", then probably because this reflected the moral and political impulses of the historiography. The same decades since the 1980s which saw the discipline of history begin to discover the power of the environment over mankind, were also the ones in which historians of Fascism were most committed to demonstrating the regime's responsibility and culpability. The priority was to rebut claims that the regime was harmless or beneficial and establish beyond argument how murderous and violent it had been. Some historians focused on the regime

as such, others on the Italian people more broadly, but the shared moral impetus was to hold the Fascists accountable and *not* let them off the hook.

Environmental history is a powerful and illuminating perspective that sheds light on many facets of the Italian experience during the Fascist years. The story of Fascist "maladaptation" (Worster 2010) to the local ecology was just as much part of the story of Libyan occupation as the regime's wanton disregard for native interests and rights. But if the environment was the theater of action, it was the Fascists who wrote the murderous script, descending like "a destructive swarm of locusts", an analogy Graziani had mendaciously used in relation to the nomadic populations (123). As long as historians care about the profound moral and political questions thrown up by Fascist rule, the environment cannot and should not steal the show from the ruthless men who wreaked such havoc in it - and through it.

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Violence, Science, and Cotton in Colonial-Fascist Mozambique (1934-1974)

Violência, Ciência, e Algodão no Moçambique Colonial-Fascista (1934-1974)

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Abstract—Since the 19th century, Portuguese authorities had made unsuccessful attempts to promote cotton production in Angola and Mozambique. Under colonial fascist rule, the cotton plantations expanded significantly to meet the demands of the Portuguese textile industry. Eventually, cotton became the major agricultural export in Mozambique. This text explores the causes for this success, focusing on the rapid growth of indigenous cotton fields in northern Mozambique. In our research, we analysed contemporary "grey" cotton scientific literature, labour legislation, administration reports, agronomical thesis and the extensive collection of anthropological and social history studies carried out since the 1970s. We demonstrate that fascism created a specific model for the exploitation of humans and nature. This model involved labour mobilization based on daily physical and psychological violence and the humiliation of the indigenous people, the promotion and advancement of colonial cotton science for the industrialization of nature, and the creation of new economic institutions and rules to promote neo-mercantilist policies.

Keywords—Cotton Plantation; Colonial Science; Indigenous Agriculture - Portuguese Mozambique - Estado Novo.

Resumo—Desde o Século 19, as autoridades portuguesas tentaram, sem sucesso, promover a produção de algodão em Angola e Moçambique. Sob o domínio colonial-fascista, as plantações de algodão expandiram-se significativamente para satisfazer as necessidades da indústria têxtil portuguesa. O algodão tornou-se o maior produto de exportação agrícola em Moçambique. Este texto explora as causas deste sucesso, com foco no crescimento rápido dos campos de algodão indígenas no norte de Moçambique. Na nossa investigação, analisamos a literatura científica cinzenta contemporânea sobre o algodão, a legislação, os relatórios administrativos, as teses agronómicas e a extensa coleção de estudos antropológicos e de história social realizados desde os anos 70. Demonstramos que o fascismo criou um modelo específico para a exploração do homem e da natureza. Este modelo envolveu a mobilização laboral baseada na violência física e psicológica quotidiana e na humilhação dos povos indígenas, a promoção e o avanço da ciência do algodão colonial para a industrialização da natureza, e a criação de novas instituições económicas e regras para promover as políticas neo-mercantilistas.

Palavras-Chave—Plantação de Algodão; Ciência Colonial; Agricultura Indígena - Moçambique Português - Estado Novo.

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1 Introduction

The propaganda of the Portuguese New State combined traditionalist discourse (in that images of the region's rural and human-impacted landscapes became part of the national identity) with the historical narrative that the Portuguese nation had a divine mission to spread Catholicism in order to 'civilize' other 'inferior' peoples. However, the new political elites did not create new visions for the African colonies. In 1929, at the beginning of the Salazar's era, a set of luxurious large-format albums published in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) used photography to celebrate the new colonial world, showcasing Mozambique's 'very rich' potential for Africanist investors and adventurers (Rufino 1929). Alongside photos of the material remains of the Portuguese presence, such as churches and military fortifications, there were images of the rapid on-going transformation: new villages, geometrically-structured missions and hospitals, roads, ports, bridges and railway stations. These new monocultural landscapes were built by companies and entrepreneurs throughout territory, and the indigenous peoples who lived there soon became integral aspect of these landscapes. Rubber and tobacco plantations in Macanga (Tete), as well as coal mines in Moatize, demonstrated great entrepreneurial success. In one photo taken in Mucojo (Macomia), off the coast of Cabo Delgado, four Muslim men in the palm plantation of the Agricultural Company of Goludo help four oxen with Portuguese yokes plough the land with an iron plough. In another photo, we see indigenous palms and a local dwelling. Taken further inland, in Montepuez, is an image of the sisal monocultures of the German Hoffman's property. Moving to the central region, in Zambézia, we see the sisal baling factories of the Companhia de Moçambique, new settlements made of huts arranged in uniform lines, and camps for indigenous workers who also 'trained oxen to work', forcing them to walk in circles while attached to a pole all day. The same disciplined environment was repeated in Quelimane, on the property of M'Baza, where tobacco and corn were produced to feed the workers. In these new mono-

cultural landscapes, the indigenous people found themselves ranked alongside cattle as the essential tools of the civilizational transformation taking place. In one photo, men appear huddled as a group of slaves, thin and tired.

In the last volume, the Fauna section contains a collection of images of a white hunter and his kills. He is pictured with his rifle, showing off the horns of the pacaças (*syncerus caffer*) and the antelope (*aepyceros*), the teeth and feet of elephants (*loxodonta africana*), which were still plentiful south of the river Save, and finally, the carcasses of baboons (*Papio cynocephalus*). Sometimes we find other hunters in the background - men who had recently been conquered, and who were then reduced to being the white man's hunting assistants. Naked, they transport a dead leopard (*Panthera pardus*) tied to a stick. The message of the photographs is clear: the fauna exists to be hunted and to celebrate the dominance of the white man and his rifle over Africa.

The colonizers noticed a profound difference in their relationship with nature, compared to that of the people who lived there. For example, the hunting practices of the indigenous people were different from the mass slaughters of white hunters, because 'they were not, then, as they are not today, processes that would put the species extinction at risk' (Martinho 1934,3).¹ Thus, wild animals would face certain extinction outside the reserves 'that to a certain extent prevent their destruction on a large scale (...) proved by this inexorable law of civilization'. These hunting reserves were created in response to those large killings, as well as to the foreseeable increase in the local human population and the concurrent expansion of agriculture. This would be the only way for mammals to survive in the new era. Additionally, these reserves showed great potential for the tourism industry. In this time period, African landscapes were seen as wild, uncultivated, and lacking human labour - spaces that must be conquered and exploited. In addition, the development of many areas was dependent on scientific advances that would make it possible to combat diseases such as African trypanosomiasis

1. All quotes from the Portuguese documents were translated by the author.

(*Trypanosoma brucei*) that plagued humans and animals, especially in the northern parts of the region (Cabo Delgado and Niassa).

This Africa, now presented as the 'hunter's paradise', would inevitably be on the same evolutionary path of Europe and the Americas, as it possessed an unexplored market value. It was an immense territory to be civilized through the work of the subjugated peoples. Conservationism was inseparable from the capitalist values that would irreversibly transform the relationship of humans with their environment, creating new landscapes dominated by agricultural and forestry monocultures. In addition to the protection granted by provincial governors to large companies and white agricultural settlers in the territory, rural communities were increasingly being compulsorily mobilized to accommodate the production of cotton, rubber, rice, and other export goods dependent on the supply of cheap indigenous labour. In the last days of the Republican regime, the Ross Report for the Temporary Slavery Commission of The League of Nations denounced the level of barbarism and exploitation of men in the Portuguese colonies (Ross 1925).

How different was this new fascist regime regarding the African environment? The new political regime mobilized the military and civil society towards the colonialist ideal in the midst of rising criticism against the violent practices of Portuguese colonialism. In 1930, the military dictatorship legislated the Colonial Act in response to 'certain international currents' that 'tend to agitate or establish ideas unfavourable to the traditional dogmas of the colonial sovereignty of the metropolises, often covering up the designs of imperialism with humanitarian principles' (decree 18.570). Moreover, the new regime placed the colonies at the centre of its nationalist program, integrating the Colonial Act into the Constitution of 1933. The imperial vocation of Portugal was to be exercised through the 'possession and colonization of overseas domains' and the 'civilization of its indigenous populations'.

The institutionalization of the colonial New State set in motion a new cycle that began during the dictatorship and enabled the expansion of cotton farming by increasing the mobilization of rural communities under the supervision of a hi-

erarchy of both 'traditional' and colonial authorities. The previous plan of colonization through the progressive settlement of white farmers, who were supported by bank credits, chemical technologies, machinery, and above all, by indigenous workers living in reserves, had failed (Fortuna 1994, 103). While Portuguese historiography has highlighted corporatism as an essential feature of the new regime, the expansion of cotton production in the colonies for the metropolitan textile industry demonstrated its neo-mercantilism (Clarence-Smith 1985; Leite 1989). Until 1934, cotton production did not exceed, on average, 1,6 thousand tonnes (tt). However, by 1970 it had reached 140 tt in order to meet the growing demands of the Portuguese textile industry (Quintanilha, 1955, p. 3; Mozambique, 1976). The military dictatorship (1926-1933) initiated the expansion of cotton farming by coercing rural communities to cultivate cotton, subordinating those peoples to the role of collective 'indigenous growers' (*machambeiros*). In Mozambique, indigenous production went from around 15 tt in the late 1930s to more than 70 tt in 1942. Ten years later, it surpassed 300 tt (Quintanilha 1954, 7). By 1940, the area devoted to cotton cultivation in Mozambique had risen to about 200 thousand hectares (th), mobilizing about half a million forced cultivators - a number that would increase significantly in the following years (Quintanilha 1948, 10). During this period, cotton production in northern Mozambique surpassed that of Angola and the rest of the colony. Cotton soon became the primary indigenous crop, and would remain so until the end of the war of independence in 1974. In addition to cotton, though considerably less significant in both quantity and value, indigenous crops included copra and food crops such as peanuts, rice, cashew nuts, corn, manioc, beans and other vegetables (Beatriz 1946). In 1970, cotton covered over 350 th throughout the territory, and was being produced in the overwhelming majority by African families who worked in a system of capitalist concessions under the tutelage of the colonial state. These new cotton *crops* were created through collective physical violence, and reoriented food production from a self-sufficient model to dependence on international trade. They became a major source of poverty, malnutrition,

and hunger.




Figure 1: Cotton regions (*zonas algodoeiras*) in Mozambique under the regime of forced indigenous farming (grey areas) (Mozambique 1934).

The expansion of industrial cotton fields created environmental imbalances that manifested in insect plagues and soil erosion. Moreover, unpredictable weather was also a major risk that affected land and labour productivity, as well as the quantity and quality of the cotton. The development of scientific institutions that communicated their knowledge to indigenous farmers became an essential pillar of this colonial-fascist regime. The instructions laid out by these institutions were considered vitally important, and farmers who failed to follow them were severely punished. The creation of new administrative economic institutions and administrative prices guaranteed profits for cotton concessionaires, exporters, and industrialists; this became the third pillar of the success of the cotton industry during the Estado Novo period (Pitcher 1991, 1995). In this text we ex-

plore the three dimensions of Portuguese colonial-fascism through its cotton policies in Mozambique from 1926 to 1975: the industrial mobilization of nature, the development of cotton science, and the making of the contemporary African peasant class.

Much like coerced labour in the mining industry and large agricultural estates, the expansion of the forced cotton cultivation scheme was a collective painful experience that would constitute one of the elements that brought together different cultural identities in the anti-colonial struggle. Both during the anti-colonial war and after independence, this experience was often invoked by FRELIMO for the cause of political unity and mobilization (Mondlane 1969; Oliveira 2019). The Makonde plateau in Cabo Delgado became the one major centre of clandestine organization since the late 1950s, and was also the origin of the armed struggle that began years later, led by FRELIMO. These events marked the beginning of a new chapter of Mozambican nationalism (Mondlane 1969; Correia 2019). The 'Mueda massacre', a tragic incident that occurred on June 16, 1960, between the Portuguese authorities and the Makonde peoples subjected to forced cotton production, became the foundational myth of the modern anti-colonial struggle of the new-born Mozambican nation.

Given this context, it is not surprising that the experiences of cotton farmers in colonial Mozambique have been the focus of abundant historical research since the country's Independence. Research missions from the Center of African Studies (CEA) at the University Eduardo Mondlane led to long-lasting historiographical controversies (Adam & Gentili 1984; Adam and Dyuti 1993; Adam 1996; Cahen 2018). Using the colonial documents gathered by the Historical Archive of Mozambique and the reports of colonial inspections deposited in the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Lisbon), in-depth regional studies on this event have continued to emerge in the following decades. That research has drawn its data not only from the investigation of colonial archives, but also from the use of interviews to actively gather local memories that document the coercion, brutality, terror, racism, hunger, and even the myopia of the daily practices of colonial au-

thorities and agents. (Adam & Gentili 1984; Adam and Dyuti 1993; Adam 1996; Isaacman-1994; Isaacman & Roberts-1995; Adam-1996; Manghezi 2003). Comparative analysis of colonial cotton policies and gender perspectives has also contributed to the body of research. Anne Pitcher demonstrated the key role of the brutal methods of coercion used on women and men to explain the failure of the expansion of cotton cultivation since the liberal period, as well as the reasons for its subsequent success (Pitcher 1991; see also in 1992). Social historians and anthropologists have also documented the daily practices of indigenous resistance against forced cotton cultivation (Isaacman 1994; Isaacman & Roberts 1995). In the wake of critical reports produced in the context of the anti-colonial struggle, historians have also taken interest in the 'collaborationism' of those oppressed by colonialism. Emphasizing bottom-up approaches, they have compared 'cotton colonial regimes' and their consequences on food security and social behaviour with various other courses of action that would have impoverished the majority and caused substantial and irreversible changes on African societies and landscapes. Many of the results of these investigations carried out in Mozambique after the independence at the CEA would be disseminated internationally in the 1990s and even later (Isaacman 1994; Isaacman & Roberts 1995; Adam 1996; Manghesi 2003). In the last few decades, these narratives have tended to integrate post-colonial analysis of social and political change as a continuum of institutional violence and poverty (Jones 2002, Dinerman 2016).

On the other hand, economic historians of Portuguese colonialism have underlined the 'classical' neo-mercantilist nature of the Colonial Pact. This is illustrated by the expansion of cotton in the colonies for the metropolitan textile industry (Clarence-Smith 1985; Leite 1989; Fortuna 1993). However, the role of arbitrary daily violence was also highlighted by Carlos Fortuna (1993), who described this practice within the framework of the colony's integration into the world economy. In this context, both Leite (1989) and Fortuna (1993) analysed the role of the new institutional framework, especially the Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial (JEAC), which was created in 1938 (Portugal 1938). Fortuna calls the new

fascist era the period of 'black cotton', as opposed to the former 'white cotton' system, highlighting the capitalist settler's agricultural model that failed in the 1920s due to the fall of international prices. The value of cotton for the Mozambican and Portuguese economies was also explored, bolstered by the data accumulated in previous studies (Quintanilha 1966; Bravo 1963; Leite 1989). Joana Pereira Leite, expanding on the data provided by Alexandre Quintanilha, noted the importance of the application of scientific knowledge to indigenous agriculture during the 1940s and 1950s, which enabled the economic development of the colony under the Colonial Pact (Leite 1989, II, 229-230). More recently, Tiago Saraiva (2009, 2016) shed light on the role of scientific institutions in the Estado Novo policies, and compared them with the role of similar institutions in other fascist regimes.

This text benefits from this cumulative research in order to succinctly describe the key elements of the historical processes that led to the major civilizational and environmental change of the colonial-fascist era in Mozambique. For this purpose, we chose to focus on the expansion of cotton fields in northern Mozambique. We argue that this major change was achieved through the combination of non-liberal economic nationalism, the investment in colonial agronomic science, and the mobilization of labour through the barbaric treatment of colonized populations. We explore these three dimensions of the cotton industry that helped set in motion the irreversible trajectory towards environmental imbalances that accompanied the formation of the contemporary nation-state.

2 The origins of 'black cotton': civilizing through work

Early attempts to produce cotton in Portuguese Africa date from the time of Marquis of Pombal. However, state-sponsored and export-oriented agrarian capitalism was successful only in Brazil (mostly in Maranhão and Pernambuco) through two different models: large estates based on slavery and small unit production by white settlers (Pereira 2018). After the independence of Brazil, and during the Liberal Era, there was been a

systematic effort on behalf of the governors of Angola to increase production through various incentives for settlers, such as the guarantee of purchase, bonuses, or exemption from military service. During the US Civil War period, at a time when prices were rising, the government authorized the governors of Angola and Mozambique to award concessions of 4,5 thousand acres. At the same time, they advanced 20 *contos de réis* and exempted from taxes the importation of machinery for the production and preparation of the raw material (Pitcher, 1991). The failure to expand cotton cultivation in the regions of Luanda, southern Angola and southern Mozambique was due both to natural causes (climate, seed quality, pests, and diseases) and to difficulties in marketing that were aggravated by falling prices on world markets (Pitcher, 1991). By the middle of the 19th century, the Bantu populations in various regions of Angola and Mozambique had marginally adopted cotton production for consumption. The expansion of cotton cultivation until the military dictatorship (1926-1933) followed the settlers model based on large and medium-sized plantations that were run by Europeans and worked by Africans who had been expelled from fertile lands, recruited in reserves, and obliged to pay the hut tax. However, extensive cotton plantations required technical and scientific knowledge that was unavailable to both white farmers and to the rural communities that had to pay the hut tax (*imposto de palhota*) for this commodity. The arrival of new colonizers often meant entire communities were either forced to relocate to poorer lands or be subjected to the role of tenants (Neves 1998). By the eve of World War I indigenous agricultural production across multiple African territories had increased to meet the growing tax burden imposed by the colonizer. The goods used to pay these taxes, such as cotton, rice, or corn, then entered the commercial marketplace. Despite these efforts, by the end of the republican period, cotton production in Angola and Mozambique was still far from sufficient to meet the needs of the growing Portuguese cotton textile industry.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, attempts to introduce cotton culture in the territories of the Chartered Companhia de Moçambique were accompanied by propaganda campaigns that

promised better living conditions for rural populations. Men would be exempt from compulsory work that kept them away from home for many months and left women by themselves. However, they were subject to the surveillance and guidance of company supervisors. Unforeseen infractions, neglect, or breaks in production were punished with the *palmatória* (a wooden paddle-like instrument) or the dreaded *chamboco* (a whip made from rhinoceros hide). The offenses were often due to the fact that farmers struggled to meet the competing demands of both cotton farming as well as food production. The amounts paid to producers were subject to fluctuations in the international market, often aggravated by dishonest prices charged by the buyer. One way to compel the populations of a region to opt for cotton cultivation was to increase the hut tax in such a way that other options would become unfeasible. The result of this was often an increase in disciplinary violence, migratory escapes, malnutrition, hunger, and tensions with colonial authorities (see, for example, Neves 1998, 181; Isaacman 1985).

The colonial-fascist regime generalized these practices throughout the territory. Following the 'Belgian Model' of cotton production, the colonial administration delivered vast areas of the districts to a few concessionaires who held a monopoly on industrial preparation and local trade, while simultaneously mobilizing indigenous agriculture. The historiography on Portuguese in Mozambique has abundantly documented the worsening of the brutality towards black farmers. Despite international criticism, this practice was considered necessary for the mobilization and intensification of agricultural work. Colonial administrators believed that they were creating an African peasant class. The idea that the Bantus were peasant peoples, in the same way as Europeans or Asians, was an odd notion to the colonizers at the time. As often colonial reports remark, the Bantus had a 'primitive' itinerant agriculture, using poor tools and no animals to work, and until recently they had been hunters, warriors, and traders. The widespread and recurring representation of Bantu societies expressed in administrative documents and in works of great dissemination such as that of Rufino, was that agricultural work was performed by women, and that men, due to hunting, war,

and other activities, were reduced to vagrants who lived at the expense of women and children. This representation was used to glorify the new role of men in society and to legitimize the use of arbitrary coercion in the name of good morals, social order, and the elimination of vagrancy. The administrative authorities made it their fundamental mission to 'civilize through work', a crusade that allowed white supervisors to feel like they were making an important contribution. To that end, they had every right to 'make use of all worthy means and methods', which involved brutal physical punishments, fetters, and deportations. The creation of new activities for those men and their families became part of the universal fight against idleness (Portugal, 1953).

The intensification of compulsory work and the legitimation of the use of disciplinary physical violence was sanctioned as early as 1928 with the establishment of the Political, Civil and Criminal Statute of the Indigenous of Mozambique and Angola. This statute was accompanied by the imposition of the odious Indigenous Work Permit (*caderneta de trabalho indígena*) and the first systematic regulations on forced labour (Martinez 2008, Portugal 1928). Still, under the ministry of João Belo, the 'Belgian model' was adopted for the cotton problem, which was based on forced indigenous labour. As a result, the extension of administrative coercion was accompanied by an increase in internal migrations motivated by compulsory work (recruitment for agricultural work or mines), escape, or the search for better opportunities. Despite the violence of the legal framework established in 1926 and 1928, the authoritarian racist ideology broke with humanitarian principles in order to intensify the mobilization of the African workforce that would continue until the end of the regime. For example, in 1940 the Government Council of the Colony of Mozambique required each man to work at least six months a year in a company, and he was free to choose his boss. However, men could be released from this obligation as long as they worked at least one hectare of land, either in isolation or in the community, 'with crops indicated or recommended by the competent authorities'. Nevertheless, indigenous people would be subject to being recruited by the administrative authority to provide private

services for up to nine months each year, whenever there was a lack of 'voluntary labour' in agricultural, commercial, and industrial companies and/or a delay in payment of taxes and fees due to the colonial State (Fernandes 1941).

The formation of the peasant class subordinate to 'traditional authorities' and independent farmers was a relatively slow process. In 1957, for example, the district governor of Mozambique was pleased to refer 'the progressive abandonment of the old [indigenous] notions that prevented men from participating in agricultural work. (...) The hoe, an exclusively female attribute, passed into the hands of men'. Until then he 'only carried out the clearing and helped prepare the crop fields, [now] he starts to collaborate with women in all agricultural operations' (Portugal 1957, I, p.77). Anne Pitcher has shown how women suffered even more than men through the cotton regime, as women were often subject to rape and torture; this included the torture of their children in order to force them to work harder in the cotton fields (Pitcher 1996).




Figure 2: Map of the cotton areas under concession by major exporter firms, and the locations of processing plants in the former districts of Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, and Niassa (Bravo 1963).

The mobilization of labour required by the cotton industry competed with the needs of European-led commercial agriculture, mining, and other economic sectors. Portugal also contracted the export of black labour in the region south of the Save river with neighbouring countries (South Africa and Rhodesia), which constituted an important source of gold for the colony. The geographical zoning of mandatory crops throughout the territory was administratively managed, and eventually expanded to include the central and northern regions of the territory (former districts of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Mozambique). These areas were not subject to intense mobilization until the 1930s, due to low population density and widespread presence of the tsetse fly. Here, large companies accumulated concessions such as Sociedade Agrícola Algodoeira (SAGAL), Companhia dos Algodões de Moçambique (CAM), Companhia Agrícola e Comercial João Ferreira dos Santos, Companhia Agrícola e Comercial Lopes & Irmãos, Sena Sugar States Ltd, and Monteiro & Giro Lda (Figure 2). These companies hired agricultural technicians from metropolitan areas in order to create a public image of modernity. Between 1938 and 1961, in the former districts of Zambézia, Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, and Niassa, more than half a million producers cultivated more than 200 thousand hectares (th) each year (Bravo 1963, 135). The prices established by the colonial administration were lower than those paid in the rest of the colony and were well below the prices paid by the English in Kenya, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, or Uganda (Bravo, 1963, 185). The expansion of cotton cultivation accompanied the growing commercialization of indigenous agriculture. Thus, the supply of rice, manioc, corn, and cashew crops increased, while other food crops such as peanuts, beans, and sorghum decreased.

The mobilization of black labour structured new social relationships involving colonial authorities, gentile authorities, recruiting agents, and employers. The cotton agriculture favoured, in some contexts, the feudal leadership style of 'traditional chiefs' who imposed strict rules on labourers in their fields, and exacerbated income inequality in the village communities (Isaacman 1985; Dinnerman 2006, 93-106). The problem of

low agricultural productivity had been tackled through scientific research, technical support, and new social engineering measures. For families, the income from cotton was often insufficient to pay the hut tax or even to buy cotton fabrics. Colonial administrators introduced cassava, which altered both local diets and everyday life for the villagers. Because cassava did not require as much labour as other food crops, men had more time to work in the cotton fields. Despite these changes, malnutrition and migration escapes had become endemic.

As of 1946, the creation of cotton concentrations camps (*concentrações algodoeiras*) was underway, which involved the displacement of populations to lands considered adequate for farming. Each family would receive two hectares of land, technical assistance, and a reduction in the hated hut tax (decree 35,844 of 31 August 1946). These camps were intended to be social and agricultural projects capable of guaranteeing food security, and as such, each camp had a school, a home for the indigenous teacher, and a nursing post with a nurse, a guard, and a foreman (George 1948). After repressing the 'primitive itinerant agriculture', measures were taken to defend the soil against erosion caused by the monocultures, and efforts were made to maintain its fertility with the inclusion of food crops and land rotation. New agricultural tools of metropolitan origin were introduced slowly, and both animal and mechanical technology could be supplied, at least on paper, for the most difficult operation of deforestation in order to prepare the fields for farming.



Figure 3: New cotton concentration camp aligned along the road showing the recently deforested area, partial view. Sagal, Cabo Delgado (Santos 1968).



Figure 4: Cotton concentration camp with cotton (first week), Sagal, Cabo Delgado (Santos 1968).

The increase in the number of concentration camps depended to a large extent on the interest and commitment of the concessionary companies and local administrators to mobilize peasants who had been harassed by years of droughts, floods, and plagues, as well as physical punishment and rape by the foremen, agents, and sepoys. The concessionaires had no interest in this scheme because they realized that crop rotation would diminish cotton production, and that indigenous people were not willing to leave their homeland. The burden of environmental risks fell entirely on the farmers, who often petitioned for better pay in order to compensate for these risks. However, local traders often underestimated the quality of cotton in order to avoid paying higher prices. In 1951, in the Mogovolas district, for example, between three and four thousand people died of starvation because of plagues that destroyed cotton crops - a phenomenon that was only noticed when victims of starvation started showing up at the hospital in Nampula (Pitcher 1995, 132). For all these reasons, the percentage of people in cotton concentration camps in Mozambique remained below initial expectations.

The growing efficacy and intensification of the mobilization of black labour by the colonial administration in Cabo Delgado provoked a mass migration to Tanganyika after the 1940s. In 1955, the large Niassa district was divided into three districts, each with their own government (Mozambique, Niassa and Cabo Delgado). Therefore, the administrative network evolved and expanded to control the Northern territory and its

peoples. The white sisal producers were then allowed to persecute all indigenous people who did not cultivate cotton extensively. During this time, it was estimated that nearly one hundred thousand men from the Makonde plateau crossed the Rovuma river to work in sisal plantations where the Englishmen offered much better pay. There were also 126 thousand from the Lago (ajauas) and another 100 thousand Makuas from Cabo Delgado that had escaped (Adam 1983, 59). New legislation appeared to promote cotton indigenous agriculture, creating the *Fundo do Algodão* for their "material assistance" and allowing for the creation of 'indigenous cooperatives' under the supervision of the concessionary companies (Decree-Law 40405, November 24th, 1955), thus enabling indigenous farmers to better fulfil their obligations. The *Sociedade Algodoeira Africana Voluntária de Moçambique*, known as *Liguilanilu* (meaning 'mutual aid' in the Makonde language) was formed in 1957 in the Mueda plateau. This program became part of a social movement to improve the living standards of black farmers during the time that the 'traditional' lineage structures of society were collapsing. Each family had now four hectares (double than before) and was required to participate in major collective works such as periodic deforestation. In addition, they received seeds and other support from SAGAL, the concessionary company. In practice, the promotion of the cotton concentration camps by other means delivered the costs of labour control to the cooperative leadership (Isaacman 1982; see also Hedges *et al.* 1993, 235). However, this kind of arrangement was not the norm, and it ended with the Mueda massacre.

3 Ecological imbalances and the science of colonial cotton

Along with the expansion of cotton production came significant advancements in knowledge about cotton monoculture, namely, about plant diseases, fungi, and insect pests. Insects were soon being studied and classified according to their capacity for causing economic damage to commercial agriculture in the colony (Saraiva 1934). The newfound interest in these organisms eventually

led to the development of agronomic research programs and increased empirical knowledge. This knowledge was the impetus for new agricultural practices that required intensive indigenous labour to support economic growth. Pests and fungi were largely responsible for white farmers' abandonment of monoculture, as these farmers still had to contend with a variety of factors such as price uncertainty in international markets, the fees of exporting intermediaries, access to bank credit, and maintenance of the labour supply. In 1925 and 1926, for example, the circumscriptions of the territory of the majestic Companhia de Moçambique, Neves Ferreira, Manica, Chimoio and Govuro had been severely affected by 'red rust'. Excessive rainfall in April and the lack of nutrients in the soil were considered responsible for the spread of this disease, which affected the production of white farmers.

Red rust, a cotton disease endemic to America, had been discovered in 1904 in German East Africa and in Angola in 1915 by the agronomist Luís Sá Pereira. It reached its peak during 1920-1924 as a result of various conjunctures that had been favourable to its expansion. The disease caused the leaves to shrink and slowly become covered in red spots; eventually, the foliage would fall and the plant would weaken and die. This could result in crop losses of up to 80%, and could even wipe out the entire production. Fertilization was then considered essential on land that, in many cases, suffered from consecutive years of monoculture. Cotton was more demanding on the soil than corn, and the chartered company was now fighting to convince farmers to persevere, providing them detailed technical instructions for protecting their crops (Companhia de Moçambique 1926).

The storage of large quantities of seed led to the appearance of several types of bedbugs that infested indigenous farms (*machambas*) throughout the territory (the most frequent species being *oxycarenus hyalianipennis*). This infestation caused severe damage, because the bedbugs also attacked the capsules after opening them. Bedbugs were also prevalent in Egypt, Sudan, Nyasaland, Madagascar, Somalia and other African cotton regions, as well as in some regions of Mediterranean Europe. Researchers studied them as late as 1950, without ever finding a way to control or

eradicate them. Once the oxycarenes had infested a field, they were impossible to eradicate. Therefore, the only solution was to abandon the land and start making successive harvests to reduce the exposure time of the open capsules (Barbosa 1951, 129).



Figure 5: Cover page of the brochure Cotton Culture (in Portuguese) published by the Potassium Salt Mines of Stassfurt (Germany), 1906.

The difficulties and uncertainties regarding the viability of cotton cultivation were great. The need for intensive use of chemicals during various stages of cultivation led German chemical companies to publish brochures in Portuguese at the beginning of the century, detailing how chemicals made cotton more profitable (Figure 5). However, the problems resulting from pests and fungi would have to be solved another way. The colony resorted to the intensification of agricultural work, along with increased mobilization of African villages and constant vigilance in the execution of farming operations. In the late 1940s, an agricultural researcher evaluated the results of the forced indigenous cotton culture: thousands of hectares of forest were cut down annually for land preparation - a task left to the men who hated to do it - and tens of thousands more hectares

of fertile soil were washed away by the erosive action of rainwater. The practice of incentivizing agricultural labour through physical punishment had resulted in low productivity. The indigenous people were victims of an 'unfortunate policy' that led them 'to hate cotton culture, as it is so often the direct cause of punitive intervention by the authorities'. The apparent success of cotton cultivation had been achieved 'by forcing an excess of indigenous farmers to cultivate extensively on any type of soil without considering the cost of production' (Baptista [1949], 3). The use of chemical fertilizers was limited by the abundance of land and the null cost to the concessionaires of the widespread deforestation.



Figure 6: Burning healthy cotton plants at the end of the agricultural cycle to avoid pests - a much-hated compulsory task. Agronomic station of Cotton Institute of Mozambique, Maniquenique, Xai-Xai 1967 (South Mozambique), (Matos 1967-1969).

Of the 465 known insect species that fed on the plant, about one hundred had been identified in Mozambique at the time, of which a dozen affected production, and were responsible for the destruction of about half of annual production (Baptista [1949], 4). Among these were the Red Caterpillar (*disparopsis castanea*), the Pink Caterpillar (*pectinophora gossypiella*), the Spiny Caterpillar (*earias biplaga* and *earias insulana*) and the Winding Caterpillar (*eulia salubricola*). There was no way to protect crops against these pests except indirect and prophylactic means, that is, without the use of chemical spraying. These means required 'cotton cultivation right after the first rains and in the least amount of time', and that

cotton trees should be uprooted and burned as soon as possible after harvest (Figure 2). Only early varieties of the plant should be sown. Insects of the genus *Dysdercus* (of the *Phyrrhocoridae* family), known as Fiber Spots, were the second most important pest and had to be combated by manually collecting them from the plants. It was recommended that nearby trees such as the baobab (*adansonia digitata*) and kapok (*ceiba pentandra*) be eliminated in cotton regions, as these trees were a source of food for the insects.

Another way to combat pests was by creating or introducing new varieties of seeds. Jasside, a small Hemiptera, favoured the adoption of the U4 seed and its varieties O52 and 5143, plants that originated in Uganda and were improved in South Africa. The 'cotton improvement' program adapted to different regions was then developed. The Elegant Grasshopper (*zonocerus elegans*) was also an important pest, especially in the district of Beira and south of river Save, where it was able to destroy the new cotton fields. Children's ranches were used to collect grasshoppers that were bought by the state as a form of encouragement (Baptista [1949], 20).

During the 1930s, the expansion in cotton production had been irregular in the territories of Manica and Sofala under the administration of the chartered company. In 1933, production topped out at 714 tonnes (t), then fell in the following two years, then slowly recovered until 1937, when it peaked at more than 1000 tonnes before falling by half again. In the rest of the territory, however, production had increased successively to 8.2 thousand t., largely thanks to the expansion of farming in the northern districts. The director of agricultural services attributed this success to the increase in production among the indigenous people. The failure in commercial white agriculture was attributed to the fact that seed with good production per hectare and good quality of fibre had not yet been found, due to the region's climate 'and to some imperfections and deficiencies with which the culture is made' (Queiroz 1939, 7).

The practice of 'rational agriculture' was imperative for success. This method involved choosing appropriate land and rotating crops to prevent insect infestations and the rapid depletion of the

soil (Queiroz 1939, 8-10). These core practices were then augmented by following precise instructions for the preparation of the field, for sowing (leaving adequate space and depth between rows was vital for a good harvest), for the timing of sowing (this varied throughout the regions according to local rainfall patterns), for weeding, for the harvest (the operation that consumed the most time and human energy), and for packaging operations and transportation of the harvest. It was up to the agents of the concessionaire companies to monitor the indigenous farmers and ensure the fulfilment of all these operations. 'After the agents transmit these norms, through the *sepoys* (...), if any of the indigenous growers do not comply with them, they must report to the respective administrative authority to be punished' (Queiroz 1939, 20). Maintaining cotton production required disciplining the colonized.

Major scientific progress in the research on cotton resulted from the direct influence of the colonial-fascist State. The institutionalization of the research happened relatively late compared with the results already achieved in the English colonies and South Africa. It came after the critical results of nationalist policies designed to control and mobilize the indigenous workforce, and was due, in part, to the corporatism framework. It was only in 1938 that the *Junta de Exportação do Colonial* (JEA) was created. The JEA was an economic coordination body based in Lisbon, with agencies in Angola and Mozambique, whose mission was 'to promote the improvement of colonial cotton and to increase its production'. The Board of Directors was to include national or foreign technical personnel, thus recognizing that 'the problems of cotton production [should] be studied by competent and specialized technicians', as recommended in 1926 by the American agronomist hired by the government to assess the possibilities of cotton production in Mozambique (Quintanilha 1954). The work of the Cotton Scientific Research Centre (CICA, which included a head office in Mozambique and an agency in Angola) begun as late as 1944 amid 'tremendous difficulties in installation, recruitment of specialized personnel, acquisition and transport of material' due to the war. Its immediate objectives were 'to create varieties that give the highest yields per hectare, the

highest percentages of fibre and the best branches for the needs of our textile industry' (Quintanilha 1954).

The training of a group of technicians specialized in different areas of expertise was necessary to deal with the 'cotton problem'. This group was accompanied by the installation of a network of stations and experimental fields in Angola and Mozambique, and by collaboration with foreign research institutes. Its vast agricultural experimentation program involved identifying the most suitable regions and lands for cultivation, choosing the hardiest species and varieties of seeds, and establishing the best agricultural practices. CICA decisively contributed to the improvement of the quality of cotton and to the increase in the productivity of the land and workforce. Between 1943 and 1953, the area being cultivated in the two colonies fell from 360 th to 270 th, while production more than doubled to 130 tt. In Mozambique, the area was reduced by 20%, and demanded the labour of 270,500 indigenous people - 35% less than before - while production more than doubled. By the 1950s, colonial production had already exceeded the immediate needs of the Portuguese industry. 80% of cotton was classified as high quality (the cotton varieties Good Middling and Strict Good Middling, 'which practically do not exist in other cotton-producing countries') (Quintanilha 1954). In 1948, the cottonseed (until then without market value) had begun to be used industrially. The industrialization of fibre in the colony for internal consumption was overseen by the elites. The culture of cotton now occupied a high position in the contribution to the 'economic development of Mozambique' (Quintanilha 1966).

CICA disseminated the results of its agronomic research in specialized national and international journals. This research included information on a variety of different categories, including soil erosion, cotton seeds, phyto-economics, agronomic statistics, fungi and pests, agricultural industrialization, and more (Portugal 1948). In 1949, Mário de Carvalho presented the first systematic study of agronomic statistics based on data collected in the cotton experimentation stations of Mozambique between 1942 and 1946 to ascertain the natural factors and cultural practices that determined cotton productivity (Carvalho

1949). In 1955, the first Ecological-Agricultural Survey of Mozambique was published, which presented systematic rainfall data for the colony. This document was considered fundamental for the success of cotton plantations. This climate of empirical data and agricultural intensification caused the emergence of a movement to 'defend the Mozambican agricultural heritage, putting an end to the senseless deforestation of areas unsuitable for the agricultural exploitation of cotton' (Baptista [1949]).

4 Economic nationalism and state corporatism

Along with the mobilization of work and science, the new regime instituted a set of policies to guarantee the profits of concessionaires in cotton regions, protecting them from the production risks and price volatility of the world market. Inspired by the 'Belgian model', the 1926 legislation established the fundamental framework for cotton production, defining the principle of concession of cotton areas. That is, the companies should make 'indispensable propaganda about methods of cultivation with the collaboration of the Directorate of Agriculture', and then distribute seeds to the indigenous farmers free of charge. The companies should then buy their cotton production in the area of the concession, in order to defibrate, bale and export it (decrees no. 11,994 and 12,050, of July 28 and of August 4). Propaganda campaigns were considered fundamental and often faced competition from missionaries who tried to convince the local chiefs and the population that cotton would improve their standard of living and combat their social norms surrounding nudity (Isaacman 1985, Manghezi 2003). In other cases, local state administrators raised the value of the hut tax in such a way that there was no alternative for the communities but to cultivate cotton. Concessionaires held a monopoly on the market and were therefore able to fix prices and focus on their task of preparing raw fibre in industrial units and exporting it. However, these tactics achieved disappointing results. In the wake of the 1929 crisis, in the pre-corporatism phase, a colonial cotton export premium was created to compensate the concessionaires for falling prices. At that

time, the Cotton Development Fund was created to manage the system and was financed with a new additional tax on all cotton fabrics of foreign origin imported into Angola and Mozambique - a measure that would have grave consequences on the price of fabrics used by African women (decree 21,226 of 22 April 1932). An administrative prize was also established for production. The authorities had 'the obligation to carry out a persistent propaganda action among the indigenous' and to provide them with 'efficient technical assistance'. In practice, this legitimized all types of punishments against farmers who did not obey the technical and regulatory instructions issued by the agents of the concessionaires during the vegetative cycle of the plants until they were delivered to the market. To guarantee maximum family production capacity, it was prohibited to recruit indigenous men who lived in the areas surrounding the ginning factories. However, emigration agreements and the requirements of large agricultural operations led to the suspension of this prohibition in Mozambique (Ministerial Order of 22 August 1932). Soon, the regulations on cotton cultivation would be imposed in the vast territory of the chartered Companhia de Moçambique (portaria 7,933 of November 20th, 1934).

The regime favoured the extension and accumulation of cotton fields by the concessionaires. Each area of cultivation could now be up to 120 kilometres long (decree 20,881 of 6 February 1932), and each concessionaire often accumulated several areas in the same region. The concessions, initially awarded for 20 years, were extended for another decade in 1946 (decree 35,844, of 31 August).

Between 1926 and 1937, the production of colonial cotton almost tripled, but did not yet reach 40% of the industry's needs. Besides, the quality of this cotton was considered poor. In that year, the Cotton Trade Regulatory Commission was created, and the following year saw the formation of the Colonial Cotton Export Board (JEAC), a coordinating body whose mission was 'to promote the improvement of the quality of colonial cotton and encourage the increase of its production'. In addition, its goals were to 'supervise cotton production and trade in the colonies, especially if the purchase of cotton from the in-

indigenous people is made under the legal conditions and at the established price', and to classify the cotton and propose 'a purchase price of cotton to the indigenous peoples' (decree 28.697 of 25 May 1938). Exporters and commercial producers were obliged to register, with minimum purchase prices attributed to them on an annual basis, which were conditional on the importation of foreign cotton. The imposition of consumption of colonial cotton would lead to the creation of a Regulatory Commission and the National Guild of Raw Cotton Importers.

The 'economic dirigisme' of the colonial-fascist administration led, in the first phase, to the imposition of common procedures for cotton cultivation, such as the definition of acceptable sowing periods. These measures proved to be inadequate and inaccurate over such a vast and diverse geographic territory, and had dramatic consequences on the general population. At the end of World War II, the regime would respond with a legal text addressing the most frequent and most important criticisms made of the 'concession zone regime', namely the fact that the costs resulting from the risks of cotton production fell 'exclusively with the indigenous grower', which often caused them to initiate 'cotton cultivation in less advisable regions' and forced them to abandon food crops. It was recognized that 'the cotton culture, under the regime of zone's concessions, causes distress in the hearts of indigenous societies, causing escapes to neighbouring regions or colonies and creating labour shortages (...) The experience of the Colonial Cotton Export Board reveals, in the many cases that have been observed, the normal independence of cotton culture and the scarcity of food products' (decree 35.844, of 31 August 1946). However, for Salazar's government, the problem of hunger associated with mandatory cotton production was naturalized and relativized based on racist assumptions:

"Endemic famines among some indigenous populations on the black continent are normal and must be affiliated with the naturally indolent and fatalistic psychology of the Bantu peoples. Before Europeans arrived there, the diet of the indigenous people had been as simple as possible, since most of the food products currently used today - corn, manioc,

beans, sweet potatoes, peanuts, etc. - were introduced by the white people. With the administrative occupation of African countries, the severity of famines tends to decrease, while its frequency increases. Nevertheless, there is no shortage of people who blame cotton for the famines that are occurring, forgetting that, from one end of the continent to the other, whether or not there is cotton, and without any apparent cause, untimely and endemic famines ravage the region."

The decree of 1946 revoked the previous legislation and reaffirmed the civilizing role of cotton agriculture, binding the 'indigenous to the land' and dictating that each individual should work 'as a self-employed farmer'. Its intention to incorporate the knowledge recently acquired by the CICA, and to rationalize and bureaucratize certain procedures, namely the elimination of areas that were less conducive to cotton production, and the demarcation and promotion of areas considered most favourable. At the same time, a new system was being promoted that would change the rural landscape: the cotton concentration camps (*concentrações algodoerias or ruralatos*). This new spatial organization of the fields would allow rotations and outcrops, using working cattle and agricultural machinery provided by the concessionaire. The argument for the implementation of the camps had nothing to do with the problem of soil erosion; rather, it focused on the issue of food security, as well as the need to alleviate the problem of chronic labour shortages and to stop migratory escapes. The cotton concentration camps would allow an increase in labour productivity, ensure the 'civilization' of indigenous populations, and free labour for other activities. Thus, concessionaires were compelled 'to watch over the food products of the indigenous people', to promote 'social assistance carried out practically and effectively' and thus, 'to reduce as much as possible the extent of famines within cotton regions' (decree 35.844, of August 31, 1946). However, since the concessionaires did not wish to increase their costs, they resisted promoting cotton concentrations camps, while at the same time, rural populations resisted abandoning their lands, as they preferred to reconcile the demands of cotton production with their existing food

crops. This required farmers to subject themselves to long hours of intensive work.

Until 1954, colonial production met 90% of the metropolitan demand. In Mozambique, the mobilization of indigenous farmers decreased after 1945, dropping from 633 to 514 thousand labourers, while production increased from 74 tt to 102 tt. The productivity of the soil increased by 70% and the productivity of labour by 140%. Despite this success, there were still food supply issues that fell within the jurisdiction of the newly created Cotton Fund (*Fundo do Algodão*). This organization was permitted to subsidize farmers whose harvests had been harmed by natural causes. In practice, the Fund became a physiocratic organization that aimed to improve the sanitary and economic conditions of indigenous people through environmental, agrarian and social agency. Its contributions included water supply and sanitation improvements for the villages, small agricultural hydraulics for the conservation or drainage of water, as well as technical assistance for farmers who were not aided by concessionaires, agricultural managers or foremen. The Fund provided credit to purchase cattle, simple tools and machinery, as well as to finance construction of silos and housing (of *machambeiro* type, approved by the governor). Finally, it promoted research on 'cotton readjustment' and provided cinema for 'the education of the indigenous'. Among its staff were agronomists, a forester, a surveyor, a veterinarian, a geophysicist, agricultural technicians and agricultural practitioners, foremen, drillers and their helpers, skilled workers, etc. (Mozambique, 1956).

The 1955 legislation would maintain the fundamentals of economic organization in the following decades (Decree-Law 40405, of 24 November). The authorities were ubiquitous. Cotton culture continued to depend on authorization from the provincial governor, and its trade could only be established in places chosen by the concessionaire, with the approval of the administrative authority. In each zone, cotton could only be grown in the areas demarcated by the Cotton Export Board (JEA). The surface and the limits of each cotton area coincided with the surface and the limits of the municipalities, districts, or administrative posts. The administrative price regime was maintained both for production and sale to

the markets. Technical guidance, which was the exclusive responsibility of the Board, would follow the guidelines established by the Nature Protection Council regarding the conservation of soil and flora. The most novel feature of this system was the possibility of creating cooperatives of indigenous people who could directly sell products to concessionaires. Cooperatives came to be seen as 'a vehicle for civilization and a useful method of collaboration'.



Figure 7: Carrying cotton to sell to the concessionary at the market, Cabo Delgado, 1968. In front, the white man exhibits his bicycle - a highly sought-after item.



Figure 8: One cotton 'market' in Cabo Delgado, 1968.

Cotton cultivation was required to follow the 'plans' for each campaign, which were proposed by the concessionaires and approved by the district governor after hearing the technical body. Mandatory programs were introduced to modify indigenous farming methods and to promote their

individual and social progress. In 1961, after the Angolan revolt and increasing international criticism, the regime rehearsed one formal 'liberal' opening: cotton concession areas were extinct, and the regime of forced crops and forced work were also both formally abolished (decrees-law 45,179, of August 5, 1963 and 202/71, of May 13).

5 Cotton killing fields

The expansion of indigenous cotton fields in Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Mozambique were also dependent on the prevalence of the tsetse fly. From 1921 to 1929, several field expeditions to the territory identified the main areas affected by glossinas. Thus, the process of making land suitable for farming often required building barriers by deforesting large areas, mobilizing large quantities of men, and conducting systematic massive slaughters of wild mammals. Several official hunting campaigns were recorded since 1947 for that purpose, but illegal hunting by white men (including local authorities) was more damaging and became the major concern for conservationists (Gonçalves, 1962, Dias & Rosinha, 1971a, 1971b). Oxen, cows, and goats occupied some of the new lands, and the human occupation remained at a low density in 1960, -2,3 (Niassa), 6,9 (Cabo Delgado) and 18 (Mozambique district), or 2,2 million people in 278 thousand km². The health of the population became a major concern for the governor of this district. He promoted medical inspections of farmers and workers, prevented abuse by local administrators against the indigenous people, and protected cotton farmers' ability to self-produce food crops by not allowing their lands (*machambas*) to be more than 3 km away from the cotton fields. He also restricted the practice of forced relocation to cotton concentration camps, and he treated tribal authorities with respect. Indigenous agriculture lacked technical assistance from the companies that did not properly treat the seeds provided to farmers. Cotton was produced with primitive tools, without fertilizers or chemicals, by families that had to support all the major unproductive costs. Meanwhile, the profits of the companies were not re-invested in the colony (AHU/UM/ISAU. 1959, 159). Land ero-

sion and exhaustion were now considered major problems.

It was during this time that the Uhuru movement developed in the Makonde plateau, which eventually ended in bloodshed. On June 16, 1960, in the village of Mueda, Faustino Vanomba, Chibilite Vaduvane led thousands of mobilized peasants and proclaimed the return of the Makonde people who had been living and working in Tanganyika in the sisal plantations. These migrants had formed the Mozambican African National Union - MANU. Another association for the defence of cotton producers had been formed, the *Sociedade Voluntária Algodoeira Africana de Moçambique*. This organization was led by Lázaro Nkavandame, another emigrant in Tanganyika, who promised better cotton prices and improved production conditions. Free farms (*machambas Liguilanilu*) were created in Nacatar, Machomué, Lipelua and Nangade (Adam and Gentili 1983). On June 16, about five thousand people from the Maconde plateau came to the meeting (*banja*) with the administrator and the governor. After frustrated negotiations, the leaders were arrested. With tensions at a peak, the population, who feared for their lives, advanced in a threatening way on the governor. In the following sequence of events, the sepoys opened fire on the crowd, causing them to flee in disarray. The number of deaths and wounded is uncertain (Cahen 2018; Israel 2017; Schefer 2016, 28).

This conflict, which was rooted in environmental violence, would be mythologized in nationalist narratives. Four years later, on September 25, 1964, an attack on Chai's administrative post (70 kilometres away) signalled the beginning of the armed struggle in Mozambique against Portuguese colonialism. The liberation war had one of its centres in Cabo Delgado, and another in Niassa, in northern Mozambique. These became the first 'liberated zones'. Moving in small groups, the guerrillas presented themselves in the villages as liberators. Soon, the main cotton production and trade centres in the North would be transformed into military barracks and war zones. Statistics show that production stagnated in those regions despite the appreciable increase in prices paid to producers since the middle of 1950s.

Since late 1950s, the administrative price of

cotton paid to producers had begun to increase steadily, thus attracting new white settlers. The companies invested in machinery and equipment, and more money began to circulate in rural communities. The share of indigenous cotton started to fall at the time of the attacks against the Portuguese authorities. In 1967, the Cotton Institute promoted new white settlements, each one having one hundred hectares, as well as material and credit support. However, the status of indigenous landowners (now called 'traditional farmers') remained ambiguous under the 'customary law'.

Portuguese newcomers from metropolitan areas arrived to assist in the war efforts, and they soon experienced the harsh climate of the territory, water scarcity, physical and emotional violence, and sometimes death. The war favoured strategies based on the promotion of concentration camps. General Kauza de Arriaga promoted settlements (*aldeamentos*) and forced mass displacements to separate the populations from FRELIMO's fighters and to 'civilize' them in a hurry. Until this time, even the catholic church had difficulties establishing new missions and rescuing those known as '*indígenas*' (now called *natives*) from their fate. This created a major political conflict. Priests such as Sebastião Soares de Resende (1906-1967), the bishop of Beira, and Manuel Vieira Pinto (1923-2020), who had been in Nampula since 1967 criticized the inhumane treatment of black people. The White Priests missionaries were expelled in 1971, and others were arrested by the political police.

From April 14-18, 1973, the general consuls of the USA, UK, Brazil and Holland visited the *aldeamentos* in northern Mozambique. The tour included visits to Porto Amelia, Mocimboa da Praia, Mangade, and Montepuez in the Cabo Delgado district; Vila Cabral in Niassa; and Songo and Cabora Bassa in Tete. At the time, there were around 240 *aldeamentos* with an estimated 300,000 inhabitants in Cabo Delgado and another 120 with approximately 186,450 inhabitants in Niassa. In another war zone, Tete there were 155 *aldeamentos* with approximately 152,000 inhabitants. Hundreds of new *aldeamentos* had also recently been built in the Vila Pery, Beira, and Zambesi districts. There were also settlers' plans (*colonatos*) outside Montepuez and Vila Cabral.

In this period of rapid change, the 'dedication of some of the local Portuguese officials, particularly agricultural engineers, [was] fully comparable to that of British and French district officers in their former African territories during their comparable stage of development prior to independence' (USDF1973). All *aldeamentos* had water fountains, primary schools and first aid dispensaries, and some 'also included social centre, administrative headquarters and stores'. In the areas they controlled, guerrillas struggled to maintain the support and cooperation of the population. Almost 'all *aldeamentos* were constructed by inhabitants themselves under civil administrative supervision, although military frequently cooperated by providing transport and materials when needed' (Ross 1973). In war zones, *aldeamentos* were surrounded by barbed wire or 'had other visible defence structures'. In non-war zones, each *aldeamento* had ten-to-fifteen-armed militia on duty. This led officials to the following conclusion:

"In answer to our query whether inhabitants were happy about being resettled, Portuguese hosts answered, they aren't trying to leave. Consensus seems to be that where resettlement accomplished with adequate advance preparation and not under too much pressure, opposition to moving is minimal" (USDF 1973).

One year later, young Portuguese officers put an end to the authoritarian regime.

6 Conclusion

This text focused on the expansion of cotton fields in northern Mozambique during the Estado Novo, to illustrate the processes of major environmental and social change that were integral aspects of the building of the colonial state. The racialized social relationships that marked colonial society developed in symbiosis with the mobilization of scientific research and the new organization of the colonial-fascist state. The State authority was crucial in defining new successful neo-mercantile economic policies by setting favourable cotton prices to exporters and to the Portuguese textile industry, protecting them from the international

markets. Thus, the regime established compulsory consumption schemes for the metropolitan industry, while promoting coercive indigenous agriculture throughout its vast territory. Efficiency required the creation and mobilization of specialized technical, scientific, and new bureaucratic institutions. Thus, the creation of the new cotton landscapes depended not only on more effective control over the territories and the individuals compelled to work, using disciplinary physical punishment, but also on the investment in science and the creation of anti-liberal organizations.

*To Danilo Guimarães,
photographer that carried me as a child to Angola
and Mozambique in colonial times.*

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Book reviews poderão ser submetidas a qualquer altura. Deverão ser compostas por um máximo de 1.000 palavras e estar em conformidade com o estilo editorial da revista.

Submission Requirements

Guidelines for Submissions

Authors must submit their manuscripts online at Perspectivas' webpage. All manuscripts must be submitted in Portuguese or in English, however, manuscripts submitted in Portuguese must provide its abstract in English as well. The Journal does not provide translation services, but it may exceptionally translate abstracts at authors' request.

All articles must include an abstract not exceeding 250 words, followed by a maximum of five keywords. Articles can not exceed 8000 words in length, including footnotes, bibliographic references, tables, graphics and figures.

Book reviews do not require an abstract and must not exceed 1000 words in length.

All manuscripts should be provided in editable formats (not PDF) and must be free from jargon, biased and offensive language. Authors are responsible for ensuring that their manuscripts are in accordance to the Journal style.

Details about the author(s) and/or academic/professional affiliations must be provided only where requested during the on-line submission process as to ensure the anonymity of the submission.

Revised articles

When submitting revised articles, authors must signal directly in the text all revisions made. Authors may also send a file with a direct response to the reviewers comments, with no reference to contacts, names or institutional affiliations. This file will be sent to reviewers, hence the importance of keeping anonymity. Answers and revisions should always be as neat and detailed as possible as to avoid any misinterpretations. The revised articles and any other files should be sent to the Journal using the author's login area, and following the articles's identification provided by the Journal.

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Authors must be sure that they have permission to reproduce copyright material, prior to submitting their articles to this Journal. Authors must secure permission if they have permission to reproduce figures, tables, or any extract from the text of another source. This applies to direct reproduction as well as to any derivative reproduction.

In assigning copyright, authors retain their right to use their own material elsewhere, provided that the Journal is acknowledged as the original place of publication, and the Editorial Team is notified in writing in advance.

Further information on copyright policy please visit Perspectivas' website.

Requisitos para Submissão de Manuscritos

Orientações para Submissão de Manuscritos

Os autores devem submeter os seus manuscritos online através da página da Perspectivas em www.perspectivasjournal.com. Todos os manuscritos devem ser submetidos em português ou em inglês, no entanto, os manuscritos submetidos em português devem também fornecer uma tradução do resumo em inglês. A Revista não fornece serviços de tradução, mas poderá excepcionalmente traduzir resumos a pedido dos autores.

Todos os artigos devem incluir um resumo com no máximo 250 palavras, seguido de um máximo de cinco palavras-chave. Os artigos não podem exceder as 8000 palavras, incluindo notas de rodapé, referências bibliográficas, tabelas, gráficos e figuras.

Book Reviews não requerem um resumo e não devem exceder 1000 palavras.

Todos os manuscritos devem ser submetidos em formatos editáveis (não em PDF) e devem estar livres de jargões, linguagem tendenciosa e ofensiva. Os autores são responsáveis por garantir que os seus manuscritos estão de acordo com o estilo da revista.

Detalhes sobre o/a(s) autor(e/as) e/ou afiliações académicas/profissionais devem ser fornecidos somente quando solicitados durante o processo de submissão online, a fim de garantir o anonimato do envio.

Submissão de Manuscritos Revistos

Ao submeter manuscritos revistos, os autores devem sinalizar diretamente no texto todas as revisões feitas. Os autores podem também submeter um arquivo de resposta direta aos comentários dos revisores, sem referência a contatos, nomes ou afiliações institucionais. Este arquivo será enviado aos revisores. As respostas e as revisões devem sempre ser o mais precisas e detalhadas possível, para evitar interpretações erróneas. Os artigos revistos e quaisquer outros arquivos devem ser enviados através da plataforma da Revista.

Direitos de Autor

Os autores devem certificar-se que possuem permissão para reproduzir material protegido por direitos de autor antes de submeterem os seus manuscritos a esta Revista. Os autores devem garantir que possuem permissão para reproduzir figuras, tabelas ou extratos de texto originais de outras fontes. Isto é aplicável à reprodução direta e a qualquer reprodução indireta.

Ao atribuir direitos de autor, os autores mantêm o direito de usar seu próprio material em outras publicações, desde que a Revista seja reconhecida como a publicação original e a Equipa Editorial seja notificada por escrito com antecedência.

Mais informações sobre a política de Direitos de Autor estão disponíveis no website da Perspectivas.

GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOUR

Perspectivas Ethics and Malpractice Statement

Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science is a double-blind peer-reviewed journal. The journal is committed to guaranteeing ethics in publication and quality of articles. Conformance to standards of ethical behavior is therefore expected from Authors, Editors, Reviewers, and the Publisher.

All parties involved in publishing an article in this journal (editors, peer reviewers, authors, and publisher) must follow appropriate guidelines for ethical behavior. Editors and reviewers must maintain objectivity and confidentiality and manage potential conflicts of interest. Authors must be honest and disclose their sources and funders. More precisely, to assure high-quality publications, public trust in scientific findings, and proper credit for ideas and results, ethical standards for publication in Perspectivas- Journal of Political Science include but are not limited to the following:

Editorial Team

The Editor-in-chief is appointed by the Scientific Committee of the Research Center in Political Science (CICP). Any concerns regarding conduct of the Editor-in-chief should be directed to the Director of CICP. Editors serve at the will of the editor-in-chief, and any concerns regarding their conduct should be directed to the editor-in-chief.

Duties of the Editors

Based on the double-blind peer review of a manuscript, the Editor-in-chief and the Editorial Team are responsible for determining which manuscripts are best suited for publication.

The Editors should evaluate manuscripts on the basis of their scientific merit, without regard to race, gender, sexual orientation, religious belief, ethnic origin, citizenship, or political philosophy of the authors.

The reviews should be supported by objective and clear arguments that help the author to improve the article. The reviewers cannot in any circumstances take advantage of privileged informations or ideas obtained through peer review for personal advantage.

Policies, Procedures and Integrity

The Editor-in-chief and the Editorial Team are guided by the policies of the journal's editorial board regarding libel, copyright infringement, and plagiarism. The Editor-in-chief will continually assess the effects of journal policies on author and reviewer behaviour, revising policies as required, encouraging responsible behaviour and discouraging misconduct.

Decisions to accept or reject a manuscript for publication are based on importance, originality, clarity, and the study's validity and relevance to the journal's Editorial Statement. *Perspectivas- Journal of Political Science* will never consider an author's race, gender, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, ethnic origin, citizenship, or political philosophy.

Identifying information will be removed from submitted manuscripts so that reviewers cannot access any information about authors, and vice versa. Reviewer comments to the editors are strictly confidential, and reviewer comments to authors will be made anonymous. The names of the reviewers will be known only to the Editor-in-chief, Editors, and Editorial staff and will remain strictly confidential to authors and other reviewers. The names of the authors will be known only to the Editor-in-chief, Editors, and Editorial staff and will remain strictly confidential to reviewers.

The Editor-in-chief, editors, and any editorial staff will not disclose any information about a submitted manuscript to anyone other than the authors, reviewers, potential reviewers, other editorial advisers, and the publisher.

Conflict of Interests and Errors in Published Works

To ensure accountability and transparency, the Editor-in-chief will establish systems for managing conflicts of interest for him - or herself, staff, authors, reviewers, and editorial team members.

It is the editor-in-chief's responsibility to promptly investigate accusations of errors in published work and to ensure that corrections and retractions are published in an accurate and timely manner.

Duties of Reviewers

The reviewers should respect the confidentiality of the revision process. The reviews should be supported by objective and clear arguments that help the author to improve manuscripts. The reviewers cannot in any circumstances take advantage of privileged information or ideas obtained through peer review for personal advantage.

Private information or ideas obtained through double-blind peer review must be kept confidential and not used for personal advantage. Manuscripts received for review must be treated as confidential documents. Information contained in a submitted manuscript must not be shown to or discussed with others without written permission of the Editor-in-chief or Editors.

Reviews shall contain no personal criticism of authors. Reviewers should clearly express their views with supporting arguments, and reviews should be conducted objectively and constructively.

Reviewers should identify relevant published work that has not been cited by the authors. If a reviewer finds any substantial similarity or overlap between the submitted manuscript and any other published works, the Editor-in-chief or Editors must be notified promptly. Editors will refer to policies and procedures regarding plagiarism to identify and react to accusations of plagiarism.

If a reviewer discovers a conflict of interest with an assigned manuscript (resulting from competitive, collaborative, or other relationships or connections with any of the authors, companies, or

institutions) the Editor-in-chief or Editors must be notified promptly to be excused from the review process.

Any reviewer who feels unqualified to review an assigned manuscript or unable to provide a prompt review should notify the Editor-in-chief or Editors to be excused from the review process.

Duties of Authors

Authors of manuscripts of original research should present an accurate account of the work performed as well as an objective discussion of its significance. Underlying data should be represented accurately in the manuscript. A manuscript should contain sufficient detail and references to permit others to replicate the work. Fraudulent or knowingly inaccurate statements constitute unethical behaviour and are unacceptable.

Peer review is the foundation of the journal publication process. By submitting a manuscript, an author agrees to be an active and responsive participant in by responding timely and appropriately to reviewer comments.

Authors may be asked to provide the raw data in connection with a manuscript for editorial review, should be prepared to provide access to such data, and should retain such data for a reasonable time after publication.

It is essential that editors and reviewers be told by the authors when any portion of a manuscript is based heavily on previous work, even if this work has been written by one or more of the authors. It is the responsibility of the author not only to cite the previous work, including his or her own, but to provide an indication of the extent to which a manuscript depends on this work. The editor-in-chief will refer to policies and procedures regarding plagiarism to identify and react to accusations of plagiarism.

Proper acknowledgment of the work of others must always be given. Authors should cite publications that have been influential in determining the nature of the reported work.

Inclusion of citations in a submitted manuscript with the primary purpose of increasing the number of citations to a given author's work or to articles published in a particular journal constitutes unethical behaviour.

Falsifying or fabricating numerical or experimental data or results in a submitted manuscript constitutes unethical behaviour.

Authorship must be limited to those who have made a significant contribution to the conception, design, execution, or interpretation of the reported study. All those who have made significant contributions should be listed as co-authors. Where there are others who have participated in certain substantive aspects of the research project, they should be acknowledged or listed as contributors.

It is the author's responsibility to promptly notify the editor-in-chief or associate editor if a significant error or inaccuracy is discovered in a published work so that the journal can retract or correct the paper as quickly as possible.

An author should not publish manuscripts describing essentially the same research in more than one journal or primary publication. If authors have used their own previously published work, or work that is currently under review, as the basis for a submitted manuscript, they are required to cite the previous work and indicate how their submitted manuscript offers novel contributions beyond those of the previous work. Submitting the same manuscript to more than one journal concurrently constitutes unethical behaviour. Redundant publications involve the inappropriate division of study

outcomes into several articles. Manuscripts that are found to have been published elsewhere, to be under review elsewhere, or to have been published or submitted with undisclosed redundant data will be subject to the procedures and penalties.

Corresponding Author

The name, address, and valid email address of the corresponding author must be provided. The corresponding author is the author responsible for communicating with the journal for publication. The corresponding author is responsible for ensuring that all appropriate co-authors and no inappropriate co-authors are included on the manuscript and that all co-authors have seen and approved the final version of the manuscript and have agreed to its submission for publication.

Funding Sources

Funding sources for the research reported in the manuscript should be duly acknowledged. It is the responsibility of the authors to follow any publishing mandates outlined by their funding organizations.

All sources of financial support for the project or any substantive conflict of interest that might be interpreted to influence the results must be disclosed.

Sanctions

In the event of documented violations of any of these ethical guidelines, the editor-in-chief of the *Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science* (acting independently or in consultation with the *Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science* Editorial Team) may:

1. Immediately reject the infringing manuscript.
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5. In cases where the violations of the ethical guidelines are deemed particularly outrageous, *Perspectivas – Journal of Political Science* reserves the right to impose additional sanctions.

ORIENTAÇÕES PARA COMPORTAMENTO ÉTICO

Declaração de Ética e de Más-práticas da Perspectivas

Perspectivas, Journal of Political Science é uma revista científica de revisão anónima por pares. A revista Perspectivas assume o compromisso de garantir ética na publicação e qualidade dos artigos. Portanto, espera-se que os autores, editores, revisores e o editor cumpram os padrões de comportamento ético.

Todas as partes envolvidas na publicação de um artigo nesta revista (editores, revisores, autores) devem seguir as orientações de comportamento ético. Editores e revisores devem manter objetividade e confidencialidade e gerir possíveis conflitos de interesse. Os autores devem ser íntegros e divulgar as suas fontes e financiadores. Mais precisamente, para garantir publicações de alta qualidade, confiança do público nas descobertas científicas e assegurar que o devido crédito é atribuído aos titulares das ideias e resultados científicos, os padrões éticos para publicação na Perspectivas- Journal of Political Science incluem, mas não se limitam ao seguinte:

Equipa Editorial

O Editor-in-Chief é nomeado pelo Conselho Científico do Centro de Investigação em Ciência Política (CICP). Quaisquer preocupações relativas à conduta do Editor-in-Chief devem ser encaminhadas ao Diretor do CICP. Os Editores seguem as indicações do Editor-in-Chief, e quaisquer preocupações relativas à conduta dos Editores devem ser direcionadas ao Editor-in-chief.

Obrigações dos Editores

Com base nas revisões anónimas por pares, o Editor-in-Chief e a Equipa Editorial são responsáveis por determinar quais os manuscritos são os mais adequados para publicação.

Os Editores devem avaliar os manuscritos com base em seu mérito científico, sem considerar raça, género, orientação sexual, crença religiosa, origem étnica, cidadania ou filosofia política dos autores.

As revisões devem ser apoiadas por argumentos objetivos e claros que apoiam o autor a melhorar o artigo. Os revisores não podem, em circunstância alguma, tirar proveito de informações ou ideias privilegiadas obtidas por meio de revisão por pares para obter vantagens pessoais.

Políticas, Procedimentos e Integridade

O Editor-in-Chief e a Equipe Editorial são orientados pelas políticas do Editorial Board da revista sobre difamação, violação de direitos de autor e plágio. O Editor-in-Chief avaliará continuamente os efeitos das políticas da revista no comportamento dos autores e revisores, revendo as políticas conforme necessário, incentivando o comportamento responsável e desencorajando a má conduta.

As decisões de aceitar ou rejeitar um manuscrito para publicação são baseadas na importância, originalidade, clareza e validade e relevância do estudo para a Revista. *Perspectivas- Journal of Political Science* nunca considerará a raça, gênero, orientação sexual, crenças religiosas, origem étnica, cidadania ou filosofia política de um autor.

As informações de identificação serão removidas dos manuscritos para que os revisores não tenham acesso a qualquer informação sobre os autores e vice-versa. Os comentários dos revisores aos editores são estritamente confidenciais, e os comentários dos revisores aos autores serão anônimos. Os nomes dos revisores serão conhecidos apenas pelo Editor-in-Chief, Editores e Equipe Editorial e permanecerão estritamente confidenciais para os autores e outros revisores. Os nomes dos autores serão conhecidos apenas pelo Redator, Editor-in-Chief, Editores e Equipe editorial e permanecerão estritamente confidenciais para os revisores.

O Editor-in-Chief, os Editores e a Equipe Editorial não divulgarão qualquer informação sobre um manuscrito para além dos autores, revisores, potenciais revisores, outros consultores editoriais e o redator.

Conflito de Interesses e Erros em Trabalhos Publicados

Para garantir responsabilidade e transparência, o Editor-in-Chief estabelecerá meios para gerir conflitos de interesse para o próprio, para o staff, autores, revisores e membros da Equipe Editorial.

É da responsabilidade do Editor-in-Chief investigar imediatamente as acusações de erros no trabalho publicado e garantir que as correções e retratações sejam publicadas de maneira precisa e oportuna.

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Os revisores devem respeitar a confidencialidade do processo de revisão. As revisões devem ser baseadas em argumentos objetivos e claros que ajudam o autor a melhorar os manuscritos. Os revisores não podem, em circunstância alguma, tirar proveito das informações privilegiadas ou das ideias obtidas por meio da revisão por pares para obter vantagens pessoais.

Informações ou ideias particulares obtidas por meio da revisão por pares devem ser mantidas em sigilo e não usadas para vantagem pessoal. Os manuscritos recebidos para revisão devem ser tratados como documentos confidenciais. As informações contidas num manuscrito enviado não devem ser mostradas ou discutidas com outras pessoas sem a permissão por escrito do Editor-in-Chief ou dos Editores.

As revisões não devem conter críticas pessoais aos autores. Os revisores devem expressar claramente suas opiniões com argumentos de apoio, e as revisões devem ser conduzidas de forma objetiva e construtiva.

Os revisores devem identificar trabalhos publicados relevantes que não tenham sido citados pelos autores. Se um revisor encontrar alguma semelhança ou sobreposição substancial entre o manuscrito

enviado e quaisquer outros trabalhos publicados, o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores deverão ser notificados imediatamente. Os Editores irão basear-se nas políticas e procedimentos previstos para situações de plágio para identificar e reagir às acusações de plágio.

Se um revisor descobrir um conflito de interesses num manuscrito (resultante de relações ou conexões competitivas, colaborativas ou outras com qualquer um dos autores, empresas ou instituições), deverão notificar de imediato o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores para serem dispensados do processo de revisão.

Qualquer revisor que não se sinta qualificado para rever um manuscrito ou incapaz de fornecer uma revisão imediata deve notificar o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores para serem dispensados do processo de revisão.

Obrigações dos Autores

Os autores de manuscritos de investigações originais devem apresentar um relato preciso do trabalho realizado, assim como uma discussão objetiva de seu significado. Os dados subjacentes devem ser apresentados com precisão no manuscrito. Um manuscrito deve conter detalhes e referências suficientes para permitir que outros possam replicar o trabalho. Declarações fraudulentas ou conscientemente imprecisas constituem comportamento anti-ético e são inaceitáveis.

A revisão por pares é a base do processo de publicação da revista. Ao enviar um manuscrito, o autor concorda ser um participante ativo e responsivo, respondendo oportuna e adequadamente aos comentários dos revisores.

Os autores podem ser solicitados a fornecer os dados brutos em conexão com um manuscrito para revisão editorial, devem estar preparados para fornecer acesso a esses dados e devem retê-los por um tempo razoável após a publicação.

É essencial que os Editores e revisores sejam informados pelos autores quando qualquer parte de um manuscrito se baseia fortemente em trabalhos anteriores, mesmo que este trabalho tenha sido escrito por um ou mais autores. É da responsabilidade do autor não apenas citar o trabalho anterior, incluindo o seu, mas fornecer uma indicação da extensão em que um manuscrito depende desse trabalho. O Editor-in-Chief fará referência a políticas e procedimentos relativos ao plágio para identificar e reagir às acusações de plágio.

O reconhecimento adequado do trabalho de outros deve sempre ser atribuído. Os autores devem citar publicações que influenciaram na determinação da natureza do trabalho relatado.

A inclusão de citações num manuscrito enviado com o objetivo principal de aumentar o número de citações no trabalho de um determinado autor ou em artigos publicados numa determinada revista constitui um comportamento anti-ético.

A falsificação ou fabricação de dados ou resultados numéricos ou experimentais num manuscrito enviado constitui um comportamento anti-ético.

A autoria deve ser limitada àqueles que fizeram uma contribuição significativa para a concepção, design, execução ou interpretação do estudo relatado. Todos aqueles que fizeram contribuições significativas devem ser integrados como coautores. Quando existirem terceiros que tenham participado em certos aspetos substantivos do projeto de investigação, deverão ser reconhecidos ou integrados como colaboradores.

É da responsabilidade do autor notificar imediatamente o Editor-in-Chief ou os Editores se um erro significativo ou imprecisão for descoberto num trabalho publicado, para que a revista possa retrain ou corrigir o trabalho com a maior brevidade possível.

Um autor não deve publicar manuscritos que descrevam essencialmente a mesma investigação em mais de uma revista ou a publicação principal. Se os autores tiverem usado seu próprio trabalho publicado anteriormente, ou trabalho atualmente em revisão, como base para um manuscrito enviado, deverão citar o trabalho anterior e indicar como o manuscrito enviado oferece novas contribuições para além das do trabalho anterior. Submeter o mesmo manuscrito a mais de uma revista constitui simultaneamente um comportamento anti-ético. Publicações redundantes envolvem a divisão inadequada dos resultados do estudo em vários artigos. Os manuscritos que foram publicados em outros lugares, que se encontram em revisão em outros lugares ou que foram publicados ou enviados com dados redundantes não divulgados estarão sujeitos aos procedimentos e sanções.

Autor Correspondente

O nome e o endereço de email válido do autor correspondente são dados a ser fornecidos. O autor correspondente é o autor responsável pela comunicação com a revista para publicação. O autor correspondente é responsável por garantir que todos os coautores sejam incluídos no manuscrito e que todos os coautores tenham visto e aprovado a versão final do manuscrito e concordado com sua submissão para publicação.

Fontes de Financiamento

As fontes de financiamento da investigação do manuscrito devem ser devidamente reconhecidas. É da responsabilidade dos autores seguir quaisquer obrigações de publicação descritos pelas suas entidades financiadoras.

Todas as fontes de apoio financeiro ao projeto ou qualquer conflito de interesses substantivo que possa ser interpretado para influenciar os resultados devem ser divulgadas.

Sanções

No caso de serem encontradas violações documentadas de qualquer uma das orientações éticas, o Editor-in-Chief da Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science (agindo de forma independente ou em conjunto com a Equipa Editorial da Perspectivas - Journal of Political Science) pode:

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