On the electoral punishment/rewarding of the incumbent Can voters do it?
Sobre a punição/recompensa eleitoral do incumbente: Podem os eleitores fazê-lo?
The article analyzes the possibility of voters penalizing or rewarding the incumbent (economic) performance at the polls. For this, it is considered that voters have limited rationality. This does not prevent them from performing this task without bias, which should serve as an obligation to use the elections to eectively penalize or reward the incumbent and/or not elect those who do not deserve it.
O artigo analisa a possibilidade de os eleitores penalizarem, ou recompensarem, nas urnas, o desempenho (económico) do governo. Para tal, considera-se que os eleitores dispõem de racionalidade limitada. Tal não os impede de desempenharem aquela tarefa sem enviesamento, o que deveria servir de obrigação de utilização das eleições para, efectivamente, penalizar, ou recompensar, o governo e/ou não elegerem quem não o merece.
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